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A nail in the coffin of the Conservatives
If you’re anything like me, you’ve been relishing the shambolic death spiral of the Conservative Party: the anarchy of its leadership elections, the farce of its policy decisions, the aberration of its defections. All of it confirming, for me, a sense of karmic justice.
After nearly a decade and a half of austerity, cronyism, corruption, and Liz the lettuce Truss, the Conservatives suffered one of the most devastating defeats in UK history, losing 251 seats and falling to just 121 in opposition. Reflecting on the hits of Conservative rule might help to explain why this has happened.
Under David Cameron, the UK was suffering from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. His predecessor Gordon Brown had previously undertaken large policy changes, such as funding failing banks (a policy copied by Bush and Merkel) and economic stimulus. This, when copied to the tune of $1T, the World Bank president, Robert Zoellick, described as having ‘broken the fall’ of the financial crisis. From here, all Cameron had to do was increase trust in the UK Government, but he and his chancellor George Osborne chose to cut public spending instead.
Austerity is a bad policy. It is quite pragmatic to seek out wasteful spending to then cut it out – it is, however, highly damaging during times of low-interest borrowing, and highly damaging to cut essential public spending. It is counterproductive to contract growth when expenditure is almost zero-cost, and Osborne and Cameron presided over borrowing costs as low as 0.5% from 2009-2016. This is why the IMF concluded that austerity had a negative impact on growth. During a Global Financial Crisis, it would be insane to attempt to slow growth.
In addition, public capital spending also included cuts to areas of Business, Innovation and Skills, Local Government, Education, and Justice, in addition to cutting half a million jobs. This failed to communicate trust, but instead a willingness to resign the public sector to the private sector—what Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy argue is the third wave of Neoliberalism: deregulation, pro-monopoly economies, and heavier reliance on e-commerce and emerging technologies.
While it is easy to claim that UKIP pressured the Conservatives into adopting Brexit, it was in fact backbenchers who supported the position, with over 100 MPs attending a Eurosceptic Conservative group. Cameron pledged a referendum in the 2015 manifesto. And we all know what happened next. But what we received was a decisive government that took unpopular and confident leadership (albeit with poor policy); the party seldom had to invoke celebrity endorsements or headline-catching farces.
Successor to Cameron, Theresa May—the first female PM since Thatcher—faced only one problem as she took office: how to do Brexit. Many smaller issues followed, such as whether the UK should have a Hard Brexit or Soft Brexit, or the issue regarding Northern Ireland, especially since the Democratic Unionist Party had been in a confidence and supply agreement since 2017 (an informal coalition to keep the Conservatives in power without a majority).
May enacted Article 50 of the European Union’s treaty, enabling the UK to leave the European Union, though this came with the responsibility to clarify how and when the UK will leave. May’s government quickly became the first to be found in contempt of Parliament over its failure to publish full legal advice on Brexit—a trend that became commonplace for the Conservatives.
May eventually negotiated a Brexit Deal and put it to Parliament, where it was voted down 432-202. It was then amended to further clarify the Irish Backstop and assure its impermanence, wherein it was again voted down 391-242. Fearing another rejection, May separated the withdrawal agreement from the political declaration that would have declared the intended UK-EU relationship, including the former and omitting the latter. This was then voted down 344-286, on the deadline to leave the EU. Legally, the UK had a No-Deal Brexit, but then the UK didn’t leave. While the deal never fundamentally changed, May had exhausted her chances of passing it, and the goodwill the party had towards her evaporated. This resulted in her resignation.
Whilst we can see the cracks beginning to form, we can still conclude that May attempted to move the party by sheer force of will. Whilst the rebellions meant she could not effectively pass Brexit, the intent was still apparent, and nothing would bend it. She attempted the same Brexit deal three times, and she browbeat the DUP into a confidence-and-supply agreement rather than a coalition. Once again, decisive and unreliant.
As the so-called ‘Heineken Tory’, Boris Johnson offered to satisfy the increasingly frustrated and disillusioned public. He triggered the Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019, and, in an alleged attempt to aid Johnson’s victory chances, Nigel Farage stood down over 300 Brexit Party (now Reform UK) candidates (we’ll come back to that). Johnson enacted Brexit on 18th October 2019 with his larger majority. With the increased backbenchers, Johnson was an effective leader, though quickly bogged down by COVID and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Within a few years, the Johnson administration became a carnival of scandal, whittling down support for the Conservatives. This includes Matt Hancock’s affair, Dominic Cummings’ COVID drive, Partygate, Boris Johnson lying to the Queen to prorogue Parliament, and alleged ‘rife’ cocaine use in his government. Alas, it wasn't long before Labour was topping the polls.
