top of page

Bolivia Has Said, Enough Is Enough

ree

The elections held in Bolivia on August 17 marked a historic turning point. For the first time in two decades, the country took a resounding step toward the centre-right and the right, categorically rejecting the socialism that had governed since 2005. The Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), the party that consolidated near-hegemonic power under Evo Morales, was virtually forgotten in the electoral polls. The message was clear: Bolivians are fed up with the excesses of a regime that for years abused power, cultivated personalism, and failed to respond to the needs of its citizens.


The figure of Evo Morales represents, perhaps better than any other, the exhaustion of that era. He governed for fifteen of the last twenty years, attempted to perpetuate himself in power in 2020, and ended up leaving a dark legacy: a weakened economy, frayed institutions, and serious judicial accusations of child abuse that further undermined his already deteriorating credibility. Despite this, Morales sought to compete in the recent elections, although he was ultimately disqualified. The forcefulness with which Bolivian society rejected both his figure and his legacy marks the symbolic and practical end of a political era.


The new scenario is defined between two options for change: the centre-right Christian Democratic Party, led by Senator Rodrigo Paz Pereira, and the right-wing Free Alliance coalition, led by former President Jorge Quiroga Ramírez (2001-2002). Both represent a break with socialism, but at the same time share the challenge of standing out among an electorate demanding renewal and clarity.


Paz and Quiroga face a double challenge in this regard. On the one hand, they must demonstrate their programmatic differences, as the electorate that propelled them to the second round is not only seeking to remove Morales’s MAS from the stage, but also to find a project that guarantees long-term stability and development. On the other hand, they will have to moderate their discourse in the face of a weakened left that, although it failed to secure a candidate in the second round, remains present in society and could reorganise itself in the future.


The fact that Rodrigo Paz won the first round doesn't mean he has secured the presidency. His challenge will be to build a network of alliances with the political rivals who were excluded from the runoff, preventing vote dispersion from becoming an obstacle. His central proposal, the so-called "50/50 agenda," seeks to redistribute political power, reform the justice system, and decentralise the state, appealing to an electorate weary of the hyper-presidentialism that characterised Morales. His approach is institutionalist: rebuilding citizen trust through a redesign of the political system.


Jorge Quiroga, for his part, presents himself as a former president with a brief presidential career but with experience and defined proposals. His economic plan includes a comprehensive reform of the legal framework to attract foreign investment, as well as the signing of free trade agreements with all countries in the region. Unlike Paz, he appears more pragmatic on economic issues, although he distances himself from Donald Trump's tariff policy. On foreign policy, his position is clear: to break with the "submissive alignment" that characterised Bolivia under the MAS toward the governments of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, and to project a more autonomous and open international integration.


Both candidates will also have to learn to coexist politically. Their forces have become the majority in the newly elected Senate, which will require them to work together, even though they are direct rivals in the presidential race. This scenario opens the door to a different parliamentary dynamic in Bolivia: if Bolivian politics was dominated for years by a hegemonic party with a vertical logic, it will now be forced to experiment with forms of cooperation and negotiation between blocs with similar visions but competing leaderships.


The MAS's defeat in the Senate is, in itself, a powerful symbol. The fact that it failed to obtain parliamentary representation confirms that Bolivian socialism is politically dead, at least in the short term. The left has been decimated by its own abuse of power and its inability to renew itself. This phenomenon is not unique to Bolivia: in Latin America, the left has demonstrated a tendency to build political idols that, once overthrown, drag an entire movement down with them. Argentina, with Kirchnerism, and Ecuador, with Correism, are recent examples of how the erosion of personalistic leadership ultimately becomes the downfall of an entire political movement.


ree

With this shift, Bolivia could become the new bastion of the Latin American right. However, it's worth noting: unlike the left, which tends to have more homogeneous and coordinated projects in the region, the Latin American right is more diverse and fragmented. The Bolivian experience could consolidate a conservative regional agenda, but its characteristics will be different and probably more heterogeneous than those of socialism.


Bolivia's future will depend on the next president's ability to capitalise on the desire for change and transform it into a state project. The country is saddled with two lost decades of personalism and bad governance; recovering them in five years will not be an easy task. However, the opportunity to begin a new era is on the horizon. The Bolivian people have said "enough" to the abuse of power and socialism in its most authoritarian form. Now it is up to Rodrigo Paz or Jorge Quiroga to demonstrate that they are capable of writing a new page in the country's political history.






Illustrations: Will Allen/Europinion


Comments


bottom of page