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What is Moldova’s neutrality worth?
Moldova’s Constitution declares the country neutral, but the Russian troops on its territory tell a different story. Article 11 prohibits the stationing of foreign forces, yet Russian troops remain in Transnistria despite repeated demands for their withdrawal. That contradiction reveals Moldova’s main security policy problem: declaring neutrality is something Moldova can do for itself; making others respect it is much harder. A credible response still requires investment in defence, cooperation with international partners and an honest explanation to citizens of what neutrality can and cannot offer. Moldova has the right to choose neutrality. But how much protection does that choice really provide if the country cannot defend it?
The strongest argument for Moldova’s neutrality is that it could help keep the country out of wider wars. For a small state with limited resources, caution is intelligible. Supporters of neutrality insist that staying outside military alliances leaves more room for diplomacy and avoids commitments which could drag Moldova into conflicts beyond its borders. That argument should be taken seriously. Still, neutrality becomes much less convincing when it is treated solely as protection. Moldova can decide not to participate in another country’s war. It cannot decide that another country will respect its neutrality and sovereignty.
Moldova’s history shows the limits of neutrality when a security problem already exists. Russian troops were present when the country adopted its Constitution in 1994, after the 1992 conflict between the Republic of Moldova and Russian-backed separatists in Transnistria. Neutrality didn’t create the problem, but it hasn’t secured their withdrawal either. At the same time, abandoning neutrality wouldn’t automatically entice Russia to remove troops from the region or resolve the separatist region. The more useful question is how Moldova improves its security while still pursuing a peaceful, diplomatic settlement with the region.
Moldova’s defence needs are already visible in its airspace. According to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, three drones violated Moldovan airspace on 30 September 2026; two fell and exploded on its territory. Whatever their intended targets were, incidents like these highlight how easily the war across the border can affect Moldovans. Detecting an approaching drone, warning the public and responding safely are the state’s basic responsibilities. A diplomatic protest shows that a violation is unacceptable. But the government must be able to protect its citizens if it happens again.
Cooperation with foreign partners already gives Moldova a pathway to improve its defence whilst remaining neutral. NATO support includes military education, cyber defence and emergency preparedness, and the organisation explicitly recognises Moldova’s constitutional neutrality. These arrangements show that accepting expertise does not mean joining the alliance. But the limits need to be clear: partnership does not grant Moldova NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence guarantee. The government should explain cooperation in terms of what it actually provides, without giving people the impression that foreign forces would automatically fight on Moldova’s behalf.
European assistance also gives Moldova a concrete chance to improve its air defence. In July 2026, the European Council approved €120 million under the European Peace Facility to finance a medium-range air defence system for Moldova. That does not mean the system is already operational. Its usefulness will depend on trained personnel, maintenance and coordination with air surveillance. Those details matter just as much as the funding itself. Equipment only improves security if the country can actually operate and maintain it.
Moldova also has to be realistic about what a stronger defence can achieve. No modernisation programme would allow a country of Moldova’s size to match Russia’s military strength. But that does not mean there isn’t anything it can do. It can reduce its exposure to specific threats and respond better when emergencies do happen. Secure communications and working warning systems still matter even if they cannot prevent every attack. Diplomacy remains essential too, especially efforts towards a peaceful settlement in Transnistria. Better preparation should support those efforts by giving Moldova more room to make its own decisions.
Public support for stronger defence also depends on whether people understand what the government is actually trying to do. In August 2026, the government approved a programme for 2026–2030 to implement its national defence strategy. That should give the public something more concrete to discuss than simply being ‘for’ or ‘against’ defence spending. Which threats matter most? How much will donated equipment cost to maintain? What will actually change in a few years? These are reasonable questions, and Parliament should be able to ask them. At the same time, saying that Moldova should spend less on defence also comes with a responsibility: there still needs to be an answer for the threats the country is already facing.
Neutrality can still make sense for Moldova. It may help the country stay outside military alliances and avoid commitments that many Moldovans do not want. But neutrality should not become an excuse for doing too little. Russian troops are still in Transnistria, drones have crossed Moldovan airspace, and the war in Ukraine is happening only a few kilometres away. None of that disappears because the Constitution says Moldova is neutral. Moldova does not need to become a military power. It does need to be able to protect people when something goes wrong. That, more than the word “neutrality” itself, is what should matter.
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