The Trial That Could Tilt Moldova

The imprisonment of Evghenia Guțul, the governor of Moldova’s autonomous Gagauzia region, has ignited new tensions in a country firmly at the precipice of strong geopolitical headwinds, as the country heads into crucial parliamentary elections this September. Analysts, ourselves included, deemed Moldova’s presidential election and European accession referendum last year as “existential” to the country’s future. One would be hard pressed to not use such a label for the upcoming legislative ballot. With a nation already divided, and Brussels and Moscow heavily invested, such affective events like the imprisonment of an elected autonomous region leader, however legally justified, are sure to increase tensions and further throw which way Moldova will tilt–West or East–into question.

Guțul and Gagauzia: Small Region, Big Stakes

Evghenia Guțul was sentenced on 5 August 2025 to seven years in a Chișinău prison for funnelling undeclared Russian funds to the now-prohibited pro-Russian Sor Party between 2019 and 2022. She denounced the verdict as “a political massacre” and protests she is the victim of political persecution by the Pro-European Sandu government. In the hours after the verdict, over a hundred of her supporters rallied outside the Chișinău courthouse, chanting “shame!” at the authorities, as scuffles broke out. Authorities had barred Guțul’s family from the courtroom, eliciting agitation from her supporters. It was only when Guțul herself pleaded to them directly to reduce tensions that they abated. Meanwhile, in the Gagauzian capital of Comrat, locals took to the streets in similar fashion to protest the release of their elected governor. 

The region of Gagauzia represents both an understated and outsized role in Moldova’s fragile unity. The Gagauzia region of circa 140,000 people, mostly ethnic Gagauz (a Turkic-Orthodox group), possesses its own language, legislature, and governor. Such autonomy was granted in 1994 to placate separatist sentiment following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Republic of Moldova. Unlike the de facto state of Transnistria, which has effectively operated separately, ballasted by Russian patronage since 1991, Gagauzia remains legally within Moldova, often at odds with Chișinău. The Gagauz are staunchly Russian-oriented and anti-EU in outlook, for example rejecting Moldova’s European accession by 95% in the 2024 referendum. 

Such a pro-Moscow orientation frequently puts Gaguzia on a collision course with the central authorities in Chișinău. Evghenia Guțul’s surprise victory in the 2023 governor election, running as a Sor Party nominee weeks after its prohibition, was one such moment of overt friction. President Maia Sandu refused to sign the formal decree to seat Guțul in the national Cabinet, as is customary for Gagauz governors under the Moldovan legislation, due to uncertainty over Guțul's legitimacy. The People’s Assembly of Gagauzia had protested the perceived political exclusion, organising rallies in the capital of Comrat to defiantly affirm Guțul as the region ‘s ‘rightful’ leader. Such a standoff is useful context for today’s crisis. Many Gagauz now see Guțul’s prosecution as the latest instalment in a long line of insults and encroachments by Chișinău against Gagauzian autonomy. 

Tensions renewed on 6 August, when the People’s Assembly voted unanimously to reject the decision of the Moldovan courts, and to keep Guțul in office. In a rather incendiary statement, the Assembly declared the prosecution of their governor as an “attack on Gagauzia’s special status” guaranteed in Moldova’s laws, “aimed at liquidating the autonomy and suppressing the will of the population.” For a Moldovan state already navigating the separatist issue with Transnistria and the government’s desired European trajectory, such open defiance from Gagauzia is sure to be cause for alarm. 

A section of the country is effectively refusing to recognise the central judiciary’s authority, which in itself could be a potential constitutional crisis in the making. Local passions are sure to continue to run high. Ilia Uzun, deputy governor of Gagauzia, initially threatened “acts of disobedience”, though later advocating for continued use of legal forms of protest only. The underlying message, however, is clear. If Guțul’s fate is “sealed in Chișinău” without what Gagauzians deem justice, then they are prepared to push back in ways that could test the internal stability of Moldova and play into the hands of the Kremlin’s policy of interference and influence, either being perceived as, or positioning itself as, the ‘guarantor’ of Gagauzian autonomy. 

Electoral narratives of East vs West

Guțul’s case has rapidly become a focal point in Moldova’s enduring battle between East and West. On one side is Sandu and her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) government, elected on a mandate to pursue European Union membership and clean up corruption. On the other are opposition forces friendly to the Kremlin, who accuse Sandu of sidelining or even “dictating” to opponents at the behest of Brussels. Moldovan prosecutors found that Guțul, formerly an official in oligarch Ilan Sor’s party, had “systematically” channeled money from Moscow to finance Sor’s political machine. Officials accuse Sor, who now is exiled in Russia, of utilising his political machine as an effective Kremlin proxy, bankrolling anti-government protests, disinformation campaigns, and vote-buying schemes, with a particular concentration in the run-up to the 2024 presidential election and referendum. Sor is similarly accused of the same offences in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections.

