Ballots, Bots, Black Ops: Moldova’s Existential 2025 Election

Pre-election analysis of disinformation, crackdowns, interference, and oligarchic politics in the tense run-up to Moldova’s 2025 legislative elections. 

Moldova is on the brink of a pivotal parliamentary election scheduled for tomorrow (28 September), a vote widely seen as a fateful choice between integration with Europe or a return to Russia’s orbit. In the final week before this high-stakes election, the country of 2.6 million has experienced anything but calm. All those I have spoken with back in Chișinău this week described the atmosphere, above all else, as “tense.” 

This is not without good reason. Authorities in Chișinău launched sweeping raids to thwart alleged Russian-backed plots, courts barred multiple parties from the race, a fugitive oligarch was dramatically extradited, and tensions flared in Moldova’s autonomous regions. All of this has unfolded amid an unprecedented surge of disinformation and covert influence operations linked to the Kremlin. As one European diplomat observed, “No one seems to know what sort of country Moldova will be by Monday,” underscoring the uncertainty and gravity surrounding this election eve. 

Both Brussels and Moscow are watching intently, as the election decides whether Moldova presses forward with EU accession or reverses course under pro-Russian leadership. This is the “most consequential” election since Moldova’s independence, a make-or-break moment for the future of Moldova and for Europe.

Interference and Instigation

All signs indicate that Russia has mounted an unprecedented hybrid interference campaign to sway the election’s outcome. A leaked Russian strategy document revealed by Bloomberg revealed a “multi-pronged” Kremlin plan to undermine PAS’ chances in the vote and ultimately remove President Sandu from power in favour of Russia-friendly forces. The plan outlines classic destabilisation tactics namely recruiting Moldovan voters abroad, orchestrating street protests, and waging disinformation campaigns, all coordinated directly at Moscow’s behest. US and European monitors also point to massive Russian financing of proxy groups with Sandu herself accusing the Kremlin of spending “hundreds of millions of euros to buy hundreds of thousands of votes” in Moldova.

One particularly alarming element is evidence that Russian intelligence operatives have been training Moldovans for violent unrest. Moldova’s police and security service uncovered that over 100 Moldovan citizens were secretly sent to Serbia in recent months (often under the guise of Orthodox “pilgrimages”) to receive paramilitary training. According to investigators, Russian GRU instructors drilled these recruits in how to break through police cordons, resist security forces, and use weapons like rubber batons, handcuffs, and even firearms. The trainees were reportedly paid around €400 per trip for such illicit training. Moldovan authorities believe the goal was to prepare coordinated violent provocations after the election, regardless of who officially wins. In other words, Moscow might attempt to stage a “mirror-image” of Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan uprising, but engineered in reverse, to topple a pro-Western government rather than a pro-Russian one. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has warned that “the Kremlin is setting conditions to generate possibly violent protests to remove…Sandu from power” following the vote. ISW analysts assess this as a “high-impact” contingency of uncertain probability, noting that Russia has positioned assets to spark unrest no matter the election result. Pertinently, however, ISW caveated that the Kremlin could still decide not to pull the trigger or could fail if it does indeed try. 

Weaponry seized by Moldovan police | Credit: David Smith/Moldova Matters

Disinformation, Cyber Attacks, and False Narratives

Meanwhile, information warfare is in full swing. Moldovans have been inundated with a deluge of fake news and toxic propaganda across social media, much of it traced to Kremlin-linked “botnets.” One such campaign, dubbed the “Matryoshka” botnet, floods the internet with AI-generated videos and fabricated quotes to discredit Sandu and the pro-EU government. These slick fakes mimic real news clips, using stolen logos and doctored footage, pushing narratives that Moldova is a failed state exporting crime, or personal attacks suggesting Sandu, who is unmarried without children, was “purchasing sperm from gay celebrity donors such as Ricky Martin and Elton John to have a child,” in between using “psychotropic drugs.” Platforms like TikTok have reportedly removed over 100,000 fake accounts and 250,000 spam accounts in the past two months for spreading election-related disinformation.