Due to the chaos that plagued the Conservatives at the time - especially with the Steve Bannon-ite “Flood the Zone” method and Johnson’s own gish-galloping technique- it is hard to confirm the degree to which Johnson controlled the Conservatives. However, with Johnson’s own personal popularity, it is likely that he was capable of conducting the direction of the party. To what extent the cabinet ran rampant is hard to say; however, with the exception of scandals, the Conservatives offered a unified front. That is, once Brexit got done. Afterwards, COVID regulations became a major point of contention, with The Brexit Party acting as a major opponent of Lockdown, and Conservative backbenchers opposing vaccine passports (once again diluted). Johnson got in with the consent of the far-right, and, once revoked, the party became more fragmented. The Conservatives had become entirely reliant on the Brexit Party/Reform in order to gain an election victory.
Jumping before he was pushed, Johnson left Downing Street and was replaced by Liz Truss. Within 49 days, she was gone. The Mini-Budget sought to put into place large unfunded tax cuts for the highest tax bracket, effectively high-risk free-market economics, causing a harsh market reaction, and was met with a doubling-down from Kwasi Kwarteng (her chancellor) and Truss. This killed the popularity of the Conservatives and forced Truss out of power.
Rishi Sunak took over, aiming to halve inflation, grow the economy, reduce debt, cut waiting lists, and stop the boats—failing on the latter three. It is worth mentioning now that the Small Boat Crisis skyrocketed after Brexit as a result of the UK leaving the Schengen Information System and the Dublin III Regulation—and it would remain high until the overall number of non-EU asylum seekers coming to Europe dropped. Sunak parroted Reform talking points in order to gain power, and utilised those same talking points once in government, legitimising them, but also giving Reform the ability to set the total Conservative agenda.
The early reign of the Conservatives in the 21st century was one that had a clear vision (Austerity and Brexit), though ultimately beholden to their members. Cameron had a clear vision for a Britain leaving the recession utilising an ultimately naïve economic plan. The Conservatives continued their vision, rejecting what they perceived to be ‘weak’ or ‘insufficient’ Brexit deals. And when they believed their leadership was no longer capable of setting or maintaining the agenda, the party ejected their leader.
However, something happened in 2019: the Conservatives won in a landslide due to a rising and noisy threat to the right backing down: the Brexit Party’s electoral stand-down. Suddenly their victory was contingent on the Conservatives’ willingness to bend to the Brexit Party/Reform UK’s wishes.
As Nigel Farage dictated his problems with government and policy, the Conservatives began to dance to his tune. As Farage ratcheted up the ‘migrant problem,’ Sunak pledged to Stop the Boats. As Farage dubbed the 2024 election ‘the immigration election,’ the Conservatives utilised culture wars to justify hardline immigration policies. As Farage demanded we leave the ECHR, Badenoch’s Conservatives pledged the same, and while Farage maintains this is merely rhetorical mimicry, the policies are very similar.
Now, two years removed from Sunak’s premiership, it is clear the Conservatives are still marching to the beat of Farage’s drum. The Tory Party Conference was effectively just a pantomime from a party that has still not learned why they were ejected from power – with an awkward attempt to regress into old Thatcherite rhetoric, and a pledge that the party was ‘election ready’ (whilst being third in the polls).
What Jeremy Clarkson’s complaints, concerning the toppling of his tax evasion scheme, at the Conference represent is the total resignation of the Conservatives. They are no longer focused on building popular policy, nor aiming for a vision, nor even reconnecting with their base to rebuild the party anew. They are instead utilising spectacle and pop culture to try to cajole the public into believing they are ‘with it.’ With celebrity endorsements and dancing to the tune of another party’s highly polarising leader, the Conservatives are no longer a serious party. They are a tribute act of a party that I don’t expect to last another decade. In fact, Jeremy Clarkson was previously a detriment to the party, and disavowed in order for regular government to occur; his endorsement betrays that the Conservatives aren’t serious.
Instead, I would advise Badenoch that she should take the opportunity afforded by Reform: purge the party. All of the backbenchers and old skeletons in the Tory cupboard that have plagued the party—pushing for Brexit, rejecting the ECHR, profiteering from office— need to be cut in favour of a party that intends to return the country to a progressive conservative force. Some of the worst offenders have already fled to Reform, and Kemi Badenoch has the chance to renew the party into a modern conservative fighting force, without the corruption and cronyism that have plagued the Conservatives for the last decade and a half, and without the sensationalised culture wars that operate within Reform. Divorce the Conservatives from Reform.
The Conservatives need to learn the same lesson that Keir Starmer couldn’t: the only people who should be dictating the direction of the party should be the members and the leaders, not the main contender against the party.
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