Guțul herself was accused of distributing “electoral gifts” of food and other basic goods during her 2023 campaign for governorship in Gagauzia. Such allegations effortlessly feed into the narrative of the ruling PAS that Russian-linked oligarchs have long meddled in Moldova’s democracy for their own gain, and thus must be held accountable if Moldova is to move forward towards Brussels. Indeed, as one Moldovan political scientist put it, Guțul’s sentencing was “one of the few examples of success” in purging pro-Kremlin corrupt networks operating within Moldova’s jurisdiction. To pro-Sandu voters, the conviction is sure to be a welcomed show of resolve. As Oktawian Milewski recalled, “the fact that the sentence was pronounced when Moldova is already in full electoral process…gives hope and encouragement for the pro-European electorate.” 

Judging by the razor-thin margin victory for the pro-European camp in the 2024 referendum, any hope or encouragement should not be taken for granted by Sandu. PAS faces a chorus of opposition parties that view Moscow, not Brussels, as Moldova’s proper strategic partner. These pro-Russian forces have, unsurprisingly, seized on Guțul’s arrest and sentencing as fuel and justification for their continued efforts to influence the outcome of Moldova’s democratic elections. Four of the major Russian-leaning parties–the Communists, the Socialists, the Heart of Moldova, and the Future of Moldova–have united in the “Patriotic Electoral Bloc” coalition to oust PAS from power. Such a coalition is consequential. The Communists are led by Vladimir Voronin who served as president of Moldova from 2001 to 2009. Igor Dodon, president of Moldova from 2016 to 2020, leads the Socialists (and the Patriotic Bloc writ-large). The Future of Moldova is headed by Vasile Tarlev, who served as prime minister under Voronin until 2008, whereas the Heart of Moldova is pertinently led by Irina Vlah, Guțul’s predecessor as governor of Gagazuia. Despite PAS’ overall dominance in the polls, in a June poll the then-nascent Patriotic Bloc did pip Sandu’s party by over 4 percentage points. The competition is very real and should not be understated.  

Another alliance, informally called the “Pobeda” (Victory) bloc, coalesced around Ilan Sor’s followers, despite the Moldovan Electoral Commission refusing to register Sor’s Victory bloc due to illegal financing links and party prohibition. Undeterred, Sor’s protégés, many of whom simply migrated into other opposition lists, are frantically rallying voters against Sandu. As recently as 19 August, Moldovan courts are, according to Russian state media, restricting the activities of the parties. Notably, Evghenia Guțul herself had become secretary-general of Sor’s Pobeda alliance, making her jailing a cause célèbre for the pro-Russian political machine. Marina Tauber, vice-chair of Pobeda, claims the Chișinău government is using “intimidation and repression” to silence Gagauzia, incitingly suggesting Chișinău is attempting to abolish Gagauz autonomy after the September elections. Opposition leaders have called for large-scale demonstrations on 23 August, intended to portray Guțul’s imprisonment as a political assault on Gagauz democracy, autonomy, and self-determination. In their rendition of events, Sandu’s administration is morphing into an Brussels-backed ‘authoritarian police state’ that tramples opponents, a narrative Moscow’s media understandably, but ironically, amplifies with eager intent. 

The Sandu government strongly rejects this characterisation. Chișinău argues that what is at stake is not a political vendetta against Guțul or Gagauz, but rather the rule of law and Moldovan sovereignty. Officials regularly accuse the Kremlin of waging a “subversive” campaign to topple the pro-EU leadership and the country’s European aspirations by interfering and stoking unrest. Just this week, Sandu’s national security adviser warned that Russia had shifted its meddling efforts towards the Moldovan diaspora abroad to sway the vote in their favour. 

There is a clear strategy here: the Moldovan diaspora were definitive in securing victory for European accession in the referendum. PAS leaders have also highlighted the glaring fact that Moldovan’s choice is predominantly by recycled figures from ancien regimes. PAS chairman Igor Grosu, in reference to Dodon and company, lamented “tired politicians who kept Moldova in poverty and a grey zone have been hauled out of mothballs at the Kremlin’s behest…what unites all these worn-out politicians? The same sack of money and the same boss behind it”. 

For Sandu’s camp, cracking down on illicit Russian funding and propaganda is not an authoritarian repression against democracy; it is an existential effort to prevent Moldova from becoming, in their view, a victim of hybrid warfare. PAS officials consistently cite examples such as Guțul’s secret trips to Moscow ferrying cash, or Sor’s alleged $24 million scheme to bribe voters via a Russian bank, as proof that “foreign interests” have subverted Moldovan politics. Sandu herself frames the election as a choice between continued reforms and European trajectory or a regression back into oligarchic misrule and state extraction. Brussels seems to agree. The EU recently hosted the inaugural EU-Moldova summit in Chișinău, both celebrating the significant progress towards criteria fulfilment and, perhaps more pertinently, signalling strong, continued support for Sandu’s and Moldova’s European path.  It is worth noting, however, that, despite all the anti-corruption rhetoric from PAS, the party itself is accused of the same embezzling state capture activities of its opponents, by its opponents.

A Nation Divided in the Face of High Stakes?

