Djibouti: A Last Hurrah For French Presence In Africa?

Over the past three years, a combination of military coups, rising anti-colonial sentiment, and growing influence from alternative partners have led more and more African governments to demand France’s military pullout from their territory. Beginning in Mali in early 2022 (after the killing of 19 civilians in a French airstrike led to massive outcry), French troop pullouts have subsequently been initiated in Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire. Today, only two African nations remain the hosts of permanent French military bases: Gabon (which has lost nearly 90% of its French presence over the past decade in a gradual withdrawal of French influence), and Djibouti, where a contingent of 1,500 troops man France’s last major foothold on the continent. The French have been in Djibouti for almost 150 years, with the small nation playing a crucial role in France’s presence abroad; however, the question of how long this status quo will continue while threatened by political turmoil and alternative partners is one it is important to ask.

Despite Djibouti’s small size and population, it’s been of strategic interest for decades: its access to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and Red Sea establish it as a gateway to the Indo-Pacific and cements military presence there as key to the protection of crucial shipping lanes, especially in an era during which these waterways are threatened by threats like the Houthis, pirates, and illegal fishing. France oversaw the territory now known as Djibouti from 1862 and, after it gained its independence in 1977, a military agreement was rapidly signed to allow continued French presence in the country. Today, as further importance has been placed on East African securitisation since the fall of the Somali government in the early 1990s destabilised the region and as over 70% of France’s imports sail through the Red Sea, a military presence in Djibouti is crucial to French foreign policy. Furthermore, as France is rapidly being pushed out of the rest of Africa, President Macron has made explicit his interest in making Djibouti the launchpad for all French military operations on the continent.

However, France’s position as Djibouti’s de facto extra-African ally is under threat. Firstly, from the sheer number of foreign powers with footholds in the small nation: beginning with Germany (whose armed forces began to use French facilities in 2002), French presence in Djibouti is now challenged by forces from the United States (whose Djiboutian base is their sole permanent base in Africa), Japan (who inaugurated their first foreign base since World War II in Djibouti in 2011), Italy, and China (who established their first ever overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017), who will soon be joined by Saudi Arabia (who aim to establish a base in Djibouti within the next couple of years to aid in their military operations in Yemen). And, although France has been in Djibouti for over a century longer than these other militaries have, other powers, notably the Americans and Chinese, may be able to offer Djibouti more than their former colonial overseers can. 

In terms of sheer securitisation, American and Chinese presence can do more for Djibouti than France can, due largely to manpower: while other nations’ presence is limited to a few hundred soldiers largely using French or American infrastructure, and while French presence, although significant, has been decreasing, American troops in Djibouti outnumber the French three-to-one, and China’s base has the potential to house up to 10,000 soldiers. Furthermore, outside of the arena of security, both the United States and China are of crucial importance to Djibouti. As one of Djibouti’s primary aid providers, the United States injects tens of millions of dollars into their economy every year, and has contributed greatly to the small nation’s COVID-19 response and vocational programs. Even under a second Donald Trump presidency characterised by a decrease in American contributions to foreign aid, collaboration with Djibouti has been highlighted as a priority for the United States by the Trump-aligned Project 2025 due to its strategic importance. China, on their hand, have cemented themselves as Djibouti’s primary creditor and investor, helping finance Djiboutian infrastructure projects like the Addis-Djibouti railroad and the salt-exporting Port of Goubet with loans worth billions of dollars. These contributions, as well as China’s history of proving relatively agreeable to loan repayment renegotiations in Africa, cement China as a crucial and preferential ally in funding and facilitating Djiboutian industry and development. This isn’t to say that Djiboutian collaboration with France is one-sided: French aid contributions to Djibouti are at least comparable to those of the United States. However, due to the size of its military and economy, French contributions to Djiboutian development cannot match the potential of those from its competitors in the region.

Cooperation with France remains a priority for Djibouti, with East African securitisation being a central point of discussion during a recent meeting between the French and Djiboutian heads of national assembly. However, with the perception of France as a neo-colonial power growing ever more popular among the peoples of Africa and with a coup attempt being thwarted as recently as 2022, the idea of the Djiboutian regime befalling the same fate as those of Burkina Faso or Niger is not a particularly far-fetched one. And with emerging discourse on the East-African “Cold War” paying little attention to France as a player, it seems the idea of an Africa without France is one that many are ready to accept.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/United States Africa Command (Master Sergeant Carlotta Holley, CJTF-HOA) Licence: US government work (public domain)

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