U.S. Retreat and China’s Reach - Myanmar’s Civil War on the Global Stage

More than four years after Myanmar’s military seized power in a February 2021 coup, the country remains mired in a brutal civil war. On one side stands a military junta clinging to power; on the other, a broad pro-democracy resistance led by a National Unity Government (NUG) that unites the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and numerous ethnic armed groups. The tide on the ground has begun to turn against the junta, offering a historic opening for democracy, but global geopolitics are complicating this moment. Notably, the return of Donald Trump to the White House has seen the United States pull back support for Myanmar’s democracy movement, while China continues to prop up the Naypyidaw regime to safeguard its strategic interests. This first article, in a tripartite series on Myanmar authored by the NGO Fondemos for publication with Europinion, explores how Washington’s disengagement and Beijing’s backing are reshaping Myanmar’s conflict on the international stage.

Washington’s Disengagement Leaves a Void

The second Trump administration has markedly scaled down U.S. support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy cause. In a sharp reversal from the preceding administration, Washington cancelled around 90% of its aid programmes including those directed to Myanmar in early 2025, axing a planned $259 million in assistance for the year: including some $42 million earmarked for democracy, human rights and independent media. Over the next four years, Myanmar stands to lose over $1 billion in U.S. aid that would have supported civil society and humanitarian needs. These cuts deal a devastating blow to Myanmar’s democracy movement and grassroots organisations, which relied heavily on American funding. Crucially, none of this aid ever went to the junta; it was supporting opposition communities and refugees. By slashing such support, Washington has effectively left Myanmar’s embattled civil society in the lurch, a move welcomed only by the junta and its authoritarian allies.

Beyond budget cuts, personnel choices in Washington signal a hostility toward Myanmar’s revolution. President Trump has appointed figures known for scepticism towards      democracy movements abroad. For instance, Darren Beattie, a former speechwriter who once dismissed Myanmar’s post-coup uprising as a “colour revolution” supposedly orchestrated by the U.S., now holds a public diplomacy post. Likewise, hardline “America First” strategists such as Elbridge Colby, who in 2021 argued for a “realistic diplomacy”, have been given influential defence policy roles. The result is a U.S. foreign policy tilted toward realpolitik at the expense of Myanmar’s democracy activists. In line with this outlook, Washington has halted material support to anti-junta forces under the pretext of cutting federal “waste”. Even the future of USAID’s presence has been thrown into doubt as budget hawks take aim. For Myanmar’s resistance, which once counted on robust American backing, the U.S. retreat is both a practical setback and a symbolic blow. It creates a vacuum of support on the international front, one quickly noticed by other global powers.

Beijing’s Strategic Embrace of the Junta

As the U.S. steps back, China has doubled down on shoring up Myanmar’s military regime. Since the 2021 coup, Beijing has emerged as the junta’s chief patron, shielding it from censure at the U.N. and providing essential economic and diplomatic lifelines. China’s motivations are clear: Myanmar sits at a geostrategic crossroads between Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, a land bridge to vital maritime routes in the Bay of Bengal. Ensuring a friendly government in Myanmar is crucial for China’s regional ambitions, including securing infrastructure projects like oil and gas pipelines and a deep-sea port on Myanmar’s coast. To Beijing, the stability of an allied regime in Naypyidaw is preferable to the uncertainty of a democratic transition that might tilt toward the West.

In practical terms, Chinese support comes through money, arms, and diplomacy. Leaked official documents in late 2024 revealed that China approved a fresh aid package worth ¥1 billion (about $138 million) for Myanmar’s junta. This sizeable grant is funding a national census (paving the way for the military’s proposed 2025 elections to legitimise its rule) as well as critical infrastructure repairs and even surveillance systems. On the military front, China remains the junta’s quiet armourer and trainer, while also taking measures to secure its own borders. Alarmed at the conflict’s potential to spill over, Chinese authorities boosted security along the Yunnan-Myanmar frontier in 2024, deploying extra border troops and conducting drills. Beijing has even temporarily closed some border crossings controlled by ethnic rebel allies of the NUG in Shan State to cut their supply lines.

Diplomatically, China is playing both protector and powerbroker. It uses its influence to moderate the conflict, lest Myanmar slide into complete chaos. In an unprecedented move, China’s special envoy Deng Xijun convened meetings with leaders of rebel ethnic armies last year, including the Three Brotherhood Alliance that had been routing junta forces in Shan State, to urge them to halt offensives and refrain from threatening Chinese interests. By acting as mediator (and occasionally, arm-twister) with these groups, Beijing seeks to prevent a total collapse of order in Myanmar that could endanger Chinese investments or prompt a refugee crisis at its border.

Yet for all its support, China’s backing is not unconditional. The Myanmar junta’s increasing frailty has made it an awkward client for Beijing. Economically, the generals’ mismanagement and the immense costs of war have sunk Myanmar’s economy into disarray. Infrastructure is crumbling: chronic blackouts plague even Yangon and Naypyidaw as power stations fall into disrepair. Myanmar has had to beg Beijing for technical aid just to keep the lights on. Militarily, the junta has lost control of vast swathes of the country; recent analyses suggest it fully controls only about 21% of Myanmar’s territory. The rest is held or contested by resistance forces, an astonishing decline for an army that once touted its invincibility. This weakness has not gone unnoticed in Beijing. Worried that their erstwhile partner may be too feeble to stabilise the country, Chinese officials have reportedly considered more direct involvement even weighing the deployment of Chinese “private security” contractors to safeguard key zones and projects if the junta cannot. Such steps, however tentative, indicate China’s waning confidence in Myanmar’s generals.

In sum, Beijing remains the junta’s principal foreign supporter, driven by cold interests rather than affection for the regime. But that support has limits. If Myanmar’s military continues to lose its grip, a pragmatic China may recalibrate its stance, potentially pressuring the junta toward a negotiated transition that protects China’s core interests. For now, though, the international geopolitical landscape of Myanmar’s civil war is defined by an American vacuum and a Chinese lifeline. The next instalment in this triptych of articles will turn to developments within Myanmar itself, where a resilient resistance is leveraging this moment of opportunity on the ground.

Image: Flickr/Utenriksdepartementet UD

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