The Most Critical Stage In Syria's Future: Negotiations On The Status Of The Syrian Democratic Forces And The Kurds

Introduction

The current negotiations between the Syrian Interim Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are not merely about administrative arrangements; they concern the nature of the future Syrian state, the recognition of minority rights, and the creation of a united and democratic Syria. Failure to reach a political solution carries the risk of further fragmentation of the country, the resumption of hostilities, and the continuation of humanitarian crises. This study aims to provide a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the recent negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian government on the issue of the status of the SDF and the Kurds, to assess progress, identify key obstacles, and examine the roles of key internal and external actors. Within the scope of this study will be examined and evaluated the impact of the March 10 Agreement, the Qamishli and Hasakah Conferences, and the Paris talks.

Political Negotiations and Agreements (Developments in 2025)

With the reshaping of power balances in post-Assad Syria, important political negotiations and agreements have taken place between the Syrian Interim Government led by HTŞ and the SDF. These developments send critical signals about Syria's future. On 10 March 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara (former HTŞ leader) and SDF leader General Mazlum Abdi signed a historic eight-point agreement called the ‘Damascus Agreement.’ This agreement, which is an important step for Syria's future, shows that the SDF wants to be part of the new Syrian state and accepts it as equal citizens with all rights guaranteed. This agreement is an important turning point in the transition from the multi-faceted conflict in Syria to a potential, but complex, new integration process. The inclusion of SDF-controlled areas and institutions into the Syrian state structure represents a significant concession from the SDF's previous de facto autonomy. The ‘constructive ambiguity’ in the agreement and the implementation committees that will work until the end of the year acknowledge the challenges of the process and adopt a phased integration approach. However, just days after the 10 March agreement, the ‘Constitutional Declaration’ published by Shara's administration became a subject of great controversy. Kurdish officials strongly criticised the declaration, stating that it did not reflect Syria's diversity and did not refer to non-Arab nationalities or non-Islamic beliefs. The new Syrian administration, composed of many ethnic and religious groups, has also been the subject of controversy for accepting the name Syrian Arab Republic. Kurdish officials have described the declaration as ‘far from the spirit of Syria.’ This sudden reaction has highlighted the deep divide between the spirit of the 10 March agreement and the subsequent actions of the new government, seriously undermining trust.

Following the 10th March agreement, a special agreement was signed between the two sides on 2 April 2025 for the Kurdish-populated neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maksud and Ashrafiya in Aleppo. This agreement is a local implementation of the general agreement and represents a practical application of the broader Damascus agreement, serving as a test of how integration will work on the ground. The SDF has stated that it is determined to preserve the identity of the Kurdish neighbourhoods in Aleppo and has announced that it is seeking to resolve the situation through diplomatic and political means. The withdrawal of the SDF's military forces from the Kurdish areas of Aleppo, with the exception of the SDF's internal security units known as ‘Asayish,’ demonstrates that control is shifting to the central authority and that concrete steps are being taken towards the vision of a unified Syrian army. In addition, the SDF's Asayish units establishing local control and coordinating with the Syrian Army has created a local example of how the SDF could be integrated into the Syrian Army. Although the 10 March agreement was presented as a comprehensive framework, it contains natural ambiguities that could be interpreted differently by the parties. While the Syrian government likely viewed ‘integration’ as complete assimilation and subjugation, the SDF perceived it as a path to partnership and recognition within a decentralised framework. This strategic ambiguity enabled the agreement to be signed initially, but became the root cause of subsequent disagreements.

The tensions that arose after the 10 March agreement and the Kurdish reactions to Damascus's constitutional declaration have pushed the Kurdish leadership in North and East Syria to consolidate their positions and create a common vision for future negotiations. One of the most concrete outcomes of this effort was the ‘Rojava Kurdish Unity and Common Position Conference’ held in Qamishli on 26 April 2025. The conference's final declaration called for a decentralised, democratic, and inclusive Syrian state for a new Syria, demanded the explicit constitutional recognition of Kurdish national rights, and proposed that the SDF become a joint local force, a ‘core force,’ within the Syrian Army.

