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While Trump Makes Deals, Europe Watches

While the United States and much of the world was focused on the fallout from the Epstein files, the second phase of the Gaza peace plan began. If the current Trump administration manages to deliver a breakthrough in the Middle East, it would be by far the president’s most significant achievement on the world stage so far. Talk of a Nobel Peace Prize for Trump may have died down, but his own desire for it remains obvious, as shown by his angry messages to the Norwegian prime minister, mistakenly accusing Norway of withholding the prize, which is awarded by an independent committee rather than the state.


This raises a broader question: how can a president whose domestic approach to politics has been so aggressively uncompromising, deploying federal agencies and troops into Democrat‑majority cities, be considered for the world’s most prestigious peace award? And even if such gestures were merely symbolic, why would Europeans or other allies feel compelled to flatter him? The answer lies in the fact that, since the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, Trump has been developing a foreign‑policy approach that goes beyond simple isolationism. His “Board of Peace,” ambitious even if initially unsuccessful, represents an attempt to reshape the international order on his own terms. The idea is straightforward: secure peace agreements in global hotspots such as Gaza, the Caucasus, and Ukraine, thereby reducing America’s direct burdens while still allowing Washington to shape outcomes. This serves two purposes. It frees the United States to focus on domestic challenges and on Latin America, its traditional “front yard.” And it provides the president with visible foreign‑policy victories that bolster his standing at home and abroad.


Trump’s approach is harder to categorise than the liberal internationalism of Bill Clinton or the neoconservative interventionism of George W. Bush. As the leading figure of the “new right,” he may be constructing a model of international politics that his ideological allies hope to emulate. He summed up his worldview bluntly in a 2017 interview with David Muir: “The world is an angry place.” There is little reason to believe he did not mean this as a guiding principle for U.S. foreign policy.


Europe, however, has struggled to interpret this approach. At the Munich Security Forum, some European leaders expressed relief that Marco Rubio was representing the United States, even before he spoke. Yet Rubio’s message ultimately echoed the scorching ideological critique delivered by JD Vance a year earlier. Rubio then followed Munich with visits to Bratislava and Budapest, two bastions of Trumpism in Europe and centres of anti‑EU and pro‑Russian sentiment. Trump and his allies have repeatedly criticised Europe for failing to take responsibility for its own defence, often linking this to immigration and social policy as if the two were inherently connected. The underlying idea, that moral weakness produces structural weakness, is a core far‑right narrative.


Europe’s real weaknesses make this critique more potent. The EU does need reform on issues beyond defence, from competitiveness to immigration. But if European leaders are not careful, they may soon confront a peace in Ukraine that favours Russia, and Europe may not only be blamed for it but also be expected to pay for the consequences. The apparent success of Trump’s “the world is a bad place” approach stands in stark contrast to Europe’s inaction. It risks emboldening politicians who share his bleak, nation‑state‑focused outlook: Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, France’s National Rally, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland. Perhaps it is time for Europe to abandon transatlantic cooperation it cannot agree with and return to the pragmatism the EU was once supposed to excel at.


Although even some of Trump’s close allies have reportedly expressed concern about his emotional state, it is probably time to stop psychoanalysing the president and start reacting seriously to what he and his administration are actually saying. Taking responsibility cannot wait until after a breakthrough in Ukraine or another U.S. election. Trying to placate Trump with Nobel nominations or elegant dinners will not work. Washington has made clear it has no intention of engaging militarily in peacekeeping efforts following any potential peace deal in Ukraine. Similarly, implementation of the Gaza peace plan currently falls to regional actors such as Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, a sign that Trump wants international cooperation, but strictly on his own terms.


Where does this leave Europe? Notably, it was completely absent from the Gaza peace negotiations. It largely followed the expected line by supporting Israel, offering symbolic recognition of Palestinian statehood, and providing humanitarian aid. As a result, Europe now faces the consequences: a weakened reputation as a partner in the Middle East, a diminished global image, and growing disillusionment at home. In the future, Europe must negotiate global conflicts from a position of strength vis‑à‑vis Moscow, Washington, and its own publics. That requires stronger leadership in European capitals and a coordinated European approach to security.




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