Integrated Syria: The Integration of the SDF and the Status of the Kurds

The beginning of 2026 marked a historic turning point in relations between the transitional government led by Ahmed Shara and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria. The military defeat of the SDF on the ground has meant the re-establishment of state authority for the Damascus government. However, in the subsequent process during which realities on the ground have evolved into a political agreement, the ‘Integration and Ceasefire Agreement’ between the Damascus government and the SDF took on a new dimension, establishing a new balance between the authority of Damascus and the constitutional rights and status of the Kurds. This new dimension represents a balance of political governance between the two sides. While the Shara administration seeks to consolidate its control throughout the country without disrupting Syria's unitary governance model, the SDF administration aims to legitimize its own status, have a say in the administration of Kurd Regions, and establish its own model of self-governance at the local level. This process is not merely a disarmament agreement, but the most concrete attempt at rebuilding Syria's administrative and constitutional structure, and shows that Syria has entered a critical institutionalisation phase as of February 2026.

Regression on the Ground, Strategic Stalemate, and Diplomatic Exit

As we entered 2026, tensions between the Syrian transitional government led by Ahmed Shara, emphasising ‘one authority, one army’ and the SDF's insistence on ‘status and autonomy’ escalated into hot clashes in and around Aleppo in early January. The spread of these clashes to the region and east of the Euphrates fundamentally altered the balance of power in Syria.

According to the agreement signed at the People's Palace in Damascus on January 18, 2026, the SDF had agreed to withdraw from all areas west of the Euphrates River to the east. However, the defection of Arab tribes in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in favour of Damascus led to conflicts between the Damascus government and the SDF spreading to the east of the Euphrates and causing the region to fall under the control of the Damascus government. The defection of Arab forces within the SDF to the Damascus government forced the SDF to withdraw. This situation compelled the YPG forces, composed of Kurds within the SDF, to retreat to their natural areas, namely Kurdish regions. Indeed, the Damascus government, which controlled strategic areas and energy lines such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor east of the Euphrates, knew that controlling the Kurdish regions would not be as easy as controlling the Arab regions such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Furthermore, the Shara administration knew that this situation would lead to a Kurdish-Arab war in which the Kurdish people would fight alongside the YPG against the Damascus government. The parties sat down at the negotiating table through the mediation of US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barak and President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Nechirvan Barzani. While the Ahmed Shara government gained the psychological upper hand with its ‘integrate or fight’ ultimatum, SDF leader Mazlum Abdi aimed for a model of ‘honorable integration’ that would constitutionally guarantee Kurdish gains. The agreement signed on January 18th, following these talks, entered a new phase with a comprehensive ‘Integration and Ceasefire Agreement’ detailed on January 30th.

Integration and Status of the SDF After the Agreement

The integration of the SDF's military wing into the Syrian army has become one of the most complex civil-military cooperation processes since the military breakdown in early 2026. The January 18th and subsequent January 30th agreements established a legal and military framework for the SDF to transform from a ‘parallel army’ into a part of the state's defence architecture. While the Damascus government initially insisted on the complete disbandment of the SDF and the individual integration of its fighters into the army, a more ‘hybrid’ model was agreed upon by February 2026.

A large portion of the Kurdish elements within the SDF are structured as special brigades directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense in Damascus, but partially maintaining a local command structure. Specifically, a division consisting of three brigades is planned for Hasakah Governorate, and another brigade is planned for Kobani. Furthermore, it has been decided that the SDF's heavily armed units and border guards will be integrated into the 5th Corps, which has direct central command. The integration of the SDF has resulted in radical changes not only in the military but also in the internal security dimension. Units of the Damascus Ministry of Interior have entered city centers such as Hasakah and Qamishli, and the local Kurdish internal security force, Asayish, has been incorporated as a separate security unit within the Syrian General Security unit. This ensures that the security of the cities is managed through joint patrols and joint command centres.

