Kyiv and Gulf Security: Rethinking Air Defence Strategy
- James Andrew Calderon

- Apr 21
- 4 min read

Long gone are the days of muskets, bayonets, and line infantry. Throughout history, the nature of conflict has consistently evolved. Both World Wars drove major advances and a growing reliance on radio communications, aircraft, and tanks, and ultimately culminated in the birth of the nuclear bomb. The Cold War era saw an increased use of precision guided missiles (PGMs), satellite GPS, and surveillance. Today, artificial intelligence, especially drones, is reshaping modern warfare.
In the war in Iran, Iranian-manufactured Shahed drones have proven effective, costing between 20,000 and 50,000 dollars. Patriot missiles used to intercept them cost roughly $4 million each, an expensive solution that’s arguably excessive for targeting relatively low-cost drones. As such, air defence has become economically lopsided and innovation is essential. Ukraine is leading the charge, emerging as a major defence industry power as it has developed deep expertise countering the Shahed drones Russia has deployed since its 2022 invasion. Expectedly, Ukrainian anti-drone expertise has become highly sought after throughout the Middle East.
Threat Environment in the Gulf
The Middle East is poised to become one of the largest drone hubs in the world. Iran is undoubtedly the leading proliferator but Turkey has also used drones to protect its interests in Syria. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) have done the same in Yemen. This trend, however, does not only include states.
From 2006 to 2023, over 1,100 incidents of non-state actors using armed UAVs were recorded. Of these incidents, about 91% took place in the Middle East and North Africa. Hamas has utilised “bomb drop zones” where a payload is dropped from above and on to a target. The Houthis and Hezbollah have conducted attacks with kamikaze drones loaded with munitions. As the name suggests, these drones fly directly into their intended target. The usage of drones is likely to continue as non-state actors further expand their capabilities.
In the first week of the Iran War, the UAE intercepted 1,000 drones. Kuwait intercepted approximately 400 and Bahrain intercepted over 100. These figures far exceed the number of missiles intercepted. Although data is not readily available, drone attacks also occurred in Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Concerns regarding a lack of interceptors began circulating quickly. This problem will not go away anytime soon and the scale of such drone attacks will make costs a decisive factor.
Ukraine’s Battlefield Solution
The Ukrainians were forced into innovation as they found themselves under constant drone attacks following Russia’s invasion. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that 2,000 Shaheds target Ukrainian cities on a monthly basis. Russian strategy has been to use drone swarms to overwhelm Ukrainian defences, paving the way for more advanced, and more expensive, missile strikes.
In response, Ukraine developed interceptor drones such as the Merops. Consistent with its broader low-cost defence model, the Merop costs about $15,000 to manufacture. This is nearly half of what it takes to produce a Shahed. Although not as advanced as more traditional Patriot missiles, Merops drones can be deployed in large numbers for more effective area coverage. The United States possesses similar interceptors such as Raytheon’s Coyote. Yet, these are nearly ten times more expensive.
In the realm of electronic warfare, Ukraine has developed Pokrova, a spoofing system designed to override satellite navigation signals and redirect incoming drones. Its deployment has reportedly led to Shahed drones being diverted off course, with some landing in Belarus and Romania.
Drone Diplomacy: Ukrainian Outreach From Abu Dhabi to Rome
Many Middle Eastern nations have become quite receptive to Ukrainian systems. Kyiv has deployed 200 experts to the region to provide training, serve in advisory roles, and participate in procurement discussions. Notably, the Ukrainian government has obtained ten year security partnerships with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Similar discussions are also occurring in Jordan and Kuwait.
These dialogues have strengthened Ukraine’s security role in the Middle East. While many world leaders avoided the region amid the conflict in Iran, President Zelenskyy moved to capitalise on the moment. During his visit, he finalised the aforementioned deals and strengthened ties with Syria, a longtime Russian ally under the now-toppled Assad regime.
These efforts also extend beyond the Arabian peninsula. In Europe, Ukraine struck a strategic defence partnership with Germany and is working towards a similar partnership with the Italian Ministry of Defence.
Yet, like all security models, Ukraine possesses weaknesses. Ukrainian interceptor drones, while inexpensive, suffer from limited range, reliance on favourable weather conditions, and vulnerability to Russian electronic warfare. Although Kyiv is exporting much of their expertise, it could also prove difficult to integrate it with existing Western systems.
Disrupting the Defence Industry
Defence contractors will also have to make an adjustment as demand shifts towards low-cost drone interception and away from traditional missile defence. Rather than being a niche innovation, this presents a more structural shift. In the future, being able to produce many cheap systems may prove more valuable than having a few sophisticated ones.
Cost and the Future of War
Going to war costs money and modern conflict is increasingly being defined by cost-per-effect rather than pure capability. In essence, the proliferation of drone use as well as Ukraine’s low-cost defence model has the potential to redefine air defence strategy. In the future, the side that wins could be the one who can simply afford to keep fighting.
Image: Wikimedia Commons/US Department of Defense (Central Command)(Cpl. Kayla Mc Guire)
Licence: public domain.
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