Libya Is A Focal Point For The Post-Davos World Order

With a grim expression and a somber tone of voice Canadian PM Mark Carney spoke at Davos. He spoke not just to the room of elites in front of him but to civilian populations across the world. The conversations that have undoubtedly been taking place behind closed doors for years were now made public: “Let me be clear. We are in a rupture, not a transition. Over the past two decades a series of crises in finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration.” The world has changed. The unipolar structure that defined geopolitics from 1989 onwards has gone and risks, as well as opportunities, now abound for states across the world. For Libya, a state embroiled in internal political conflict but also abundant in natural energy reserves and of great geographical strategic importance, the stakes are high. 

When the US launched a strike on Caracas and brought Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro back to the states it marked a shift toward a new style of international relations. Trump demonstrated his belief in ‘spheres of influence’ and quipped that he was now rewriting the “Donroe Doctrine” - a warning that America had the right to engage in the western hemisphere as and when it wished. Libya is a country not entirely incomparable to Venezuela however far from the US sphere of influence. Both are rich in oil and also of great geopolitical importance, therefore attracting interest from the major players in their respective neighbourhoods. Venezuela has acted as a gateway for smuggling gangs and human traffickers heading to the US just as Libya is for Europe. As a result, Russia, the EU, Turkey and UAE all have a vested interest in both Tripoli and Benghazi.

Libya is a state that has, ever since the fall of the despotic dictator Colonel Gaddafi in 2011, been a portent for the direction of geopolitical travel the world is going in. A destabilised central government in Tripoli relies on militia gangs in order to survive despite being recognised by the United Nations, meanwhile a Russian-supported regime led by General Khalifa Haftar operates out of Benghazi with the pull for foreign investment now arguably coming from the east. In February 2025 Reuters reported that a private oil company in the east of Libya had exported over $600 million worth of oil since the previous May, thus bringing an end to the monopoly held by the Tripoli based National Oil Corporation. 

Russia’s interest toward Eastern Libya has grown since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. Military equipment, personnel and direct flights have been taken from Russia to Eastern Libya and diplomatic missions have been made on multiple occasions. As Trump threatens to break apart international norms and institutions Russia’s engagement in Eastern Libya will almost certainly only grow as it looks to disrupt the interests of the UN-backed government operating out of Tripoli. 

However, it isn’t just Moscow that has demonstrated an interest in growing diplomatic relations with Benghazi in recent years. In July 2025 an EU delegation was expelled from Benghazi after the Haftar government accused them of “disregarding national sovereignty". The exact reasoning for the expulsion is unclear however it was a humiliation for the delegation and for Europe more generally. It also further highlighted the fact that the dynamics of power may be shifting in Libya and that Benghazi is confident enough to be assertive and confrontational in its actions: it further underpins the idea that Tripoli is chaotic and weak, whilst Benghazi is confident and assertive.

Europe’s focus may be drawn further away from the Maghreb in the months and years ahead as Trump threatens Greenland and the disbandment of NATO. As a consequence EU member states are preparing to rearm at an accelerating pace. The threat from Russia to Europe’s eastern border is an obvious focus of concern but that should not distract from the fact that Libya will become of even greater geostrategic importance in a Europe that is no longer backed by US military power and supranational defence institutions like NATO. 

The EU is limited in its ability to engage with Benghazi meanwhile Russia, UAE and Turkey have the independence to shift their focus away from Tripoli and instead cosy up to Haftar in the east. The UAE has backed the Haftar regime with weapons that have also been used to support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan - a rebel group backed by Haftar and accused of crimes against humanity by the UN. The UAE have long denied supporting the RSF however the evidence to the contrary has been widely reported. If Benghazi continues to enjoy economic and military support from Russia, Turkey and UAE then it may very well surpass Tripoli in becoming the power centre in Libya despite the latter being formally recognised by the UN, EU and the US. 

Libya will certainly become a country that is competed over in the years to come and the division between Tripoli and Benghazi exemplifies the competition perfectly. The EU has already shown its willingness to overlook human rights abuses in order to protect its southern border from smuggling gangs crossing the Mediterranean by training and funding the Libyan Coast Guard, an institution notorious for their violent methods. But the EU and UN are limited in their engagement in Libya due to institutions and frameworks tying them to Tripoli. In a post-Davos world order without US backing and in which EU focus is drawn back to domestic rearmament, Libya may be open for further Russian support and the balance of power may swing toward Benghazi.

Image: Flickr/Andy Carvin

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