The Future of Syria: The Balkanization Scenario

On the thirteenth anniversary of the Syrian Revolution, which began in March 2011, Syrian politics entered a new era with the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Following the completion of the Syrian Revolution with the overthrow of Assad, at the end of the first year (December 2025), the new Sunni central authority established in Damascus by the Transitional Government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is attempting to shape the country's future. While the Transitional Government, led by Ahmed al-Shara, is striving to create a Sunni-centric Syria as a whole, conditions on the ground are making the situation difficult. Following Assad's overthrow, the new administration is seeking diplomatic legitimacy from the international community, establishing relationships with numerous regional and global actors, primarily the US, but also Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Ahmed Shara's administration, which aimed to establish a strong, centralized, Sunni-centric political authority by overcoming Syria's geographical and ideological fragmentation, has failed to resolve fundamental issues such as the status of Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), even after completing its first year in office.

The recognition of Ahmed Shara's administration within the Arab League, which receives Saudi Arabian economic and political support, and the reestablishment of relations with the West (particularly the United States), on a conciliatory basis, has secured Ahmed Shara's administration international legitimacy. While Saudi Arabia is strengthening its ties with Shara to establish itself on the territory, against the political Shiite threat and to limit Turkey's influence in the region, the main goal of the US administration is to establish a permanent presence in Syria. The reasons behind the US administration's goal of establishing a permanent presence in Syria are to limit Turkey's influence, counterbalance Russia geopolitically, and create a platform for Israel in the region. It is further likely that the US will establish a presence in the region to prevent local conflicts and combat international terrorism. Russia, in particular, wants to strengthen its relations with the new Syrian government in order not to lose its military power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey, through Shara's high-level visit, has opened up political space for the new government and provided strategic support to the Ahmed Shara administration by emphasizing the principles of Syrian territorial integrity, inclusive governance, and the elimination of terrorism. This international acceptance  and support has increased the new administration's motivation to establish authority throughout the country, but it has also brought anxiety to minority regions.

Separation Dynamics: The Interior and Coastal Regions

The rise of a new Sunni Islamic authority in Syria is creating serious security concerns for sectarian minorities in western and southern Syria. In Latakia and Tartus (Alawite/Nusayri region), strongholds of the Assad regime, Alawite civilian militias and some pro-former regime military groups are demanding autonomy to protect themselves from attacks by Sunni Islamist militias and potential repression by the Shara government, and to constitutionally guarantee their minority rights. However, the Shara government maintains tight control over the region, refusing to allow administrative separation and conducting operations against pro-former regime military groups. The armed repressions against the Alevi population in the region and the conflicts over control of the area, which have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, highlight the oppression and critical situation in the region. The Ahmed Shara administration opposes the Alevis' demand for autonomy, particularly due to the region's strategic location as a corridor opening onto the Mediterranean and Iran's desire to re-establish itself in the region. Saudi Arabia and the United States have sided with the Shara administration on this issue. However, this region is of geopolitical importance for Russia due to the presence of its military bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. In short, the issue of control over the Nusayri region and the status of the region is a strategic region where the interests of many states intersect at the regional and global levels.

In the south, in the Suwayda region where the Druze are in the majority, popular movements against both the old regime and the new government have strengthened demands for autonomy, spearheaded by the Military Council. The separatist Druze's demands for autonomy have increased due to the new administration's efforts to control the region. The increase in ransom and kidnapping incidents targeting Druze groups, along with bloody clashes, is pushing the motivation for secession in this region to new heights. Although Turkey emphasises its commitment to Syria's territorial integrity, the geographical location of Suwayda and Israel's strategic interests in the Druze issue, coupled with the fact that the region is far from Turkey's military operations area and the Druze pose no threat to Turkey, make it highly likely that the region will become a separate political Druze canton from centralised Syria. While Saudi Arabia maintains a calm stance on the Druze issue, Israel and the US are showing serious political opposition to the Shara government's approach to the Druze. In particular, Israel does not shy away from bombing southern Syrian regions, primarily Damascus, citing its own security and that of the Druze as justification. Israel also openly supports Druze rebels and separatist Druze groups led by Sheikh al-Hijri, both politically and militarily. Saudi Arabia, while not directly opposing the Druze gaining constitutional minority rights, emphasises its commitment to Syria's territorial integrity and supports the region remaining under the political and military control of the central government in Damascus.