Moldovan cyber experts are also on high alert for a potential election day cyberattack. Just this week, officials revealed that thousands of household internet routers were quietly hacked and hijacked, likely to be marshalled in a massive DDoS attack aimed at crashing Moldova’s Central Election Commission systems on election day. Such an attack could disrupt the electronic voter registry and sow chaos (since Moldova uses real-time e-registers to prevent multiple voting). In response, the EU has deployed its first-ever “hybrid rapid-response team” of cybersecurity and disinformation experts to assist Chișinău during the election period. European officials say they have been actively monitoring Russian malign narratives, tracking illicit funding flows, and bolstering Moldova’s media resilience in the run-up to the vote. 

Notably, the Russian government’s own messaging has grown more belligerent as election day nears. In a formal statement on 23 September, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) bizarrely accused the EU of plotting to “occupy” Moldova with NATO troops after the vote. The SVR claimed, without evidence, that NATO forces are massing in neighbouring Romania, poised either to suppress post-election protests or even to interfere in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region (which itself has an unrecognised vote scheduled in November). “Euro-bureaucrats in Brussels are determined to keep Moldova in line with their Russophobic policies. They intend to do this at any cost, including deploying troops and carrying out the de facto occupation of the country,” the SVR alleged in an openly conspiratorial tone. 

This statement appeared to be a preemptive narrative flip: essentially priming the information space to blame any post-election unrest on Moldovan fraud and Western intervention. Indeed, the SVR insisted that “gross falsification” of results by pro-EU authorities would inevitably drive angry citizens to protest, at which point Sandu would supposedly invite NATO troops to crack down. Such claims are unsubstantiated. Moscow offered zero evidence in supporting this assertion. Yet, such claims underscore the Kremlin’s intent to cast doubt on the election’s legitimacy and justify its own interference. Notably, the SVR rant came just one day after Moldovan police busted a major Russian-backed unrest plot, perhaps as Moscow’s attempt at damage control. Russian officials have also lodged diplomatic protests, accusing Moldovan authorities of unfairly limiting foreign (i.e. Russian) observers and trampling democratic values, a complaint the Moldovan government strongly denies.

Raids, Arrests, and Crackdowns

Facing this onslaught, Moldovan authorities have launched an aggressive counter-operation in the final days before the vote. On 22 September, in a dramatic nationwide sweep, police and security forces raided 250 locations across the country in an investigation into the aforementioned Serbia training plot. The coordinated raids, involving special forces units, led to 74 people being detained for allegedly preparing to orchestrate mass violence around election day. According to Moldova’s anti-corruption prosecutors, this probe actually began back in July when the Șor Party’s network (a pro-Russian faction banned earlier for corruption) sponsored a large group of Moldovan citizens to travel to Serbia, raising suspicions that were later confirmed. During the raids, officers seized weapons, ammunition, drones, stacks of cash, false passports, SIM cards, tents and other equipment, essentially a “protest kit” for sustained street actions. 

Moldovan "Fulger" SWAT forces during a raid | Credit: Moldovan Interior Ministry

Police have reported that some of the sites searched were regional offices of the Socialist Party, suggesting multiple pro-Russian groups were implicated in the violence scheme. Currently, investigators have identified 111 individuals involved in the secret trainings; of those, 74 were captured in the raids and at least 12 have been formally arrested by court order. Many others are cooperating with law enforcement, providing further intel on the network. Moldovan officials credit this action with striking a major blow to Russia’s plans, earning praise from the European Union’s Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos who called the Moldovan government “resilient and capable of fighting back forces that want to pull the country off the European path or to see the European Union fail.”

The crackdown has not stopped there. Virtually every day in late September, Moldovan police have carried out further searches and seizures targeting illicit election activity. They traced 9 million lei (about $500k) in suspicious money flows tied to vote-buying and seized 800,000 lei in cash stashes linked to political operatives. In one case, authorities uncovered an underground print shop producing fake newspapers aimed at inciting inter-ethnic and religious hatred during the campaign.