The Status of Kurds and the Transformation of the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria

When the reality on the ground is examined after these conflicts, it is clear that the de facto 'Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria' model has lost its large-scale political claims. However, this is not an annihilation, but an institutional evolution. The defection of Sunni Arab tribes within the SDF in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor to the Damascus government side during the conflicts caused the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria to lose territory and also destroyed the territorial integrity of the autonomous administration. Only the Kurdish regions called Rojava, where Kurds live in large numbers, remain under the control of the autonomous administration. The 14-point agreement signed after the conflicts has created a new local administration system in Syria. With this agreement, the Damascus government accepted administrative autonomy in local administration in the Kurdish-populated regions of Syria. The most concrete indication of this situation is the fact that the governor appointed to the Hasakah Governorate was officially chosen by the SDF, and this development is the first step in the integration of the SDF's autonomous administrative institutions into the Syrian state structure. Prior to this, through Decree No. 13 by the Damascus government, the recognition of Kurdish as the national language in Kurdish-majority settlements and the constitutional guarantee of cultural rights were also indicators that self-governance would transform into cultural and local autonomy.

While the SDF views this new local governance system as an 'Autonomous Administration System’ the Damascus government sees it as an ‘Strengthened Provincial System’. This structure, formalised under Damascus's sovereignty, legitimises the Kurdish presence in the region, transforming it from a separatist entity into a special status local administration integrated into the Syrian state. If the Hasakah model proves successful, it is likely to be adopted in other regions with large religious and ethnic minorities, or in provinces where Sunni Arab tribal structures are strong. This is because the Alawites and Druze also demand autonomous status in local governance. Furthermore, while Sunni Arab tribes in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, who have sided with the Damascus government, have strengthened the balance within the army in favour of Damascus, these Arab tribes also seek a share of the oil in their regions and official representation in local governance. This situation makes it possible to switch to an ‘Strengthened Provincial System’ in other provinces as well.

Conclusion and Evaluation

Thanks to Ahmed Shara's successful diplomatic initiatives, the Trump administration's positioning of the new government in Damascus as a primary partner in the fight against ISIS and its pressure on the SDF to integrate has strengthened Shara's hand in unifying Syria under his control. As of February 2026, the Shara government is closer than ever to achieving its goal of ‘one flag, one army’ in Syria but the preservation of the SDF's existence demonstrates on the ground that this integration is a unification, not a dissolution. Although the significant departure of Arab tribal forces from the SDF, which was established under the leadership of Kurdish forces, is seen as a loss of territory and power, on the contrary, the SDF's return to its essence as a homogeneous structure composed of Kurds has led to the formation of a national (Kurdish) homogeneous structure under one identity and in a specific region. Because the nationalistic sentiment of the Kurdish civilian population in the Rojava region in the face of the Damascus government's military attacks and their solidarity with the SDF has been the most important indicator of the formation of a regional Kurdish homogeneous structure. However, the Syrian government's Decree No. 13, which legally guaranteed official language and citizenship rights for Kurds, became the most important soft power element used by the SDF to reduce its influence among the Kurdish people and increase trust in Damascus among the Kurdish population. For Ahmed Shara, this was less a military victory and more a success in creating an image of a statesman capable of uniting the country without firing a shot.

The agreement between the Damascus government and the SDF is likely to bring Syria closer to a ‘decentralised unitary state’ model over time. Therefore, the model, referred to as the ‘Strengthened Provincial System’ or ‘Autonomous Administration System’ could pave the way for a Balkanization of Syria. The success of the agreement depends on whether the Damascus government fulfils its constitutional promises to the Kurds and on the adaptation of SDF elements to their new positions within the army. While SDF leader Mazlum Abdi, with the support of international guarantors (the US, France and the KRG), is trying to make Kurdish rights unchangeable in the new constitution, the Ahmed Shara administration is exhibiting a centralizing reflex that risks diluting these rights after establishing full control on the ground. This is because at the Riyadh Summit on February 9th, Damascus government officials confirmed that the ultimate goal regarding integration is to completely eliminate the institutional identity of the SDF. If the Damascus government transforms this process into an oppressive centralism, it seems inevitable that the region will be pregnant with a new internal conflict in the coming years.

Image: Emrah Roni Mira

Licence: CC BY-ND 4.0