Navigating India’s Role Amid the Birth of a New NATO

Global security alliances have enjoyed a resurgence in relevance as regions the world over come under ever-increasing geopolitical strain. In the shadow of this global uncertainty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will convene its 2026 summit in Türkiye on 7-8 July 2026. Originally confined to the Euro-Atlantic domain, catering to traditional security, the alliance’s footprint has assumed a global dimension. India, though outside its formal structure, remains a proximate observer (not an official observer) and a promising partner in the broader emerging global security architecture. 

NATO in Transition

The 2025 Summit at The Hague was the first summit-level meeting since Secretary General Mark Rutte assumed office in October 2024. His tenure is set against a broader climate of international instability with sustained Russian aggression in Ukraine and mounting confrontation between Israel and Iran, with the United States of America taking centre stage. Last year’s summit was convened against the backdrop of the Strategic Concept first adopted at its 2022 Madrid Summit, which identified China as a systemic challenge, citing its threats to the alliance’s “interests, security and values”. This exemplified a significant shift in its broader outlook, going beyond its habitual Euro-Atlantic sphere. Delineating itself as a nuclear alliance, NATO assumed greater importance amid a heightened security crisis in West Asia, where questions of deterrence, forward deployment, and calculated preemption gain renewed importance. 

In June last year, Rutte highlighted the high-level defence capabilities of Russia in comparison to NATO and the risks that the European capitals are facing, given their proximity to Russia as well as Russian capability to deliver “terror from above”. In response to these rising threats from China and Russia and their allies, Rutte invoked a “wartime mindset”, calling for increased defence expenditure in aid of greater deterrence. He further staked out an ambitious budget target calling for 5% of GDP (3.5% on defence and 1.5% on structural security), largely a response to Europe’s need to assume greater responsibility as the United States, under President Trump, redirects its attention to the Indo-Pacific. 

At the 2025 summit, aligning with Rutte’s vision, the alliance reaffirmed its continued support for the Ukrainian cause and reached an agreement to invest 5% of GDP annually by 2035. This was further supported with a commitment to boost military industrial production across the alliance. In light of these developments, the summit was heralded as both “transformational” and “historic,” and symbolically termed by President Alexander Stubb of Finland as the “birth of a New NATO” – i.e., a NATO which assumes a greater European responsibility. 

NATO has thus embarked on a transition to a leaner, tech-driven alliance capable of responding to novel, evolving multi-domain threats, including infiltration of critical State infrastructure by non-State actors and proliferation of hypersonic missiles and advanced drones, which is increasingly allowing adversaries to strike high-value targets faster than traditional air-defence systems can respond to these attacks. 

What key developments should India monitor ?

India stands at the crossroads of a dividing world. It must navigate discursive tensions between its strategic autonomy and consolidating blocs aiming at collective security. NATO’s reorientation has its opportunities and dangers for India. NATO has expanded its operations in the Indo-Pacific, including NATO-Japan and NATO-Australia partnerships, indicating maritime convergence in these regions. This suggests shifting regional power dynamics, creating a more fluid geopolitical landscape. On the other side, China's burgeoning assertiveness in the Indian Ocean, and its tactical alignment with Russia, highlights the imperative for India to be flexible in managing its partnerships, particularly in the Quad. 

In response to these and other geopolitical challenges, India revised its Maritime Security Strategy in 2026 after more than a decade, signalling a recognition of the growing multilateral securitisation of critical sea lanes and strategic choke points, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait. Although India places special value on its strategic autonomy and does not want to be part of formal alliance structures, the increasing NATO involvement in the region requires intensifying interoperability, particularly in maritime domain awareness, joint logistics, and counter-piracy.

Second, the growing interest of NATO in non-traditional security infrastructure  including cybersecurity and hybrid warfare, will have an indirect effect on the norms of global policy. India lacks a robust critical infrastructure network, ranging from banking systems to satellite networks, necessitating its joining international frameworks through which norms and thresholds are established to define cyber conflict. Article 5 of NATO (collective defence) is now being understood as covering cyberattacks as well; India does not fall within that security umbrella, but it should not be left out of the discussion on digital deterrence.

Third, the innovation ecosystem of NATO, especially the activities of the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), indicates that the world is becoming more and more integrated in terms of military capabilities and dual-use civilian technologies. India, in its capacity as a rapidly emerging hub for startup innovations, particularly defence technologies, therefore has much to offer in technological discussions with NATO members, particularly in the domains of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artificial intelligence, and secure communication networks. This can particularly be relevant if Indian startups, especially those developing AI-enabled surveillance systems or counter-drone technologies, could participate in innovation programmes and research initiatives involving NATO members. These kinds of engagements would allow India to contribute technological expertise while also gaining exposure to the emerging standards and best practices in defence innovation globally.

Pragmatic Way Forward

India should not see the aforementioned Turkish NATO summit as a distant geopolitical theatre, but part of a global security architecture shift. A three-fold strategy is essential. 

At the outset, India ought to formalise its informal relations with NATO on common issues involving maritime security, counter-terrorism and critical technology governance. This strategic flexibility can be achieved through structured dialogues in the absence of a formal alliance membership. Launched in 1994, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue offers a useful precedent. The Dialogue, based on the two pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation, has enabled non-member states in the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean regions to engage with NATO on shared security challenges, without assuming the obligations associated with formal membership. A similar framework in this regard could provide India with an institutionalised mechanism for cooperation with NATO while preserving its strategic autonomy.

Second, where India is not in a position to assume an effective standing, given its non-member status, it can consider the alternative by approaching the pluralistic norm through Track 1.5 dialogues. This can be ensured with the help of think tanks affiliated with NATO, collaborative frameworks on climate security, resilient supply chains, and disaster relief operations, where consensus is more feasible than coercion. 

Third, India must be at the forefront in designing multilateral efforts, similar to NATO’s outreach approaches, particularly in the Global South. Forums, such as IORA, BIMSTEC and the Quad should strengthen their capacity-building initiatives in addition to their developmental cooperation. This will help avoid the development of ‘exclusive’ Western security regimes in Asia that reinforce the idea of sidelining regional leadership.

Finally, India cannot afford to remain a passive observer, as NATO is trying to adjust to a rapidly changing security environment. While it is unlikely that a formal alliance may ever come into existence, the gradual shift of its interest, however, to maritime security, new technologies and multi-domain threats is important for New Delhi. Thus, the key lesson for India is to engage where interests meet and build up its own capabilities and strategic autonomy.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Prime Minister's Office

Licence: Government Open Data Licence (India)

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