Estonia and Latvia Must Reckon with the Reality of Russian Non-Citizens

A recent trip to the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia impressed on me an increasingly prescient political issue requiring ever more European attention: the status of non-citizen Russians in the Baltics. As of 2024, in Estonia 61,000 people have ‘undetermined citizenship’. In Latvia, 175,000 people have noncitizen status, making up 9% of the population. These murky categories exist as a result of a desire to protect independence and cultural heritage after the Baltic states regained independence in the 1990s, but create uncomfortable realities of societal exclusion and isolation.

In Estonia, 19% of ethnic Russians hold the ‘undetermined citizenship’ status, and ethnic Russians comprise 80% of the total non-citizen population. In Latvia, 24.5% of the ethnic Russian minority are non-citizens, accounting for 26% of the total ethnic Russian population. Only ethnic Belarusians make up a higher proportion of non-citizens. The third Baltic state, Lithuania, does not have non-citizens due to a 1989 citizenship law that effectively gave most people residing in the republic the opportunity to become Lithuanian citizens. Much of the ethnic Russian population dates back to the period of occupation by the USSR from 1940-1991, when many ethnic Russians migrated for work. Before 1940, some ethnic Russian populations have also lived primarily along the eastern frontier of the Baltic States, owing to geographical proximity and Imperial Russian presence. 

In practice, non-citizen status looks similar in Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia, people of undetermined citizenship are not allowed to vote in national elections, and cannot form political parties, stand as a candidate, or work in many public-sector jobs such as the police force. In Latvia, non-citizens have no voting rights at all. This stems from fears that ethnic Russians would support pro-Russian governments, undoing the independence which has been so intensely fought for. In addition, education and the Russian language have become highly politicised issues. Recent laws enacted to phase out Russian language education in both states have received criticism from the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In 2012, a Latvian referendum vote to recognise Russian as an official language was rejected, with around three-quarters of participating citizens voting against recognition. More broadly, language proficiency requirements have been a barrier for employment, with high unemployment rates amongst Russian-speaking populations, such as in Estonia’s Ida-Viru county. It is understandable why many ethnic Russians in the Baltics feel excluded from the society they contribute to, with access to political representation so highly restricted and the Russian language itself so taboo. Additionally, suspicion is often cast on the political allegiances of ethnic Russians, despite many communities overwhelmingly expressing support for Ukraine after the Russian invasion. 

In response to criticism of its noncitizen policies, the Latvian government has argued that noncitizens are not stateless persons, since the amount of the rights guaranteed to non-citizens is considerably larger than the rights given to stateless persons. Latvian and Estonian officials have both described non-citizenship as a choice, with Diāna Eglīte, press secretary of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, stating “30+ years is a sufficient time to choose to become a citizen of Latvia and to acquire all the rights that the citizenship provides, including the right to vote.” Though laws in 2016 and 2019 have made it easier for children to become citizens in Estonia and Latvia respectively, naturalisation in these states is still viewed as more restrictive than in other developed democracies, discouraging integration. Regardless, UNHCR figures include non-citizens in the end-2022 figures for statelessness in the Baltic and Nordic countries. 

Continuous provocation from Moscow is unlikely to calm tensions. Just last month, stray drones from Ukraine caused minor incidents in the three Baltic states, resulting in Russian accusations of collaboration that the Latvian government demanded be retracted. But discrimination and exclusion from public life for Russian minorities is likely to exacerbate division in Baltic societies, at a politically precarious time. It would be unwise to forget Putin’s proclamation of a cultural ‘genocide’ against ethnic Russians, propaganda which he later used to justify the invasion of Ukraine and drum up political support at home. Alienation of ethnic Russians, and a political acceptance of the idea that Russian-speaking Baltic communities are themselves Russian, would be highly beneficial for Putin’s propaganda efforts. 

Productive solutions are likely to focus on societal cohesion, not further divisions which heighten tensions and themselves pose a threat to Baltic democracy. Community grassroots organisations that promote a normalisation of ethnic integration and tolerance, such as Russian language groups, are likely to be at the centre of charting the way forward. Beyond this, the Baltic states must not make enemies of their ethnic minorities. Fostering a belief in justice and democracy, rather than political and social exclusion, must be prioritised.

Image: Flickr/einalem

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