From the streets to power: Serbia’s parliamentary election results

On 25 October, Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections ended 14 years of Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) rule. Its biggest opponent, the Student List, won more than half of the vote and an absolute majority of 140 seats in the 250-seat National Assembly. The SNS, running under the banner “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia list” with other allied formations, secured 103 seats. International and domestic observers warned that parity in campaign opportunities was being compromised, citing grave misuse of public resources and pressure on voters.
A month prior, Aleksandar Vučić resigned as the president of Serbia to head the SNS list as its candidate for prime minister, a strategy endorsed by Vladimir Putin himself. Aiming for the more powerful post that would have let him stay on beyond the two-term limit on the presidency was a manoeuvre reminiscent of Putin’s move to the premiership in 2008. Ana Brnabic, a close party ally and a parliament speaker, became acting president.
The tactic was unsuccessful. According to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the SNS vote held at roughly the 2023 level, but turnout jumped from 58.9% to about 69%, and new voters made all the difference.
The opposition grew out of the protest movement that began in November 2024, when an awning collapsed at a rail station, killing 16 people. Chinese contractors who led the railway reconstruction denied responsibility, and the tragedy was widely blamed on corruption. For nearly two years, student protests ravaged Serbian streets; initial calls for a transparent investigation grew into demands for early elections and system reforms. The movement drew a large number of activists and supporters unhappy with Vučić’s regime, solidifying its position as the election’s key opponent. Most opposition parties have stepped back to support it.
The win came despite an uneven playing field. Freedom House reports Serbia has experienced severe democratic backsliding largely due to SNS eroding political rights and civil liberties. The Serbian watchdog CRTA kept warning of “electoral engineering” by the pro-government actors, using intimidation tactics and media manipulation, including surveillance of opposition activists. In its monitoring of national television last month, ruling-party political actors received three-quarters of the airtime and no negative coverage, while the opposition merely got a quarter. The report found the Student List was portrayed negatively in more than 80% of the time it was discussed.
CRTA also found that one in three monitored campaign activities of the ruling Vučić list involved elements of manipulation or potential legal violations, including suspected signature forgery, misuse of public resources and offers of money, assistance or jobs in exchange for support. A Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, based on over 100 testimonies, reported that public-sector employees were asked by their superiors to sign lists pledging their votes to the SNS, attend rallies or recruit further supporters, with many fearing dismissal if they refused. None of this is new; the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has reported on Serbia’s unjust conditions for the opposition since 2014. Most of their recommendations were never addressed.
The result may not shake Serbia’s precarious foreign policy. The Student List’s programme rejects NATO membership and reaffirms that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. It maintains no sanctions on Russia, citing its own experience of UN sanctions in the 1990s and considering the method to be counterproductive to Serbian interests. That contradicts what Vučić warned a change of government would bring, denouncing the Student List as “traitors to the fatherland”.
The dependencies remain. Serbia buys its gas from Gazprom at about €318 per 1,000 cubic metres, a price Vučić has put at far below the European TTF benchmark rate of €868. That sits uneasily with the EU’s plan to end Russian gas imports by 2027, as Brussels expects candidates to align with EU policy as they move towards membership. China, meanwhile, pledged an additional €953 million through cooperation agreements aiming to expand its mining and industrial footprint in Serbia.
The EU wants more commitment from its candidate country. Serbia has opened no new negotiating chapter since December 2021. Lead candidate Ilija Srdanović has promised to align domestic policy with the EU’s on justice and fundamental rights. EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has said Brussels is ready to help, but has warned that progress without foreign and security policy alignment, mainly regarding Russia, would be “very, very difficult.”
This is partly the logic of a “big tent.” On Russia and Kosovo stances, Student List has chosen to persist, adopting the balancing act between Brussels, Moscow and Beijing that the SNS performed for 14 years. What it cannot inherit is the method. Vučić held that balance with a state that runs on loyalty and anti-democratic methods, something the Student List stands against, like media capture and public jobs traded for votes. A movement born in the streets must now govern institutions while stripping out the very same methods that made them serve one man.
The first deadlines will test the new government. The presidential election is due by December 27. A gas contract with Moscow expires December 31; it remains to be seen whether Student List can negotiate Vučić’s low price. The same day, €224 million of EU growth-plan funds could be forfeited if reform conditions aren’t met, according to a senior EU official. Whether the students can keep their footing abroad while dismantling the system at home will decide if October 25 brought a change of government or a change of regime.
No image changes made.
.png)




Comments