Europe’s Security Situation is Proof that Machiavelli is Still Relevant

Since its posthumous publication in 1532, Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince has served as an incisive articulation of realism – the idea that power is gained through self-interest and competition. Written against the backdrop of the Italian Wars (1494 – 1559), The Prince was intended for the eyes of Lorenzo de Medici, the ruler of the Florentine Republic. Yet, Machiavelli’s insights remain robust, and, to this day, his magnum opus continues to provide a helpful framework for making sense of politics and the shifting of power in Europe.

Leading through Protection (Chapter III)

Machiavelli observed that a prince “ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful neighbours.” This has been exemplified by French President Emmanuel Macron in his recently announced ‘forward deterrence’ strategy, in which France will expand its nuclear deterrent both numerically and geographically across Europe through partnerships with seven European countries. As France is the only nuclear power on the European mainland, it seems natural to take on the mantle of defending the unarmed. Macron framed this historic policy shift as a symbolic act in the defence of liberty: “to be free” he declared “one must be feared. To be feared, one must be powerful.”

Appearance and Reality (Chapter XVIII)

Yet, as Machiavelli astutely noted, politics is a game of illusion. Whilst the pretence of protecting Europe’s liberty enhances France’s diplomatic esteem, aligning the present-day Fifth Republic with France’s historic ethos of spreading liberty throughout the world, it diverts the narrative away from the strengthening of French regional power across Europe. 

This is important to recognise as it poses implications for UK-EU cooperation over defence issues. A key example is French initiatives to thwart the UK from joining Security Action for Europe, an EU defence fund intended to incentivise joint procurement. Not only was this unpopular with other EU members, but this move seems counterintuitive to European interests, particularly as joint procurement has been deemed of “renewed strategic importance” by the European Parliament, and the UK’s BAE Systems is Europe’s biggest defence contractor. 

The twofold illusion under Macron’s grand rhetoric of liberty hides the practical limitations of the nuclear policy shift. With the French Presidential elections next year, in which Macron, having served two consecutive terms, will be unable to stand, the long-term future of the strategy is not as coherent as it seems. Indeed, a potential successor, the far-right Jordan Bardella, is known to be wary of the Europeanisation of the nuclear deterrent. That said, the message of defending liberty remains diplomatically powerful. 

Relying on One’s Own Capabilities (Chapter VI)

Another poignant observation of Machiavelli’s pertains to the importance of self-sufficiency. Unlike the UK, France’s nuclear deterrent is spread between four nuclear ballistic missile submarines and two squadrons of Rafale fighter jets, which can be deployed on land and from the sea via Rafale Marine, a French aircraft carrier equipped to hold nuclear missiles. All this is supported entirely by French-made equipment, thus ensuring the nation’s independence. 

By contrast, the UK’s only sovereign nuclear capability lies in its Vanguard Class submarines. Yet, these submarines are armed with Trident 2 D5 missiles, which are manufactured by the American defence contractor Lockheed Martin. As a result, the missiles are required to periodically return to America for maintenance checks. The UK’s dependency on America for its Trident system has been discussed in Parliament for decades. The conclusion to a 2006 Select Committee on Defence Report urged the Ministry of Defence “to respond to the argument that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is not truly independent.” The UK’s nuclear deterrent is thus dependent on maintaining positive relations with America, and is endangered by the United States’ fluctuating commitment to Europe’s security. 

The Paradox of Peace and Security (Chapter XIV)

Another essential feature of Machiavelli’s realism was his urge for leaders to continually prepare for war, even when at peace. This resonates when considering the lack of “warfighting readiness” of the British Armed Forces, laid bare by the seven-day delay in the deployment of the UK’s HMS Dragon to Cyprus following a drone attack at a Royal Air Force base in early March. This vulnerability was also the consequence of a lack of British vessels in the area – the negative result of initiatives to scale back Royal Navy operations. Earlier this January, for instance, the last warship, the HMS Middleton, was withdrawn from the Gulf. Thus, in doing the exact opposite, relaxing its guard, the UK actively left its interests vulnerable to attack.

An additional layer is the comparative speed with which the French Navy was able to deploy their nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, in Cyprus. This is indicative of a wider and longer-term process of strategic reorientation towards direct conflict, which has been taking place in the French military since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Over the past twelve years, the French Army has invested in modernising their equipment and information systems, such as through the SCORPION programme. Moreover, in recent years, the French Army has also been able to gain a great deal of combat experience, especially through operations in regions like West Africa. This, in turn, contributes to swift responses at short notice. Thus, unlike the UK, and as Machiavelli recommended, in peacetime, the French have indeed been preparing for war. 

From leadership dynamics and illusions to self-sufficiency and the false seduction of peace, therefore, The Prince continues to stay acutely relevant to the ebb and flow of power between nations. 

As in Machiavelli’s own time, France remains a skillful player on the diplomatic chessboard, continually recalibrating its military capabilities to project hard power and regional authority in Europe. This is something the UK must continue to pay close attention to when navigating security and defence relations with the EU and NATO.

Image: Flickr/No 10 Downing Street (Simon Dawson)

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