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For Whom the Border Opens – a lesson from Ceuta’s humanitarian crisis


July 31, 2026. We have just witnessed the unprecedented arrival of around 60,000 migrants (mainly from Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa) in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, in North Africa, in just 48 hours. The crisis swiftly reignited deep geopolitical divisions within the European continent, leading to bitter political frictions between Spain and several EU member states. The Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, immediately called for Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez to close its borders, while affirming Italy’s stance on temporarily suspending the Schengen Area.


But is this crisis in Ceuta anything new? Not exactly. In a way, these types of crises are not unprecedented in the sense that Spain’s southern border has experienced repeated migration crises over the last three decades. What is unprecedented, however, is the number of people involved: tens of thousands in a matter of days. The sheer scale of 60,000 arrivals in just 48 hours is overwhelming for a city that has only 85,000 inhabitants - it creates unsustainable humanitarian pressure. 


Interestingly though, Morocco’s Minister of the Interior said that the recent border surge in Ceuta was mobilised by misinformation on social media. Apparently, there were rumours that Spain could no longer immediately deport people arriving by sea. The possible misinterpretation comes at a time when Pedro Sánchez simplified the route to legal status for more than one million undocumented migrants already in the country. If what the Moroccan minister said was true, then Europe’s external borders are no longer challenged only physically – they are challenged digitally. Algorithms can move thousands of people before governments even realise a rumour exists. 


Politicians love to point their fingers at each other, but no one seems to take the blame (our parents taught us it is rude to point, but they seem to do it anyway). So, who or what is actually to blame for all of this? As a non-politician, I point my finger at three things.

First, the government of Morocco. Are we led to believe that the Moroccan government did not provoke this? That Rabat and Madrid made peace with each other after what happened in 2021? To refresh everyone’s minds, in May 2021, Morocco allowed 8,000 to 12,000 migrants into Ceuta as a retaliation against Spain for the latter admitting Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front (a group fighting for Western Sahara’s independence), for medical treatment. Some authors consider this deliberate tactic as an ‘instrumentalisation’ of migration. I prefer the term ‘weaponisation’, because, although similar in meaning, it encapsulates the retribution-like attitude Rabat exhibited when the government incentivised the crossings. Since 2021, relations with Spain (or the EU) are still strained, based on how migration has been repeatedly used as a diplomatic leverage. Morocco bears responsibility because it either enabled or failed to prevent a mass movement which Rabat previously demonstrated it could control, while online misinformation has spread false expectations about access to Europe.


Second, the government of Spain. As mentioned previously, Pedro Sánchez has alleviated controls for undocumented migrants inside the country. This makes it easy for widely followed influencers to convince Moroccan and Sub-Saharan African migrants to head towards the Spanish border with little to no obstacles. Additionally, although the Spanish government has reinforced border controls in Ceuta after what happened in 2009, 2014 and 2021, they still indicate uncertainty in enforcement. This means that they risk fostering the belief that unlawful entry will be accepted. I do not claim that Spain’s policies caused the crossings, but they may have shaped incentives and expectations. Additionally, the ongoing humanitarian crisis will intensify migration discussions in Spanish politics while also granting radical opposition parties more electoral leverage.


And last, but not least, the EU as a whole. Brussels also bears responsibility because every previous crisis – 2005, 2014, and 2021 – ended with promises of reform, yet recent events prove that the EU still reacts to rather than anticipates emergencies. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum still remains fragmented as some member states are still adapting their national laws to this framework whilst remaining heavily critical of the solidarity payouts. Not to mention that migration is a politically fraught issue that is highly dependent on the socio-political orientation of a national government. 22 EU leaders have already criticised Spain’s policies as ‘pull factors’ impacting EU security, especially Pedro Sánchez’s approach. Instead of a reactive approach, the EU should be more attentive and anticipate these migration flows judging from past experiences.


All the puzzle pieces are there for anyone to see. We have Morocco being responsible for the mass movement and the enabling information environment; Spain failing to align humanitarian commitments with robust border policies; and the EU repeatedly reacting to crises instead of ensuring a sustainable border strategy. It’s also worth noting that political actors in Europe are exploiting this crisis for their electoral advantage, ignoring humanitarian impacts. If we stopped and think for a second, we would realise that borders fail twice: first when governments cannot control them, and again when politicians convince themselves that controlling them is incompatible with humanitarian values. Loss of border control erodes public support as citizens no longer believe those policies are accompanied by credible enforcement.


Image: Unsplash/Markus Spiske

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