Latin America's Right Revival

The second half of the decade begins with a political map in Latin America radically different from the one that marked its early years. The region enters 2026 undergoing a clear shift to the right, with political forces that have not only consolidated their power but have done so with greater ideological discourse and ambition for power than in previous cycles.

During 2025, the right wing won all four presidential elections held in the region - Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras - in addition to the change of presidency in Peru through parliamentary impeachment. This pattern was not accidental. It stemmed from profound social discontent and growing rejection of hard-leftist models that for years governed in a populist, clientelistic, and, in many cases, authoritarian manner. The result is clear: Latin America enters 2026 more polarised than ever.

Latin America is divided as follows:

• Left-wing governments (8): Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela.

• Centrist governments (3): Costa Rica, Panama and the Dominican Republic.

• Right-wing governments (8): Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru

While the profiles, agendas, and leadership of these new right-wing movements are heterogeneous, a common element exists: an increasingly visible discursive and political coordination against their left-wing counterparts, both nationally and internationally. Latin American politics is changing rapidly, and right-wing movements that have yet to emerge, or are seeking to resurface, in countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil should take note.

These three countries represent the region's heavyweights that still remain under left-wing governments. In Colombia, change seems to be approaching; however, Brazil and Mexico continue to be solid bastions of nationalist leftism, where a shift to the right appears, for now, much more complex.

In the Brazilian case, the right remains trapped in Bolsonarism, a movement that is losing strength without the figure of Jair Bolsonaro, now politically neutralised after being found guilty of his attempted insurrection following the 2022 electoral defeat. The Brazilian right, in its current state, remains toxic to democracy, which leaves it poorly positioned to prevent a possible fourth electoral victory for Lula da Silva in 2026.

Mexico presents a different, though equally unfavourable, scenario for the right. The 2030 presidential election is still years away, but the PAN, the main centre-right party and opposition force to MORENA, lacks competitive leadership and the capacity for social mobilisation. Perhaps it won't be until the 2027 midterm elections that new figures begin to emerge, although the road to rebuilding a solid right wing in the face of a nearly hegemonic and still popular regime will be long.

However, some interesting signs have emerged. The PAN seems to be flirting with a business profile as a possible future candidate. Without official confirmation, Ricardo Salinas Pliego's name has begun to circulate widely, fuelled by his constant public clashes with President Claudia Sheinbaum and his growing international visibility, including the invitation he received from US President Donald Trump to an official dinner in Washington in December 2025.

This last element is not insignificant. The United States continues to closely observe Latin American politics, and Trump's explicit support for right-wing leaders in the region, as well as his frictions with left-wing governments, especially in Colombia and Venezuela, confirms that the regional landscape has a clear geopolitical dimension.

The next five years will be decisive for Latin America. The feasibility of international cooperation between opposing ideological poles will be put to the test. We will also see a converse surge in the intrapolar alignment of right-wing movements, which, as in Europe, will seek to build common agendas and thereby strengthen their legitimacy and effectiveness.

In this new political cycle, Latin America faces not only an ideological realignment but also a structural test of the quality of its democracies. The rise of right-wing parties does not, in itself, guarantee stability or better governance, just as the decline of certain left-wing movements does not automatically imply their disappearance. In an international context marked by geopolitical tensions and realignment, and an economic slowdown, Latin America will have to decide whether polarisation becomes its norm or whether the productive channelling of political conflict is possible. The outcome of this cycle will define not only who governs but also how they govern, and whether the region will be able to break, once and for all, with the pendulum of unbridled expectations and recurring disappointments that has marked its recent history.

But one crucial question raised by this interregnum is whether the political centre manages to survive such polarisation? For now, its room for manoeuvre is narrow. Polarisation is here to stay, and there is nothing left to do but navigate and resist it for the rest of the decade.

Image: Flickr/The White House (Daniel Torok)

Licence: public domain.

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