The India-Russia Arctic Partnership: Symbolic or Strategic?

India’s 2022 Arctic Policy has been framed as an expression of the Hindu philosopher, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’s, “the world is but one family.” The Government of India identified “Science and Research” and “Climate and Environmental Protection” as its first two strategic priorities. Meanwhile, earlier this year in May, in the joint statement of the Third India-Nordic Summit, “cooperation in the Arctic” was emphasised, mirroring the Arctic Policy’s signal of willingness to collaborate “with all stakeholders in the Arctic region.” 

As such, following an India-Russia Summit in New Delhi in December last year, President Modi and President Putin formalised a five year commitment which includes, among other things “regular bilateral consultations” on “Arctic related issues.” This has already resulted in a memorandum, approved this month, between India and Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company, concerning the transportation of maritime cargo through the Northern Sea Route (NSR).

It is clear, therefore, that in the context of an increasingly multipolar and economically fractious world, President Modi is cautious to commit entirely to a single side, keeping the ‘Bharat First’ (India first) policy at the forefront of his mind as he navigates the geopolitical chessboard. That said, an India-Russian partnership in the Arctic provides several strategic benefits for both countries.

History

India’s first Arctic expedition took place in 2007, and was swiftly followed by the construction of the Himadri research station a year later. India has held Observer status in the Arctic Council since 2013. 

Russia and India first initiated their “Strategic Partnership” with the establishment of an annual summit, which began in 2000. However, the Arctic did not feature in dialogue between the two countries until the 2019 summit – just a year after China started calling itself a “Near Arctic State.” Following this, in 2021, India and Russia first started cooperating on transporting Russian oil to India via the NSR. 

Russian Interests in an Arctic Partnership with India

Balancing Relations with China 

As Western sanctions squeeze the Russian economy, the Sino-Russian partnership has grown stronger. Russia and China have engaged in frequent joint military exercises – 27 took place between 2022 and 2024, with 16 in Arctic waters. Meanwhile, Chinese firms are collaborating with Rosatom to develop shipping infrastructure for the NSR. This symbol of strength nevertheless masks an imbalance of power in the partnership: sanctions have left Russia more dependent on China for financial investment than ever, posing a strategic challenge for Russia as China’s interest in the Arctic is highly ambitious. The country has voiced aspirations to establish a Polar Silk Road, including turning the NSR into an international trade corridor, and build infrastructure to harness the Arctic’s energy resources. Over-dependence on China thus undermines Russia’s leveraging power and even de jure control over its own Arctic territory. 

Bringing India deeper into Arctic affairs would balance out Russia’s vulnerability to China. Not only would India be more likely to remain loyal, due to suspicions of China’s relationship with Pakistan, but Russia would also be able to further diversify its investor portfolio. 

Another BRICS stakeholder in the Arctic 

Though Russia occupies the largest area of Arctic landmass, it is the only Arctic Circle power who is not a member of NATO, meaning the territory is entirely surrounded by NATO members. In addition, since Russia’s war in Ukraine, Arctic Council meetings were initially suspended, but have since resumed without Moscow. As a result, in order to exert political agency outside the Council, it is strategically beneficial for Russia to encourage non-regional BRICS stakeholder involvement, like that of India. This has already started with the BRICS Working Group on Polar and Ocean Science and Technology which took place in May 2025. 

Leverage through New Shipping Routes

The NSR is fast becoming an alternate shipping route as a result of the melting of sea ice caused by climate change. In 2024, the shipping lane transported 37.9 million tonnes of goods and could in the future, according to John C. K. Daly of Jamestown, become as important as the Suez Canal for global trade. If this does indeed occur, controlling the NSR would also give Russia leveraging power to challenge current Western sanctions, as well as a strong hold over global economic security. Continued Indian investment and cooperation in the construction of such infrastructure would thus be highly beneficial to this end. 

Indian Interests in an Arctic Partnership with Russia

Increased Military Capability

One way New Delhi can enhance India’s global prestige is through a demonstration of military strength. At the India-Russia Summit last December, it was agreed that Indian mariners will be taught by the Russian military how to operate in polar waters. In addition to this, both states have agreed to support up to 5 warships, 10 aircraft and 3000 personnel on each other’s territory. Moreover, joint Indo-Russian shipbuilding is increasingly likely as is the joint development of a new class of non-nuclear icebreakers. Gaining Russian icebreaker technology will be a particularly valuable technological prize for India. Indeed, not only has Russia invested heavily in icebreaker development, but the country possesses the world’s largest icebreaker fleet; compared to Russia’s 57 icebreakers, the US Coast Guard only has 3 – Finland and the US are planning to build 6 more. Thus, India can gain access to technology which is currently a source of asymmetry with Western Arctic capabilities. 

Preventing Russian Over-dependence on China  

To protect diplomatic relations, India has remained fairly neutral about Russia’s war in Ukraine. This is because an unfriendly Russia overly dependent on, and closely partnered with, China could be unfavourable to India. Though India-China relations have warmed recently through increased investment opportunities, this is largely pragmatic due to geopolitical uncertainty, and India’s need for access to rare earth elements. Rather, not only did China support Pakistan in the conflict between India and Pakistan, which ensued in May last year, and provides 80% of Pakistan’s military capability, but Pakistan is also part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Above all else, China and Pakistan have spoken of their diplomatic relationship, which has existed for over 75 years, as that of ‘Friendship and Brotherhood.’ A key source of the longevity of the relationship is the shared threat of India. And so, supporting Russian logistical and operational activity in the Arctic benefits India’s interest to keep Russia favourable to India over Pakistan. 

Shorter Maritime Routes and Resources

As an article in the Hindustan Times by Pravesh Kumar Gupta of Vivekananda International Foundation put it, “it is the right time for India to increase its economic activities in the region, which will also provide strategic advantages.” Indeed, developing new shipping routes, such as the ambition to connect the NSR to the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor – which was agreed at the XXIII Russian-Indian Annual Summit - would reduce northern European-Indo-Pacific shipping distances by 40%. It would also enable India to diversify shipping routes, thus reducing dependence on the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca, which could be weaponised as geopolitical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the completion of the North-South Transport Corridor would open up the opportunity for Arctic oil, gas and rare earth elements to be delivered directly to India, thus aiding Modi’s ambition for a more autonomous India. 

Yet Practicality Plays a Part…

Ambitious as the idea, possibilities and opportunities of the NSR are for India and Russia, it is certainly a longer-term objective. Not only does the route periodically freeze over, but major infrastructure is yet to be developed and Russia is still subject to Western sanctions.

All in all the India-Russia Arctic Partnership is far from mere symbolism, serving multiple strategic interests for both countries. In the immediate political context, by balancing the power triangle with China and increasing BRICS influence in the Arctic region; and in the longer term, economically through exerting influence over a potential major shipping route, which could pave the way for a stronger grasp over global trade and critical resources.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Prime Minister's Office (GODL India)

Licence: Government Open Data Licence (India)

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