The stereotypical cultural ideal of a right-wing voter resembles that of an individual susceptible to fear of change, and who internalise a distaste for the social progress that forces them to confront positions they have passively held for the majority of their lives. It is initially quite striking therefore, to find that the climate-conscious, liberal, ‘Greta Generation’ are in fact one of the main support bases for anti-immigrant, conservative, and traditional far-right political movements across Europe.
Although surprising in theory, a quick look at the material conditions facing many of Europe’s youth, although inevitably multi-faceted and region-specific, traces a clear path towards the newly-established, counter-establishment populist right.
Threats to the standard of living from rampant inflation, housing costs, and the war in Ukraine have placed young Europeans in a precarious economic position; one they do not feel ruling establishment parties can help them with. As the entry-level job market takes its toll on young people’s mental health, many have defaulted to the belief that things will simply not improve. This dejection, although represented by parties from across the political spectrum, has been most expertly coaxed and manipulated by the far-right.
Initiatives to support the economically anxious youth are ubiquitous in right-wing party manifestos. France’s Rassemblement National promised to do away with taxes for those under 30, and proposals to increase investment in healthcare and housing have seen far-right parties in the Netherlands and Germany surge in the polls.
The fear of falling living standards also aligns neatly with many far-right parties’ anti-immigrant rhetoric, as young nationals fear greater competition over dwindling resources. The bubbling resentment felt by many Europeans under 25 has also been easy to manipulate and funnel towards the ‘corrupt’ mainstream establishment and a ‘disconnected’ EU technocracy, who the far-right has positioned as the barriers to prosperity.
In their outreach to young sectors of the population, it is also important to highlight the far-right’s use of social media to spread their message. The RN’s Jordan Bardella is especially good at amassing attention on TikTok, where he reaches an audience of over 1 million with lighthearted engaging videos meant to boost his public image without necessarily involving politics. In Germany, the AfD’s TikTok account has 5x the follower count of its rival parties’, a fact that means there is practically no visible counterforce for its videos conditioning young men and boys into believing that supporting the far-right will get them a girlfriend.
This last point touches subtly on another aspect of youth support for the far-right, in that it is gendered. In Belgium, the far-right Flemish Interest party receives most of its support from Gen-Z men as again, 32% said they would vote for the party, whereas only 9% of women said they would. Anti-immigration parties also tended to do much better amongst men, apart from in France, where there was equal support for the RN.
This ideological disparity between genders of the same age can also be traced back to economic circumstances, but in a way that is harder to neatly narrativise. Much like the age group as a whole with respect to the rest of society, young men are increasingly feeling left behind and isolated. At a time when obtaining a university degree is increasingly important for ensuring stable income growth, men are relatively absent from higher education compared to women. Simultaneously, more men are unemployed than women in many countries, with many reporting long-term physical and mental health issues. Among this group of idle and disengaged men is where the far-right finds its strongholds, while women of similar age groups tend to hold more liberal ideals.
What makes this divergence difficult to diagnose directly is that both groups are suffering from economic hardships. Women, despite breaking into higher education and achieving greater career success than before, still carry out the majority of the costly care work, while still coping with the general economic afflictions facing their age group. This is why it is important to apply nuance when analysing the voter base of the far-right, as the picture is more complex than a direct response to material circumstances. An important point of division is the traditionalist policy platform of these movements, one whose anti-abortion rhetoric turns many women away, and whose affirmations of patriarchal power dynamics are attractive to ‘lost’ men.
Carefully analysing the sources of young people’s support for far-right movements around Europe, reveals a solution to the situation which is not much different from the problem itself. Fundamentally, young people feel cornered, desperate for an alternative to the mainstream centrist parties they feel are unfit to resolve their problems.These are not demands solely accessible to far-right populism, but the challenge from the left and the centre has been lacking for years, and the right has been startlingly astute in manoeuvring this political landscape. The French left organised and won a historic electoral win against the far-right, a similar effort of introspection will be necessary across the continent to avoid repeating history.
Image: Flickr/European Parliament
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