Alliance in Flux: The Complex Reality of Sino-Russian Partnership

As China's grandest military parade approaches, Russian President Vladimir Putin has confirmed his attendance at this commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Putin's presence, along with Chinese President Xi's latest state visit to Moscow in May 2025, seems to prove that there is "no ceiling and forbidden zone" in Sino-Russian friendship, a famous quote from a former Vice Foreign Minister of China in 2021. However, Russia’s economic travails and global political headwinds could reduce this mighty vision into a mere slogan.

While Sino-Russian trade volume reached a record high in 2024, predominantly due to Western economic sanctions against the Kremlin, this trend appears to reverse starting in 2025. Trade between the two countries fell by over 9% year-on-year in the first half of this year, with China's automotive exports to Moscow decreasing by 70% in the second quarter of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024. The shrinking trade volume is the direct result of Russia's increased taxes and various trade protectionist measures, indicating its intention to distance itself, at least economically, from Beijing.

Russia has long been struggling with its domestic manufacturing capacity. As a country rich in energy resources, Russia’s economy relies predominantly on natural gas and petroleum. On the other hand, labour shortages and brain drains have hindered the establishment of a mature industry chain, leading to significant imports of finished goods. At the same time, since China is suffering from manufacturing overcapacity, Beijing is keen to export its products. Under these circumstances, Russia is gradually losing its economic independence in several essential sectors related to livelihoods. For instance, the share of Chinese vehicles in Russia almost reached 60% in 2024. The loss of national economic independence due to heavy reliance indubitably discourages Moscow from further integrating into the China-led “community of common destiny”.

Global political turbulence is another pivotal factor that could drag the Sino-Russian relations backwards. Central Asia has long been considered "Russia's backyard". Since the surrender of the Emirate of Bukhara in 1868, Central Asian regimes have been under Russia's influence. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained strong ties with its Central Asian counterparts through various intergovernmental organisations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yet, China's "Belt and Road Initiative" inevitably steps into the Kremlin's traditional sphere of influence. In addition, the Sino-Central Asia cooperation has been deepening since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, as the latter is striving to form an independent diplomacy. For example, the China-Central Asia Summit held in 2023 and 2025, excluding the Russian participation, outlined several major China-led investment projects across various industries, ranging from transportation infrastructure to technology. Given Russia's geopolitical setback in the Middle East and the South Caucasus in recent years, China's move may drag Russia from a prominent global power to a (struggling) regional power.

Indeed, Sino-Russia relations, despite their relatively close economic ties, are less likely to be a strong geopolitical alliance. Historically, a state with a dispersed population tends to be vigilant toward its neighbour with a significantly higher population density. Intense internal competition in a heavily populated state might prompt it to expand its influence, peacefully or violently, to placate its population. Russia and China share one of the world's longest borders, and Siberia is known for its rich natural resources. Furthermore, Russia's control over the region is limited by its sparse population and recent military degradations. Therefore, it is less than surprising that Russia's intelligence agency, FSB, classified China as its "enemy" in a leaked memo.

While there may be distrust and disputes between the two countries in their cooperation, they are unlikely to split in the foreseeable future, at least until the war in Ukraine ends, as both countries need each other to safeguard their national interest. Sanctioned by Western economies, Russia has no choice but to rely on China and its allies to earn the necessary foreign currency reserve and supplies to continue the war. For China, Russia's confrontation with the West, apart from providing an immense market for its exports, also prevents Beijing from facing Western political pressure solely and directly.

Sino-Russian relations remain a complex dance of necessity and suspicion. Their alliance,

though fragile and driven by strategic interests, endures as a testament to both nations’ resilience—a formidable partnership forged not in trust, but in mutual reliance amid a turbulent world stage.

Illustration: Will Allen/Europinion