A Long Flight to the Wrong Conclusion

On 25th August 2026, John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA, travelled to Moscow on an extraordinary, unannounced trip that reflects the unprecedented and urgent period we now endure. Ratcliffe’s visit has been widely discussed in media circles after the Washington Post confirmed flight-tracking data showing a C-17 flying from Joint Base Andrews to Moscow. Ratcliffe spent nearly eight hours there, meeting Sergei Naryshkin, head of the SVR, in what was described as a working-level meeting. Official sources described the matters discussed as routine. Peskov said Ratcliffe did not meet with Putin, who was instead briefed on the meeting, and that it was premature to determine at this stage whether relations would be affected. 

The ambiguity and debate about the meeting's significance stem largely from ongoing rumours of an alleged impending attack by Russia on the Baltics, strikes on the UK for its involvement in the war, which relate to the recent meeting between Burnham and Zelensky on 24th August, and the Iran conflict. Trump, however, denied it was about these issues, but rather a semi-routine event.

However, there is a strong argument that this meeting was significant, as reports have implied. First, the last sitting CIA director to visit Moscow was William Burns in November 2021. He met the Security Council secretary, Nikolai Patrushev, and warned the Russians not to invade Ukraine, having acquired evidence that predicted they would. Three months later, having not taken the warning seriously, Putin launched a full-scale special military operation in Ukraine. The visit is therefore significant when one recognises the precedent set by Burns's visit. A sitting CIA director who flew unannounced to Moscow at a time when tensions between the collective West and Russia have escalated is likely to draw attention, as the last time this happened, Russia invaded Ukraine three months later. This visit is undoubtedly more significant than the powers that be want us to think. 

It appears that Ratcliffe's visit was, however, less about an impending attack on Europe than about concerns that the US deep state’s Project Ukraine is in jeopardy. Weaknesses on the Ukrainian side are being exploited by a resilient Russian armed forces that is making significant inroads into its special military operation (SMO). Ratcliffe is likely to have spent the meeting, therefore, outlining Zelensky’s desires, namely to bring a freeze to the conflict, more accurately a buffer zone in the Donbas region that would become a free economic zone, in exchange for a relief of sanctions for the Russians and further concessions. This deal, however, was already presented to the Russians last year and rejected. The idea that the Russians, who are in a stronger position than they were when this deal was last presented to them, would accept it this time is futile.

While what I have said up to this point suggests that the US is concerned about Russia’s encroachment into Ukraine and its victory on the battlefield, the NYT has reported the opposite regarding what Ratcliffe said to the Russians. In fact, they argue that Ratcliffe shared intelligence with Aleksandr Bortnikov, the head of the FSB, from the CIA about the bleak assessment it had of Russia’s war and urged them to cut a deal before its military and economic situation worsens. The report, however, notes that Ratcliffe did not make an overt threat about what would happen if Putin disregarded the assessment and continued its SMO.

I have my doubts that the NYT is correct, given the substantial evidence that the Russians are making significant inroads. It is unlikely that the CIA would fly to Moscow out of concern for Moscow's welfare, particularly since it is the CIA that is deeply involved in the organisation of the deep strikes by Ukraine into Russia through intelligence provision.

The fact is, Ukraine is under significant pressure in the air and on the grid. Zelensky does not have enough air-defence missiles, with allies supplying only a third of the number provided in 2025. Kyiv was struck every three days on average in July. In July 2026, Russia fired 376 missiles and 4,606 drones, compared with 181 missiles and 5,749 drones in June. This shows a reduction in drones but a doubling in missiles, indicating that Russia is aware that Ukraine is unable to stop ballistic missiles reliably, having intercepted only 40% of them in June.

The strain that Ukraine faces does not end there. Naftogaz was hit 13 times in a week in mid-August and nearly 300 times since the start of 2026. This comes as the grid is under pressure, with capacity dropping from 55GW before the war to 20GW in mid-2026. Shmyhal estimates that it has lost more than 80% of its generating capacity. 

Ukraine's weaknesses have prompted Russia to take the initiative and launch its 2026-2027 energy strike campaign in August rather than in the planned September. This is to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of interceptors ahead of winter, amid a front under mounting pressure along the fortress belt.

While Ukraine has struck Russian oil facilities 305 times since February 2022 – with nearly all regions in Russia reporting gasoline shortages or supply disruptions, leading to rationing - the damage has not yet translated into anything visible on the front line, where the war is currently being decided. As a result, Britain and France decided to transfer Storm Shadow cruise missile technology to Kyiv, albeit as blueprints. The extent to which this will be useful to Ukraine in the short term is disputed, given production time constraints. Ukraine is unable to intercept effectively, which has led it to shift its air defence strategy from taking down individual ballistic missiles to destroying production and launch facilities. It struck a Su-33 and a MiG-29 at Vityazevo airfield in Krasnodar, an oil transhipment terminal at Yeisk, and a MiG-29 at Millerovo in Rostov.