Police also raided a printing house and discovered 200 pre-stamped ballot papers prepared for a party called the “Alternative Bloc,” apparently to be used in a carousel voting fraud scheme (whereby voters cast multiple ballots). The officers arrived after a tip from the printing company itself, which reported the suspicious order. While the accused party’s leaders claimed these were merely “model ballots” for voter education, the Central Election Commission noted that printing exact ballot replicas with stamps is illegal and clearly not standard campaign material. The incident heightened concerns that certain actors are willing to cheat on a large scale.

Election authorities have taken extraordinary measures to safeguard the vote. The Central Election Commission, citing “serious risks” in the Transnistria ‘security zone’, announced it would relocate all 5 polling stations that were initially planned for Transnistrian residents, moving them farther inside government-controlled territory. This decision was driven by credible threats of bomb scares or provocations on election day near the demarcation line with the breakaway Transnistria region. Any security incident in the security zone could halt voting for hours, and Moldova would need special Russian-approved clearance to send bom squads there, a wholly unworkable scenario on election day. 

This precaution effectively shrinks the number of polling sites accessible to Transnistria’s voters from 44 to just 12, consolidating them in safer locations. Moldovan officials argue this is necessary to prevent violent disruptions, but Moscow has loudly protested the move. Oleg Ozerov, Russia’s ambassador in Chișinău, blasted the last-minute polling station changes as “unprecedented” and that he had never heard of changing the rules of the game a couple days before the vote, as per Izvestia. He accused the Moldovan authorities of trying to reduce Transnistrian turnout and confuse elderly voters, rather than maximise participation. Chișinău, however, maintains that public safety and an orderly vote are the priority, and it has sought support from international partners (like Ukraine and the OSCE mission) to monitor the sensitive security zone on election day. 

Another bold step has been taken by Moldova’s Electoral Commission and courts to purge illicit actors from the race. In the final 48 hours of the campaign, two prominent pro-Russian parties were barred from the election over illegal funding schemes. On 25 September, the Chișinău Court of Appeals suspended the “Heart of Moldova” party (led by former Gaguzia governor Irina Vlah) for one year, upholding the Justice Ministry’s evidence of “massive illicit financing and vote buying” by the party. Heart of Moldova, a new party that had become part of the main opposition Patriotic Bloc, had its offices raided in recent weeks, uncovering that it was largely a repackaged network of the banned Șor Party. Vlah denounced the ban as a “final act of a dirty show orchestrated [by the Sandu government] to silence [her].” 

Nevertheless, election officials proceeded to strike all Heart of Moldova candidates from the opposition bloc’s list, giving the bloc 24 hours to re-submit its list without Vlah’s people. The very same day, the commission also disqualified a party called “Moldova Mare” (Great Moldova) for engaging in hidden foreign funding, vote buying, and operating as a camouflaged proxy for a banned party.

Both Heart of Moldova and Moldova Mare had openly campaigned for closer ties with Moscow, making them key challengers to PAS. Their eleventh-hour removal has “rocked” the opposition, though other Russia-leaning blocs still remain in the race. Notably, Irina Vlah’s troubles extend beyond Moldova. Poland’s government announced it has banned Vlah from entering its territory for five years, citing her role in abetting Russian interference in this election. Canada and Lithuania had already imposed similar travel bans on Vlah earlier in the campaign. These moves underscore that Western allies are actively supporting Moldova’s efforts to safeguard the election. In August, Polish leader Donald Tusk even visited Chișinău alongside French and German officials to show support for Sandu’s pro-European reform agenda.

Regional Flashpoints: Transnistria and Gagauzia

Moldova’s two Russia-leaning regions, Transnistria and Gagauzia, have inevitably figured into the pre-election tumult. This time, however, the security fears around Transnistria are especially acute. As noted, Moldova’s security services identified possible bomb or sabotage plots targeting polling sites near the Transnistrian boundary, warranting relocation. By relocating those stations, the government hopes to neutralise any provocation that Moscow’s agents might use as a pretext for escalation.