North-East Pole: SDF Integration and the Status of the Kurds

The issue of Syria's integrity after Assad has triggered a necessary negotiation process between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the new government in Damascus. The search for potential non-conflict and integration between SDF Commander Mazlum Abdi and the Shara government is proceeding under pressure from the US and Turkey. The US assumed a mediating role to prevent a potential civil war between the two sides, while also attempting to ease pressure from Ankara and Damascus against the Kurds. This policy shows that the US is trying to preserve Syria's current fragmented political structure. However, the other most decisive actor in this process is Turkey. Ankara has absolutely opposed the federalism demands of the SDF, which possesses a strong military structure, and has even threatened to launch operations against the SDF together with the Damascus government. Turkey opposes the formation of an autonomous Kurdish region with a strong army in Northern and Eastern Syria. However, if a situation arises where the SDF is integrated into the new Syrian army and the YPG disbands itself, Turkey might allow a local administrative Kurdish structure (with limited autonomy) that lacks military power. This political situation indicates that any potential final SDF-Damascus agreement cannot take place without Turkey's approval. Although the Kurds' fundamental demands are a federal structure and constitutional recognition, the most likely scenario is that they will be forced to settle for a regional administration with local administrative and financial autonomy, lacking military power (or with limited military power), as a result of the pressure exerted by Turkey and the US (regarding the integration of the SDF), leading to the abandonment of full federalism.

Possible Scenarios for Syria's Future: The Possibility of Balkanization

The future of Syria is now shaped around three main scenarios: Fragile Decentralization, Complete Fragmentation and Military Unification. Given the current policies of international powers (particularly the US and Turkey), the most likely scenario is Fragile Decentralization. In this scenario, the Shara Government is nominally recognized as the central authority, but the SDF, Druze, and Alawite regions continue to exist as semi-autonomous cantons that effectively manage their own internal affairs. While the US is trying to stabilize this current fragmented political situation, Turkey, emphasizing its unitary state and territorial integrity, is trying to prevent this ‘de facto’ division from gaining legal ground. Actually, this situation is leading to the Balkanization of Syria.

The overthrow of Assad in 2024 has placed Syria under a process of ‘Regional Guardianship’ overseen by international powers (especially the US and Turkey). This guardianship seeks to prevent the complete disintegration of the country (sectarian division) by recognizing the legitimacy of the Shara government. Although Assad's overthrow appears to have brought unity and victory to Syria, in reality it has left behind a geographically fragmented legacy, constrained by the red lines of international powers and ready for conflict at any moment. The Shara government's inability to ensure integration and security, in particular, will pave the way for foreign troops to officially establish a presence in Syria to provide security. The new administration's current policies indicate that it will be unable to overcome Syria's geographical and ideological fragmentation and that the country will continue to exist on a fragile axis of decentralisation. This situation is likely to push this fragile balance either towards complete collapse (as a result of military intervention) or towards an unstable model under international tutelage (fragile decentralization). In short, Syria is in a state of ‘fragile decentralization’, framed by the red lines of the US and Turkey. Despite being internationally recognised, Ahmed Shara's administration finds itself caught between the security concerns and autonomy demands of minorities in Suwayda and along the coast, and the status demands of Kurds and the SDF in north-eastern Syria. If international actors withdraw their support, this balance is inevitably heading towards rapid and complete disintegration, as national conflict escalates.

Image: Emrah Roni Mira