ISW assessed on 7 August that Russian forces have prioritised offensives towards Pokrovsk and Dobropillia to encircle the fortress belt from the south-west. For context, the fortress belt comprises four cities, including Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk. Kostiantynivka is the southern anchor, while Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are in the north. Dobropillia is on the western side. If Russia were to take Dobropillia, it could enable access to the belt from the southwest. On 30 July, Russian forces advanced in the Druzhkivka area from the eastern and western flanks, enabling them to capture Toretske. This reopened a sector of the Kazennyi Torets valley. They pushed north-east of Kostiantynivka from the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal towards Kramatorsk to bypass the defensive line. They took Bilytske west of the belt, broke through Shevchenko, and pushed to Vodianske and Svitle. Russia's Defence Ministry claims its troops have entered Dobropillia, though there is no visual confirmation. At the same time, Russian forces have infiltrated Kostiantynivka. Bohdan Krotevych, former chief of staff of the 12th Azov Brigade, said Russia chose the Dobropillia and Lyman axes to encircle Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.

While it could be argued that efforts to encircle occurred in late 2025 and failed to materialise, Ukrainians now face worse conditions. These include a reduction in interceptors to a third of last year's, a manpower shortfall prompting discourse about lowering the mobilisation age, including female recruitment, and significant pressure on the flanks of Druzhkivka. 

What Ratcliffe’s visit represents is more pertinently the desperation of the deep state and neo-con forces that dominate Washington and Europe to ensure that their Ukraine is in a better position before winter strikes. 

Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, the Holy See’s Secretary for Relations with States, was also in Moscow between 24 and 28 August 2026, having met Lavrov on 25 August, the same day Ratcliffe was there. This was the first face-to-face Vatican-Russian talks since the beginning of the SMO, with Gallagher’s first visit since November 2021. As evidenced at the joint press conference, Gallagher's visit appeared to aim to seek an end to the war and acknowledge the substantial differences between Moscow and the Holy See. He also invoked Pope Leo XIV's call to end hostilities. This ethical attempt by the collective West to get Russia to end its operations is unlikely to succeed. Instead, it represents a desperate attempt by the West to pull out all the stops to pressure Russia into stopping a war it is winning. 

Lavrov is right to argue that a ceasefire along the current line of contact would freeze the fighting rather than advance broader efforts to settle the conflict. Ultimately, the issues Russia has raised in its demands for any negotiation point to NATO's ceaseless expansion since the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite what Moscow says it was assured would not happen. More specifically, NATO's declaration at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine would become a member crossed a red line for Russia. NATO's reaffirmation of this objective in June 2021 led Russia to feel the need to respond as it did in 2022.

This is not the first time the collective West has rolled up to Russia's borders to poke the bear. Moscow regards the removal of Yanukovych in 2014, the democratically elected President of Ukraine who happened to be pro-Russian, as a coup. Its subsequent replacement by a pro-Western puppet fuelled fears of further Western encroachment. Since then, the West has provided billions in military aid, trainers and advisers, and has conducted joint military exercises such as Operation Sea Breeze in the Black Sea, with the West moving into Russia's strategic orbit.

Moreover, the US-Ukraine Strategic Defence Framework and the Charter on Strategic Partnership helped operationalise military cooperation at a time when the US had withdrawn from the ABM and INF treaties to station Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland, which have MK 41 launchers that Moscow argues could be used for offensive purposes. This ultimately contributed to Western pressure on Russia, which led Russia to retaliate through its SMO.

Given the context of the war, it is not surprising that discussions about potential British and French stabilisation forces in Ukraine would not address NATO enlargement. At the same time, trust between Russia and the West is lacking, with Lavrov saying that Western diplomacy remains predicated on deception. Therefore, negotiations would be unlikely to recognise or seek to redress the root causes behind the SMO.

Instead, Lavrov said that halting along the line of contact would be impossible and that Russia plans to intensify strikes. This will coincide with the Kremlin’s pro-war rhetoric, which will dominate the State Duma elections on 18-20 September.

To conclude, Ratcliffe neither met Putin nor got what he wanted. Neither did Gallagher. Lavrov merely repeated what he said in public on 14th August, eleven days earlier. A ceasefire along the line of contact is not a serious option, and Russia will strike harder. This is not surprising, given the increasingly challenging conditions Ukraine faces. The notion that Ratcliffe went to warn the Russians about a deterioration in their position mischaracterises what is happening on the battlefield. It does not bring the two sides any closer to serious negotiations. The time would have been better spent acknowledging the collective West's historical role in pushing NATO eastwards and seeking to mediate tensions ahead of what will be a difficult winter for Ukraine.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Daniel Torok

Licence.

No image changes made.