Where Do We Go From Here? A Week Of Russia–Ukraine Negotiations In Perspective

Mid-August was filled with discussions on the Russia-Ukraine situation. 

On the 15^th, Trump met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, with talks ending earlier than expected in a summit that ‘yielded more questions than answers’.

Then, on the 18^th,  Trump met with Zelensky and European leaders in the White House. This was a much more pleasant affair than that of February, where Trump and Vance ambushed the Ukrainian President in the Oval Office, but still seemingly answered few questions about ending the conflict. 

What we do know is that the US President wants more talks to be held. However, the US now seems keen to distance itself, with Trump adamant that Zelensky and Putin must hold bilateral talks before the US will step in as mediator with trilateral talks. Reportedly, preparations for this are underway.

The sticking points, though, are twofold.

Firstly, Ukraine and Russia obviously have different goals and aims for ending the war. Russia continues to demand that Ukraine relinquish control over Donbas, renounce ambitions to join NATO, and prevent Western troops from being deployed to its territory. In return, Moscow has hinted at only limited territorial concessions and an end to active hostilities, serving little benefit to Ukraine. Zelensky, meanwhile, wants the polar opposite, aiming to retain territory and gain security guarantees from Western allies to deter future conflict. It’s difficult to envision how the two sides can find a middle ground.

Secondly, there is the reluctance of Putin and Zelensky to meet one another. Despite weeks of shuttle diplomacy, both leaders have shown hesitance toward bilateral talks. Zelensky appears to be more open to the idea, stating after his meeting in the White House that "if Russia proposed to the president of the United States a bilat, then we will see the result", adding that "Ukraine will never stop on the way to peace". Putin is more hesitant, with Yuri Ushakov, a Kremlin aide, positing that it might be worth exploring “the possibility of raising the level of representatives” in the negotiations between the two parties.

The muted enthusiasm makes sense. Zelensky, wary of being manoeuvred into an unfavourable deal without solid Western guarantees, has resisted entering a room where Moscow could dictate the terms. Putin, for his part, appears reluctant to elevate Zelensky by meeting him as an equal, and may prefer to negotiate indirectly through Washington or European capitals. Both sides lack trust, which is understandable after more than three years of war, making such talks incredibly difficult.

Trump appears to have acknowledged this in recent days, remarking on the 25^th of August that Zelensky and Putin “really don't like each other”.

Admittedly, it is rather lost on me that it required two summits in two states, numerous meetings, and a plethora of visits to the White House from European leaders to establish that Putin and Zelensky probably don’t like each other all that much. 

It does appear to have reached a bit of a stalemate again, though, so the question is: what next?

The idea of bilateral talks must be utterly reprehensible for both leaders, with Zelensky forced to sit across from the man who has destroyed his homeland and killed hundreds of thousands of his compatriots for no rational reason, whilst Putin faces the man who has cost him his credibility and strength on the global stage. The idea of having a third party in the room, especially one that could come down on either side of the fence, must be more appealing. Thus, in the short term, the likelihood of bilateral talks seems low, with trilateral talks appearing more appealing. Given that Trump’s stance on the conflict appears to change with the wind, it’s more plausible that Putin and Zelensky would want the US President in the room, offering up a ‘two versus one’ scenario, were either to win his favour at any prospective summit. Perhaps this is what Trump wanted all along. 

Although it seems unlikely that the quest for peace will be successful in the short term, there may be moves made by both sides to initiate the process, aiming to reach a point where negotiations can take place. Think prisoner exchanges, humanitarian corridors, grain and energy transit arrangements, de-confliction around critical infrastructure, or a temporary artillery stand-down along specified sectors. None of these resolves the core dispute, but they could offer a starting point for negotiations. Suppose those micro-deals hold for weeks rather than days. In that case, negotiators can layer in bolder steps: more extensive ceasefire lines with third-party monitoring and clearer rules on drones, missiles, and electronic warfare. 

It is unglamorous diplomacy, but it is also the least fragile.

The danger, of course, is that such piecemeal arrangements end up functioning as pressure valves rather than stepping stones. They buy time, but they rarely change the fundamental objectives of either side. For Ukraine, the core issue remains the restoration of sovereignty and security guarantees strong enough to prevent another invasion. For Russia, the priority is to lock in territorial gains and prevent Ukraine’s integration into Western security structures. Unless those two positions shift, any micro-deal risks being temporary, vulnerable to collapse the moment one side believes it can achieve more on the battlefield than at the negotiating table.

Another layer to this is the role of external actors. Trump’s equivocal position makes Washington a fickle guarantor of any deal. European leaders, meanwhile, have shown greater eagerness to sustain Kyiv but lack the coherence or military heft to act as decisive mediators. Moscow understands these divisions and will likely exploit them, pushing for a ‘managed freeze’ that cements the status quo while eroding Western unity. This would leave Ukraine in a precarious limbo: neither fully at war nor meaningfully at peace.

Perhaps, though, the recent summits and future limited agreements could matter. They create documentation of commitments, introduce third-party monitoring mechanisms, and most importantly signal to domestic and international audiences that diplomacy remains an option. The next six months will likely determine whether the Alaska and Washington meetings were mere theatre or the early stirrings of a process that could one day lead to substantive negotiations. If the current cycle produces even a modest humanitarian corridor or verifiable ceasefire along a narrow stretch of the front, that may be the first fragile step on a much longer road to peace.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Department of Defense (Benjamin D Applebaum)

Licence: public domain.

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