The SNP and the Stagnation of Scottish Politics

Ahead of the 2026 Scottish Parliamentary elections, Frederick Graham examines eighteen years of Scottish Nationalist rule and the state of Scottish politics. 

In Westminster and Europe, recent election cycles have revealed an increasingly consistent pattern: governing parties have become exposed to sharp electoral punishment. This trend has cut across ideologies. After four years the centre-left “traffic-light” German coalition was decisively punished at the ballot box. Across the continent, far-right opposition parties have continued their ascent. Even Hungary's once near-hegemonic national-conservative Fidesz has had its dominance eroded, entering the 2026 parliamentary elections facing its strongest opposition in a decade.

Against this background, Scotland stands out as an anomaly. After eighteen years in power at Holyrood, under four First Ministers, the Scottish National Party (SNP) appears poised to secure another term despite a record marked by under-delivery and internal scandal. The paradox of the SNP is that its electoral durability has coexisted with declining governing capacity, leaving Scotland mired in political stagnation. 

Scotland's failings in governance come from lack of political ambition, preferring consultation and rhetorical radicalism to meaningful reform. Few areas exemplify this better than Scottish homeowners paying council tax based on what their property was worth in 1991. Alex Salmond insisted he would scrap it. Nicola Sturgeon said she hated it. Why? House prices in more affluent areas like Edinburgh have soared. In more deprived West Dunbartonshire, they’ve barely moved. The impact is pernicious: without updates the most deprived areas of Scotland will continue to pay higher council tax as a percentage of their house value, resulting in a transfer of tax advantage to wealthier areas – exacerbating, rather than alleviating inequality.

The SNP’s progressive rhetoric and repeated consultation exercises and ‘consensus-building’ masks the absence of meaningful policy change. Council tax is not an isolated failure, land reform and education policy show the same pattern: bold promises followed by diluted delivery. Reform would mean taking responsibility for the hard trade-offs that come with governing. Maintaining the status quo, by contrast, keeps blame focused on Westminster. A serious government, particularly one claiming readiness for independence, would use reform to demonstrate a distinct governing vision. Instead, the SNP has remained paralysed by the fear of alienating voter blocs, preferring indefinite incumbency over defining its differences from the rest of the UK.

Yet despite nearly two decades in power, the SNP remains remarkably insulated from the anti-incumbent backlash reshaping politics elsewhere. While support for Scottish independence is still an important factor in voting nationalist, its centrality in public debate has diminished significantly since both the UK Supreme Court confirmed that an independence referendum can only be held with Westminster’s consent, and SNP First Minister John Swinney shifted his party’s focus towards demonstrating delivery as a prerequisite for achieving independence.

With voting behaviour heavily influenced by the state of Scotland and the UK, the asymmetric accountability of the Scottish devolution settlement – in which many of the devolved powers are shared between Westminster and Holyrood – means that evaluating the performance of both governments is filtered through partisanship. SNP voters are more likely to see key policy areas as being primarily the responsibility of the Westminster government. The divergence is exemplified by views on taxation – a partially devolved matter in which Scottish Labour voters are significantly more likely to view the Holyrood government as being responsible, while SNP voters tend to attribute more responsibility to Westminster. 

Scotland’s convoluted devolution settlement alongside half of the electorate continuing to support independence helps shield the SNP from the electoral effects of long-term incumbency. However, what ultimately entrenches Scottish political stagnation is the lack of a credible alternative in the eyes of many voters.

At the time of the 2024 UK General Election, Scottish Labour Leader Anas Sarwar looked like a First Minister in waiting. His party was leading the polls in Scotland and trounced the Scottish Nationals winning 37 of the 57 total seats in Scotland. Since then, the script has flipped. Sarwar has been dragged down by a toxic national brand, net approval for the UK government has fallen to -64% in Scotland last November. Scottish Labour will try to differentiate their politics from that of the national party and will rely on their strong operations and ground game – they unexpectedly won the Hamilton, Larkhall and Stonehouse by-election last June – but hopes of becoming the largest party now seem distant. 

Union-supporting parties have also had their vote share eaten into by Reform UK. Despite Farage being widely perceived as English-centric, Reform is now consistently polling at around 15-20%, taking votes from both Labour and the beleaguered Scottish Conservatives, who languish at just over 10%. Whilst the Scottish Liberal Democrats and Greens have seen some growth both are far from major forces – the latter limited by being a separate entity from the Green Party of England and Wales and thus not benefitting from its recent surge.

Without a strong alternative, Scotland will likely deliver another SNP-led government not out of enthusiasm, but out of habit – a choice led by the absence of an acceptable alternative. The Scottish National Party will likely preserve power, but this will not be enough alone to renew its purpose, and even less to justify it.

ILLUSTRATIONS: Will Allen/Europinion