Additionally, Moscow has been sabre-rattling about Transnistria’s own “election”, scheduled for 30 November. The SVR’s recent statement suggested NATO might intervene in Transnistria’s vote, signalling the Kremlin could exploit that event to stir trouble. For now, Transnistria remains a powder keg in the background, relatively quiet on the surface, but used increasingly in Russian propaganda to undermine Moldovan authorities’ credibility. The Moldovan government has sought international monitors to help keep the peace in the buffer zone on election day, and any incident there will be scrutinised closely.

In Gagauzia, the autonomous southern region populated by a Turkic, Russophile minority, the political drama has also been intense. Gagauzia was formerly governed by Irina Vlah, the very politician now banned from the election. Vlah’s new Heart of Moldova party was expected to deliver many Gagauz votes to the opposition Patriotic Bloc, until it was disqualified for financial crimes. Her downfall follows that of Evghenia Guțul, another pro-Russian Gagauz leader. Guțul, who won the region’s gubernatorial election in 2023 with support from the Șor Party, was convicted in August 2025 of funneling Russian money to influence Moldovan politics. A Moldovan court sentenced Guțul to seven years in prison for secretly channeling undeclared funds from Russia to Ilan Șor's party, which the government describes as a Kremlin proxy used to meddle in Moldovan affairs. The Kremlin furiously condemned Guțul’s jailing as “politically motivated” and claimed Moldova is ‘clamping down’ on the opposition.

Protestors in support of Evghenia Guțul in Ceadîr-Lunga, 23 August 2025 Credit: Official Press Service of the Gagauzia Governor

Gagauzia thus illustrates the wider pattern of Russian influence via local actors, and the Moldovan state’s willingness to prosecute even powerful regional figures who play a role in Moscow’s interference schemes. Importantly, the new de facto political leaders representing Gagauzia at the national level (including some aligned with Vlah or Șor) are now either banned from the race or under legal scrutiny, which could leave some Gagauz voters feeling disenfranchised. Igor Dodon, the leader of the Socialist faction allied with Gagauzia’s autonomy, insisted that Vlah “remains on our team” despite her party’s suspension, and even threatened protests if her faction were excluded. 

The Extradition of Plahotniuc: An Oligarch in Handcuffs

Amid all these security challenges, Moldovans witnessed a political earthquake on 25 September: the surprise return, in handcuffs, of Vladimir “Plaha” Plahotniuc, the fugitive oligarch who once dominated Moldova’s politics. Plahotniuc fled the country in 2019 after his network fell, and he has since been wanted for his role in the infamous “theft of the century,” the 2013 looting of $1 billion from Moldova’s banks, equivalent to 12% of GDP. For years he evaded capture, reportedly hopping between countries under various aliases. That ended in late July, when Greek police arrested Plahotniuc at Athens airport as he attempted to board a flight to Dubai. Acting on an Interpol Red Notice (which intriguingly listed 16 different passports linked to Plahotniuc’s alias stash), Greece held him for extradition. Plahotniuc unexpectedly chose not to contest extradition, and just three days before the election he was put on a plane back to Chișinău. 

The sight that morning was dramatic. Local media livestreamed as masked officers led a man in a white shirt and cap, hands bound behind his back, off the chartered aircraft and into a police van on the tarmac. It was Plahotniuc, home in Moldova for the first time in six years, now as a prisoner. He was escorted immediately to a detention facility, where officials say he will be held in solitary confinement at the high-security Prison No.13. Sandu and her allies hailed the extradition as a major victory for justice. The President recalled the anti-corruption protest movement of 2017 that opposed Plahotniuc’s rule, saying: “If you don’t give up when it’s hard...even criminals who seemed invincible come to justice.” 

However, others cautioned that Plahotniuc’s saga is just beginning. His legal team is certain to mount a fierce defence. Under Moldovan law, if the trials do not conclude within twelve months of pre-trial detention, he must be released. His lawyers have a hearing every thirty days to request release. Tellingly, the first such hearing was delayed after a bomb threat emptied the courthouse on 26 September. Observers warn that Plahotniuc’s wealth and networks could still influence the process, potentially via legal stalling or political bargaining. “This isn’t the end of a story - it’s the beginning of the greatest challenge ever faced by Moldova’s fragile justice system,” noted David Smith of Moldova Matters of the task of truly holding a figure like Plahotniuc to account in a beleaguered Moldova. 