In addition to these local agreements, negotiations are also being conducted with the support and participation of international actors. On 9 July 2025, Syrian Transitional President Shara and government officials, General Mazlum Abdi and officials from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria held a critical meeting in Damascus with the participation of the French Ambassador to Syria, the US Ambassador to Turkey and US Special Representative for Syria Tom Barrack. While an agreement was reached on the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Army, no decision was made on the form and status of this integration. During this meeting, Syrian Transitional Government Foreign Minister Shaybani also requested assurances that the SDF would withdraw from certain Arab areas in Deir ez-Zor, while the SDF stated that it was open to ‘joint administration’ with the central government in these areas, but that security would remain its responsibility until a final political solution was reached. Although this meeting was generally negative, it shows that integration and future cooperation negotiations between the two sides are continuing with international mediation.

The meeting between the Syrian Transitional Government and the SDF planned for 25 July in Paris has been cancelled and postponed to a later date. Although Damascus officially cited clashes between Druze and Bedouin Sunni tribes in Suwayda as the reason for the cancellation, sources say that the real reason was pressure from Turkey. Turkey was worried that France's pro-Kurdish stance would tip the negotiations in favour of the Kurds and suggested that the talks be held in Amman instead of Paris. However, the Syrian Transitional Government later announced that it would not attend the Paris meeting, citing the Joint Position Conference of the Components of North and East Syria held in Hasakah on 8 August as the reason. All ethnic and religious groups within the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria participated in the conference, while Xezal, president of the Syrian Alawite Council, and El Hicrî, spiritual leader of the Druze, participated via video conference from outside the region. The main topics of the conference were the creation of a democratic constitution that includes all parties, a pluralistic and decentralised Syrian Republic, and the preservation of the status of the SDF. The conference emphasised that a Syrian Republic should replace the Syrian Arab Republic for an inclusive Syria. The Syrian Transitional Government, which sharply criticised the conference, said that it resembled ‘old plans aimed at dividing Syria’ and was ‘contrary to the 10 March agreement.’ The Damascus administration also stated that all negotiations should be moved to Damascus. The postponement of the Paris talks, despite significant international support, demonstrates how difficult it is to resolve the fundamental differences between the SDF and the Syrian government. This situation suggests that even strong external pressure and mediation support cannot overcome deep ideological and political differences when fundamental issues such as the governance model in Syria, constitutional guarantees for democratic rights, and identity are not genuinely addressed.

The Process of Integrating the SDF into the Syrian Army and the Kurds' Demand for Status

The future of the Syrian Democratic Forces is a critical issue for Syria's overall stability in the post-Assad era. The integration of the SDF into the Syrian army is a complex process, both politically and militarily, and faces various challenges. SDF leader Mazlum Abdi has stated that, in principle, they want to be part of the Ministry of Defence and play a role in Syria's defence strategy. However, he has also expressed concerns about integrating into the Syrian army without constitutional guarantees and insisted on maintaining a separate military command and organisational structure within the army. While the SDF argues that its forces should join as a bloc, the Damascus administration prefers individual participation for the SDF forces to be absorbed into the new Syrian army. Ahmed al-Shara, on the other hand, emphasised the importance of transitioning to a single national army, stating that ‘a state cannot be established alongside armed groups,’ and firmly rejected the idea of a federation.

In order to accelerate this integration process, the US and Turkey have given the SDF 30 days to complete its full integration into the Syrian army. It has been stated that units that do not comply will be disarmed. This ultimatum is putting serious pressure on the SDF. The Damascus administration is not particularly eager to include YPJ units (Women's Defence Units) in its ranks. Turkey's main expectation in this process is that the SDF will not claim sovereignty over any part of Syrian territory and that the YPG and YPJ will not attempt to exist as a bloc within the army. In this context, Mazlum Abdi stated on 30 July 2025 that the SDF would be integrated into the Syrian army and that Turkey would have no role in this process. However, the postponement of the planned local elections in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria indicates that political uncertainty and external pressure continue in the region. Tom Barrack welcomed Abdi's statements and expressed his expectation that the talks would continue. In addition, in order to accelerate the integration process and continue diplomatic contacts, Mazlum Abdi and his delegation travelled to Paris on 23 July 2025, at the initiative of the United States, to hold diplomatic talks. It was stated that these talks aimed to accelerate the integration process that began in Amman and was interrupted after the clashes in Suwayda.

