The Myth of Russian Reliability

For years, the Kremlin has marketed itself as a dependable security patron for embattled regimes by offering military support, mercenaries, and diplomatic cover without Western-style political conditions. However, recent setbacks in Mali, alongside immense pressure on Russian partners in Syria, Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba reveal that Moscow fares much better at preventing immediate collapse rather than delivering long-term stability. It is not that the Russians necessarily abandon their partners; rather, the larger issue is the structural limits of Russian patronage.

By emphasising regime security over political reform, Russia has made itself an attractive partner for governments seeking immediate assistance without external scrutiny. This approach can help leaders suppress insurgencies, consolidate power, and weather acute crises, often at relatively low political cost. Yet the model does little to address the deeper governance, economic, and institutional weaknesses that frequently drive instability in the first place. As a result, Russian-backed governments may survive, but they often remain vulnerable to the same structural pressures that threatened them before Moscow's involvement. 

Mali as the Test Case

Mali is part of the coup belt which ranges across West Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. It experienced coups in 2020 and 2021, led by military officer Assimi Goïta who has served as President since 2021. After the coups, Mali removed French as an official language, expelled the French ambassador, and saw several European countries and Canada withdraw their troops and military support from the country. Mali then turned to Russia and embraced the Wagner Group. Malian leadership framed this shift as a victory for their sovereignty and strategic independence. 

In reality, insurgent violence has ballooned across the country. The al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has expanded its influence, while Russian-backed security efforts have failed to bring stability to the country. The city of Kidal has become a symbol of Malian state weakness, being seized by JNIM as well as Tuareg separatists. Mali was intended to demonstrate that Russia could replace France as the region’s security guarantor. Instead, recent developments have revealed the limits of the Russian model. 

From Wagner to Africa Corps

Wagner advertised regime protection and counterinsurgency support in exchange for strategic resources. This became attractive to Malian leadership due to Wagner’s rapid deployment, the desire to coup-proof the regime and to win political points domestically. Additionally, the Wagner Group in Africa allowed for Russia to exert influence via irregular and deniable means. However, following Wagner’s march on Moscow and the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s activities in Africa shifted to the Africa Corps, a force established in 2023 by the Russian Ministry of Defence. 

Now even more closely tied to the Kremlin, Russian efforts in Africa are subjected to tighter government control, reduced autonomy, increased bureaucracy, and growing difficulties adapting to local dynamics. Russia did not simply lose the Wagner Group, instead it lost a flexible tool that masked the limits of its underlying capacity in Africa.

Comparative Cases: A Broader Pattern of Fragility 

In Syria, Russian support undoubtedly allowed for the Assad regime to survive much longer. However, survival does not equate to stabilisation. Today, following Assad’s removal, Syria remains destitute and disunited. 

In December 2018, Russia sent two Tu-160 strategic bombers to Venezuela for exercises. Experts interpreted this as Russian leadership expressing support for Nicolás Maduro’s regime, his having been one of the few to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, Russian support was unable to protect Maduro as the United States forcibly brought him and his wife to New York. 

Iran-Russia relations largely reflect a shared opposition to the West. Although Russian support has sustained Iranian weapons programs and battlefield capabilities, Russia has proven hesitant to directly enter the ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel despite the February assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei. 

Cuba is a foundational version of the same issue. The Soviet Union provided significant economic, political, and military support for the Castro regime until the former’s collapse in 1991. Post-Soviet Russia, itself in crisis, did not have the ability to replace Soviet-level support. As a result, Cuba was plunged into a severe economic crisis, prompting the Cuban leadership to declare a “Special Period in Time of Peace,” marked by widespread shortages and strict rationing. 

The Cuban case illustrates that even highly institutionalised patronage systems can collapse abruptly when the patron experiences a systemic shock, exposing the vulnerability of dependent regimes.

Why Russian Patronage Consistently Fails

Most glaringly, Russia is overstretched due to its war effort in Ukraine. Approximately 50% of the Russian federal budget and 8% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) goes to Ukraine. The war has sapped Russian resources and has reduced the country’s ability to sustain any external commitments. 

Secondly, the Russian model provides security without governance. While Russia’s disregard for democracy promotion and human rights is part of the initial appeal of its intervention, this approach is ultimately unsustainable. Russia provides mercenaries, arms, and regime protection, but makes little effort to strengthen institutions, promote economic development, enhance legitimacy, or build state capacity. Thus, underlying instability goes unaddressed. 

Lastly, most of Russia’s client states, including Mali, Syria, Venezuela, and the Central African Republic, are highly fragile. These countries are plagued by coup installed regimes, sanctioned governments, and weak authoritarian systems. As such, these countries are inherently unstable and require constant external support. 

Reliability vs. Reality

The issue is not abandonment, it is structural limitation. Russia can delay collapse but struggles to build durable stability as its model is inherently reactive instead of developmental. From Cuba’s post-Soviet crisis to Mali’s present instability, the pattern appears consistent: Russian patronage works as emergency intervention, not as a foundation for lasting order. Russian reliability erodes under the weight of its own constraints.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (Mil.ru)

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