Vladimir Plahotniuc escorted off Aegean aircraft by Moldovan police and Interpol officials, 26 September 2025 Credit: CU SENS

It is worth noting that Plahotniuc’s return was likely not engineered for electoral effect. Rather, it was a convergence of legal timing and his own gambit. He was caught somewhat by chance (the Interpol notice was issued in February, and he happened to slip up in Greece in July), and after that, events took their course. Some in Moldova speculated that the government timed his extradition to boost PAS’s anti-corruption image right before the vote, but most evidence suggests otherwise. Plahotniuc himself tried to influence the election from behind the scenes upon his arrest. In early September, he reactivated some loyalists and even made a Facebook post lamenting he had not had “time to gather [his] old team” to run in the election.

In that post, Plahotniuc urged Moldovans that “no direct or indirect vote should reach PAS”, effectively calling on voters to support any opposition force that could enter Parliament. One of his lieutenants, Vladimir Cebotari, explicitly directed supporters toward the Alternative Bloc (led by pro-Russian mayor Ion Ceban) and Renato Usatii’s Partidul Nostru party, as the preferred vessels for anti-PAS votes. In any case, Plahotniuc’s last-minute attempts to play kingmaker were cut short by his extradition. As a result, he is now behind bars and “unlikely to have anything else to say about Sunday’s election.” PAS officials have taken this as validation of their anti-corruption drive, while opposition voices claim it is a distraction, but the broader public appears largely supportive of seeing the once untouchable oligarch finally face justice.

Tense Outlook for Election Day and Beyond

As Moldova reaches election day, the atmosphere is tense and uncertain. Authorities are on high alert. Thousands of police, “Fulger” SWAT units, and security service agents will be deployed to ensure calm. The government has repeatedly urged citizens not to fall for provocations and to report any suspicious activities. In a public awareness campaign, police have even plastered ads on billboards, social media, and the sides of patrol cars telling people “Don’t play with your vote – you will lose everything!”, warning that accepting bribes for votes is a crime. International partners are likewise vigilant. The EU’s rapid response team is actively assisting in countering cyber threats and fake news in real time, and neighboring Romania’s president Nicușor Dan made a point of calling on Moldovans to turn out and ‘decide your future’ free from outside pressure. 

Despite all preparations, the risk of post-election turbulence is evident. Moldovan security officials privately admit concern that if the results are close or contested, Russia’s networks could trigger street protests that escalate. This is precisely the scenario foreseen by the ISW and others, a manufactured “Maidan” to overturn an unfavourable result. The good news is that Moldovan state institutions have shown impressive resolve in the past weeks by preemptively disrupting violent plots and illegal schemes. Hundreds of suspects are off the streets, millions in dirty money have been seized, and key pro-Russian operatives have been neutralised through legal action. European partners have also made clear they are standing by Moldova, whether by sanctioning meddlers like Irina Vlah or helping expose disinformation. 

Much now depends on the integrity of the voting process and the acceptance of results by all parties. If PAS loses its majority but the process is deemed fair, will the opposition abide by the result – or attempt to whip up chaos under Moscow’s encouragement? Conversely, if PAS manages to retain power (perhaps buoyed by diaspora votes, which proved pivotal for pro-European camp last year), will pro-Russian forces cry foul and take to the streets? These questions hang over Chișinău like a gathering storm. President Sandu has called this election a final battle for Moldova’s soul, imploring citizens to choose the “European future” and reject those paid “thirty pieces of silver” by foreign interests. 

The week before such an existential vote for Moldova has been anything but quiet. It has been marked by raids at dawn, bomb scares, spy games, and an oligarch’s downfall, a tumultuous prelude that suggests the stakes on Sunday could not be higher. Now all eyes turn to election day, praying that the storm of foreign subversion can be weathered, and that Moldova’s democratic choice, whatever it may be, emerges intact on the other side.

Image: European Parliament/Flickr

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