Beneath the campaign rhetoric, Moldovan society remains fiercely divided between East and West. Opinion surveys show a genuine split in pubic attitudes. The European referendum received an endorsement of just 50.35%, a narrow majority that revealed a genuine ambivalence in Moldova proper, and more concentrated support from the diaspora in the West. In Russia, on the other hand, far fewer polling stations were opened, somewhat hypocritical conditions that were often linked to concerns that Moldovans in Russia would vote overwhelmingly in favour of Russia. Polls currently suggest PAS could win pluralities but would struggle to form a stable majority if the opposition remains united. It also accentuates the fact that a significant portion of the electorate prefers parties that are openly skeptical to the EU or are aligned with Russia. Many of these voters are concentrated in Gagauzia, Transnistria, and Russian-speaking towns and villages, as well as amongst the older generations, nostalgic for the Soviet era. 

Such discontent is fertile ground for Moscow's influence operations and hybrid warfare. Moscow has sharply condemned Guțul’s jailing as “politically motivated” and an attempt to “pressure political opponents during an election campaign.” In the words of Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Russia “see[s] how the opposition is being clamped down in every possible way.” Russian state media has given sympathetic coverage to Guțul, casting her as a democratically elected leader ousted for her Russian sympathies. Tellingly, the Russian human rights ombudsman even appealed to the UN about Guțul’s case, calling the imprisonment a “gross violation” of rights, a dramatic if ironic gesture from a Kremlin official. 

Combined, this signals Russia's continued interest in Moldova’s trajectory. Whilst its war in neighbouring Ukraine rages on, militarily unaffected by the great power machinations in Alaska and Washington, the Kremlin increasingly sees Moldova as the next (if not already) battleground in a contest in its quest for a continued sphere of influence in its “near abroad.” A tilt back into the orbit of Moscow via these upcoming legislative elections would not only scuttle EU expansion but could give Putin perceived leverage, or cause of self-justification, of more conventional actions in Moldova.

Meanwhile, the breakaway de facto state of Transnistria, home to around 1,500 Russian troops on Moldova’s eastern border with Ukraine, adds another layer of complexity. Thus far, authorities in Tiraspol have remained quiet on the Guțul saga, but share the same deep distrust of Sandu’s European course. Pro-Russian commentators warn that, if Sandu feels emboldened after the elections, she may get “tough” on both Gagauzia and Transnistria. Marina Tauber, speaking to Russian-newspaper Izvestia, argued Chișinău “is not seeking dialogue, but acting solely through intimidation and repression” which is deemed as likely to translate into extra pressure on Gagauzia and Transnistria. She and others claim that the Sandu administration could, for example, escalate economic pressure on Transnistria by leveraging control over electricity or trade routes. Indeed, Izvestia went so far as to suggest that a newly appointed Moldovan Constitutional Court might one day “initiate the abolition of Gagauzia’s autonomy”, thereby setting a precedent that alarms Transnistria. 

Such dramatic scenarios are almost certainly propaganda, but the real risk is the affective resonance such narratives have with voters in Moldova. The net effect is a highly combustible pre-election climate, one that worries not only Moldovans, Gagauzians, and Transnistrians, but also policymakers in European capitals. Brussels officials have urged calm and “restraint”, acutely wary that any violent eruption or heavy-handed state actions in Moldova could be exploited by the Kremlin. Again, such claims are not unfounded. Visible tensions are rising in daily demonstrations calling for Guțul’s release in Chișinău.

Western policymakers effectively must walk a tightrope. They must continue to support Sandu’s reformist, pro-European agenda, whilst ensuring that Moldova’s Russian-speaking population and autonomous regions do not descend into open conflict or renewed separatist bids. Awareness of the key interests and problems of the Moldovan population, whether pro-Russian or pro-European, is essential. The issue of EU accession is only of secondary concern to people; more relevant issues are high energy and electricity prices, low wages, and a weak economy.

As election day approaches, Moldova finds itself (yet again) at a crossroads between Brussels and Moscow, laden with risk and hope. Guțul’s imprisonment, coupled with its courtroom drama and street protests, encapsulates the precarity. Will Moldova continue on its path towards Europe, bolstered by continued anti-corruption crackdowns whilst managing to mitigate any frustrations in its autonomous regions? Or will the backlash against such crackdowns provide affective resonance to pro-Russian forces and their voters to pull the nation back into Moscow’s orbit? 

For now, Moldovans will brace for a tense few weeks of campaigning and undoubted machinations from Moscow. Each side is evidently marshalling its base, be it through rallies in the streets of Chișinău, provincial meetings in the Gagauz steppe, or (dis)informational dissemination online. If Moldova can navigate these tensions without violent unravelling, it would send a powerful message that even Europe’s smallest democracies can resist the pull of Russian influence. If not, the cracks in Chișinău’s already-fragile consensus could widen into a geopolitical chasm. The coming weeks will be decisive. Come 28 September, all eyes should be on Moldova.

Illustrations: Will Allen/Europinion