The students changed the game: now Vučić must play

Power in Serbia has remained unchanged for more than fourteen years. The Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power in 2012, and since then, Aleksandar Vučić has amassed an impressive collection of political offices. He served as President of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) from 2012 to 2023, Minister of Defence from 2012 to 2013, First Deputy Prime Minister from 2012 to 2014, Prime Minister of Serbia from 2014 to 2017, and President of Serbia from 2017 to 2026.

Over the years, snap elections have become an important instrument for Vučić and his party to renew their political legitimacy. Elections called at the ruling party’s initiative allowed it to seek a renewed mandate from voters. However, the snap elections scheduled for 25 October represent a significant departure from this established practice. This time, the call for elections came not from the government itself, but from nearly two years of sustained protest mobilisation. Consequently, Vučić is approaching a new election under circumstances where the decision on whether to hold one rests less on his political strategy than on public pressure against his government.The catalyst for this shift was the student protest movement that emerged in the aftermath of the November 2024 collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which claimed 16 lives. Over time, the movement brought questions of government accountability and political responsibility to the forefront. It has reshaped the conditions of political competition in Serbia, turning these changes into both an opportunity to improve its own electoral prospects and a means of pushing the ruling party onto the defensive.

Before the protests, the SNS already faced significant opposition in parliament and from civil society. However, fragmentation and political differences among opposition forces made broader unification difficult. The student movement, by contrast, managed to bring voters and political elites under a common umbrella, transforming the logic of competition with the SNS and creating a new pathway to electoral success. For example, during the SNS's time in power, opposition parties had repeatedly joined forces in electoral coalitions. Yet there had been no previous instance in which some parties withdrew their own electoral lists and urged voters to support another party instead. As things stand, only two opposition lists -  “European Serbia” and “Authentic Right” - are still running independently, while several other opposition parties have withdrawn their own lists and endorsed the ‘Students list- Students win’.

These endorsements clearly reflect the level of public support enjoyed by the students in Serbia. The resulting consolidation has had several important implications for party competition in their favour. First, it has reduced the risk of opposition votes being split across competing electoral lists. Voters who support a change of government but are unable to choose between the traditional opposition parties now have a common electoral alternative.At the same time, the ‘student list' has challenged the SNS not only by consolidating opposition votes, but also by changing the very form of opposition political representation. Instead of relying on established party leaders and existing political elites, it has put forward candidates from a range of professional backgrounds, including doctors, academics, economists, artists, and civil society activists. This limits the SNS's ability to build its election campaign around discrediting the traditional opposition. Against these new candidates, the ruling party cannot rely on the same political track records and past governing failures that it has used for years to attack opposition parties. At the same time, the movement offers an alternative to voters who favour a change of government but distrust traditional opposition parties. By making the fight against corruption and government accountability the foundation of this alliance, the students have enabled groups with different political views to unite around shared demands.

Although the SNS retains control over the state and administrative resources across the country, its own political manoeuvres reveal signs of vulnerability. For the first time in fourteen years, the SNS is no longer the sole force shaping the electoral landscape; instead, it is being forced to adapt to a competitive environment shaped by others.

The clearest indication of this survival strategy is the party's decision to change the voting arrangements for polling stations abroad. Under the revised rules, voting at all 93 polling stations abroad is to follow Serbian time rather than local time. In some countries, this schedule will require voters to cast their ballots during the night, making it more difficult for approximately 100,000 Serbian citizens living abroad to participate in the election. The picture is markedly different in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Republika Srpska, which accounts for approximately 30% of polling stations established abroad. This is particularly significant given that Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska, enjoys considerable support among the local Serb population and maintains close political ties with Vučić. Such electoral manoeuvres suggest an attempt to manage the conditions of the election when the mood of the electorate itself can no longer be controlled.However, the party's electoral creativity does not end there. Serbia faces two elections ahead, parliamentary and presidential, which, at the government's initiative, will be held separately rather than simultaneously. This decision primarily reflects an effort to increase the importance of the parliamentary election. Vučić has never been so close to losing power. Unable to seek a third presidential term, his only remaining route to the centre of power is to become prime minister. Hence, the party's immediate priority is to concentrate its resources on the parliamentary election.

The SNS also appears to be calculating that this strategy will weaken the student movement's capacity to mobilise. Had the parliamentary and presidential elections been held simultaneously, the students could have channelled public discontent with the government into a single electoral campaign. Holding the elections at different times, however, forces them to secure political support in stages, through two separate campaigns. This matters because participation in protests does not automatically translate into sustained political engagement over an extended period, particularly when the presidential election could be scheduled as late as 27 December. Following the parliamentary election, the students will therefore have to mobilise their supporters and volunteers once again and keep public attention focused on their movement. This will be especially difficult if their electoral list fails to win the parliamentary election.

Ultimately, the student movement has achieved what Serbia's traditional opposition failed to accomplish for years: uniting fragmented political forces behind a common electoral alternative to the ruling party and breaking the political deadlock that has long characterised Serbian party politics. Serbia has rarely, if ever, appeared as close to a change of government as it does today, and this possibility has emerged precisely because the students have transformed the conditions of political competition. Whether this shift will translate into an actual change of government remains to be seen. One thing, however, is clear: the students have changed not only the way the SNS is challenged, but also the very conditions under which the ruling party must now fight to retain power.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/duma.gov.ru

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