Unstable stability: the state of the Pacific Cold War in 2026

With the Middle East aflame for the past three years, the European security situation growing increasingly dire, and discussions of political tensions often looking at the Atlantic relationship over the Pacific, it can be easy to forget about the sizable elephant in the room of geopolitics - the United States military itself has come under fire for supposed neglect of this vital theatre. But amidst controversy regarding the accidental transfer of sensitive US military components to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), now would be a good time to review the realities of the ongoing Sino-American Cold War and how the chaotic events of the past year have changed the security situation in the Pacific Ocean.

The state of the Sino-American relationship

Luckily for the world, relations between the two great powers are somewhat cordial. Trade negotiations hosted in Washington D.C. a fortnight ago went rather well (even if fairly little of substance was achieved) and produced an extension on the current trade ‘truce’ between the two states. President Donald Trump applauded the meeting and his personal relationship with Xi Jinping in press conferences during the event. Xi and the wider Communist Party of China were significantly more restrained in their response to the events of the meeting, but there is no reason to assume they took the lack of concrete action as an offence. 

The recent trade summit is a perfect objectification of the wider relationship under the second Trump Presidency. The USA and PRC have been able to take a step back from direct confrontation amidst a continued American policy of diplomatic isolationism and a withdrawal from its long-standing security obligations. The chance of any military conflict is low. However, the two powers continue to bash heads on economic issues, most notably being Chinese efforts to supersede US dominance in the field of artificial intelligence and Trump’s campaign of protectionist trade policy since “Liberation Day”. Little ground has been made in trying to solve these issues, but neither side seems to favour a direct confrontation on any of these points. A semblance of stability has emerged between the two sides, a rarity in Trump-era American diplomacy.

Détente isn't peace

While a positive in the short-term, the lack of codified cooperation between the two states paints a poor picture for the future. The two leaders will not be meeting together forever. President Trump will find himself legally removed from the Presidency in 2029 - exhausting his constitutional term limits - and is facing a probable defeat in the upcoming midterm elections in November, which would constrain his power. Xi Jinping is a more fluid case; while he is likely to stay in power until death (or at least, significant infirmity), his age (like Trump’s) is becoming increasingly apparent - signalled by a brief period of concern for the premier’s health. While stability can be guaranteed with Xi and Trump, what happens when their replacements take office without any agreements to follow?

And even this analysis is ignoring a glaring hurdle in building a sustained cross-ocean relationship between the two great powers: Taiwan.

The Taiwan factor

While comments by American officials predicting a Taiwan invasion scenario by 2027 have been discarded in the face of internal purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the US military remains firmly on edge amidst continued Chinese rhetoric surrounding the so-called “sovereignty issue” of Taiwan’s status as an independent nation. Beijing continued to signal willingness to take the island, currently governed by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), by force. The Intelligence Community has downplayed the chance of a conflict, affirming that Beijing would rather wait to see the result of the Taiwanese 2028 Election before taking concrete steps toward unification - hoping to avoid yet another Ukraine or Iran-style catastrophe.

The US has maintained a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ regarding its hypothetical defence of Taiwan - refusing to commit to a military intervention but also refusing to rule one out. While the US refuses to officially recognise Taiwan, it conducts regular diplomatic meetings and trips while providing modern equipment to Taiwanese forces. However, the political instability plaguing the US of the 2020s adds an additional layer to this ambiguity. It is clear that the American electorate has grown tired of decades of failed global interventions and that anti-interventionist camps are influential in both Republican and Democratic (or more accurately, the aligned but practically-independent Democratic Socialists of America [DSA]) camps, but with the American economy, military and research base largely reliant on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry and its champion firm TSMC, will Washington be able to avoid an intervention if a peaceful solution to the Taiwan conflict becomes untenable?

The US military has had relatively little to boast about in recent years. Two decades of attritional counter-insurgency in the Middle East ended with a hasty withdrawal without lasting reform, peace or alliance - with American military losses in the thousands and civilian losses in the hundreds of thousands. Its ongoing conflict in Iran has shown little improvement: US missile stockpiles (vital for a long-distance conflict in the Pacific Ocean) have plummeted, US strikes have been minimally-effective in preventing Iranian missile strikes across the region and airframe losses amongst the USAF have been mounting - including the damage of an F-35 fighter.

The PLA is a force that has not fought a war since its attempted invasion of Vietnam in 1979, but the force that failed to break through to Hanoi is not the force that currently stands facing the Pacific Ocean. The PLA now boasts technological near-parity (and even parity in some cases) with the US itself, with a vast array of long-range missiles, unmanned aircraft and latest-generation warships and aircraft. Chinese militarisation has reached a point where the traditional regional powers - Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan - are racing to keep up with a PRC that is no longer a peer, but a hegemon. But while the PLA now boasts one of the world’s largest amphibious warfare fleets, observers remain skeptical that the PLA would be able to achieve the quick victory necessary to avoid the debacles faced by the Russian and American forces in their respective offensive conflicts and potentially deter an American intervention in Taiwan.

Consequently, both the USA and PRC face both economic and military blockages to achieving their respective Pacific policy goals, and both are staring down a series of potential flashpoints that could force the two great powers to wage war across the ocean. However, neither side is willing to make any moves that would shift the fragile balance - resistant to building a lasting collaboration but terrified of triggering a conflict. And for now, that balance keeps peace over the Pacific. But without an anchoring treaty to bind the two powers to cooperation, this peace can only last so long. With the PRC now potentially compromising one of the US’ most advanced military projects, Washington is now painfully reminded of this glaring security threat that it has left unresolved.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Sgt. Mikki Sprenkle 

Licence: Work of the U.S. Federal Government, public domain.