The integration process is a critical turning point for the future of the SDF. While the SDF seeks to maintain a certain identity, status, or level of autonomy within the national army, the new Syrian government and international actors (particularly the US and Turkey) are pushing for full integration and a unified command structure. The US-Turkey ultimatum is forcing the SDF into a difficult choice between integration and potential military conflict or disarmament. The outcome of this process will redefine the future of northern and eastern Syria and the overall stability of the country. Although General Mazlum Abdi had previously stated that they wanted a decentralised Syria, he has recently made statements such as, ‘We are not demanding federal governance in Syria; we are demanding a centralised Syria without division.’ This can be interpreted as a signal that the SDF may be willing to accept a decentralised local government model with limited powers rather than a federation for the Kurds' autonomy demands. Indeed, Mazlum Abdi reiterated his demand for a decentralised system in which ‘all ethnic and religious groups fully enjoy their rights’ in a statement made in May, and stated that the cultural autonomy of the Kurds must be guaranteed by the constitutional framework. However, Syrian Foreign Minister Shaybani warned that delays in integrating the Autonomous Kurdish Administration into the central structure would ‘open the door to foreign intervention and fuel separatist tendencies.’

Regional and international actors are playing an active role in this process. Turkey supports the full integration of the SDF and the Kurds' renunciation of their claims to autonomy, based on its perception of the YPG threat, while continuing to increase its cooperation activities with the Sharar government. The US continues to support the SDF, its partner in the fight against ISIS, while also supporting a unified Syrian state and pressuring the SDF to join the central army. France, like the US, directly supports the SDF, while conducting numerous international diplomatic activities to secure political status for the SDF vis-à-vis the Damascus administration. Russia, meanwhile, has established pragmatic relations with the new government in order to protect its strategic interests in the post-Assad era, negotiating the future of its military bases and economic cooperation.

Conclusion

The negotiations between the new Syrian government led by Ahmed Shara and the Syrian Democratic Forces represent a critical turning point for the future of post-conflict Syria. Although the agreement signed on 10 March 2025 was seen as a potential step towards integration and reconciliation, subsequent developments such as the Syrian government's constitutional declaration, the postponement of the Qamishli and Hasakah Conferences, and the Paris talks have brought to light the deep disagreements between the parties. Indeed, the postponement of the Paris talks clearly demonstrated the fragility of the diplomatic path. The fundamental point of contention in these negotiations is the contrast between the SDF's demand for a decentralised, autonomous system in which Kurdish rights are constitutionally recognised and the Syrian government's insistence on a centralised ‘one state, one army’ model. In addition, the issue of military integration, with the SDF's desire to preserve its unique command structure and status, remains another significant point of contention. International actors such as the United States and France, as well as regional powers such as Turkey, are exerting significant influence on the process through their recent approaches to the Syrian government. The Syrian government's rejection of federalism and Mazlum Abdi's apparent concession on this issue reflect the pressure exerted on the SDF by international power dynamics.

A lasting agreement depends on bridging the deep ideological divide between the SDF's demand for a decentralised, democratic system that explicitly recognises Kurdish rights and the Syrian government's unwavering commitment to the centralised principle of ‘one state, one army’. The influence of external actors, particularly Turkey's recent rapprochement with Damascus and US pressure for integration, adds additional pressure and complexity to the negotiations. The success of this integration will depend on the new government's willingness to truly embrace the SDF's multi-ethnic structure and guarantee minority rights. While local agreements offer limited, tactical successes, a comprehensive political solution for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria remains uncertain. In order to achieve a broad-based and sustainable political solution in Syria, political flexibility, genuine confidence-building initiatives, and the establishment of a democratic political structure that respects both Syria's territorial integrity and the legitimate aspirations of the various ethnic and religious groups living in Syria, and protects their fundamental rights and freedoms, are necessary. In addition, strong and detailed international mediation support is required for the establishment and sustainability of such a democratic political structure in Syria. Without such an initiative, the region faces the risk of prolonged uncertainty or renewed cycles of conflict.