BRICS: The Blueprint For A United Global South?

The 2025 BRICS Summit, convened in Rio de Janeiro, underscored, once again, the growing ambition of the Global South in reshaping international political and economic orders amidst the tariff threats of US President Donald Trump. The group declared its stance on numerous pressing issues, in particular its stern opposition to tariff increases and the recent attacks on Iran. Whether the bloc is capable of taking concrete steps, beyond lofty rhetoric, towards creating a politico-economic system independent from established economies, is an open question. This essay adopts geopolitical and economic lenses to address this question.

Founded in 2009, BRICS is an intergovernmental economic institution that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa. It aims to provide a counterweight to the Western-dominated economic order. The bloc established the New Development Bank as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank, providing financial support for the Global South. It even vowed to release its currency for international trade, threatening the dollar’s hegemony. Recently, the group transformed into BRICS+ by welcoming more members. Ambitious as it may seem, the differing political and economic backgrounds and interests of member states pose significant challenges stoppering deeper cooperation.

To begin with, stark political and cultural differences provoke conflicts between member states. In the Middle East, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), both newly admitted to the bloc, share opposing religious beliefs. The Sunni-Shia rivalry stirs territorial disputes between the two Muslim countries over the Persian Gulf, a strategic hub for global energy supply. The diplomatic normalisation between the UAE and Israel further hampers the relationship between the two BRICS member states. As for the Far East, China and India have fundamental divergences in their political systems. India, accepted by the US as a democratic ally, cooperates in multiple US-led initiatives that aim to contain China's rising geopolitical influence, notably the QUAD. In addition, the border dispute between the two countries in the southern Tibet region remains unresolved. These conflicts of interest make it challenging, if not impossible, for member states to reach a consensus in concrete policy terms, and to transform BRICS into an institution akin to the European Union, in which its 27 member states share a more similar political background.

The divergent economic interests also taint the group's goal of de-dollarisation. Indeed, sanctioned members, such as Russia and Iran, are actively seeking alternative currencies in international transactions. However, other member states appear less willing to abandon their trade with the West, primarily conducted in dollars. In May, the UAE signed a trade deal of $200 billion with the US to deepen collaboration in AI, energy, and aerospace industries, evidencing its eagerness to maintain a friendly relationship with Western economies. India, an emerging world factory benefitting from the shifting landscape of global supply chains, attracts significant foreign direct investment, especially those from established economies, due to its massive labour force and relatively friendlier relationships with the West. These close economic ties with the West makes these BRICS members reluctant to support the de-dollarisation project, especially when US President Trump threatens to impose an extra 10% tariffs on countries that align themselves with the "anti-American policies of BRICS".

The shrinking economic performance of several member states further limits the ability of BRICS to reshape global economic hierarchies. Russia and Iran are currently trapped in regional wars and suffering from severe economic sanctions. South Africa is on the edge of stagnation, with a high unemployment rate, significant corruption, and worsening law and order. China, being the economic engine for BRICS, performs slightly better than its partners on paper, albeit hampered by a decline in domestic consumption and real estate crisis. Considering that most BRICS member states also participate in the China-led "Belt and Road Initiative", in which members receive large-scale investment and loans from China to fund mega infrastructure projects, China's economic struggles may limit its ability to prop up its fellow members. BRICS, under these circumstances, can hardly compete with established economies.

One could argue that the overall GDP of BRICS members exceed that of the G7, reflecting the former's strong momentum in influencing the global economy. Yet international political and economic analysis is never a simple comparison of figures, especially when an excessive horizontal expansion over a short period distorts the GDP figures. The Group of 77 (G77) could serve as a precedent for this type of cooperation. G77, now boasting 134 nation state members, was established in the 1960s with the mighty goal of promoting collective economic interests and bargaining power. Yet divergent economic interests prohibited members from syncing policies. Ultimately, G77 receives minimal international attention nowadays due to its negligible influence. BRICS members should take this demise as a valuable lesson, and therefore focus on reconciling the inherent tensions among members and shoring up their economies before launching another round of expansion.

BRICS stands as a fragile sailboat navigating turbulent geopolitical waters. Its sails strain to steer a unified course. Without repairing its hull, riven by internal discord, and strengthening its engine of cooperation, the bloc risks breaking up, unable to transform its lofty ambitions into a steady voyage toward a more equal global order.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Prime Minister's (of India) Office (GODL-India) Licence.

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