United in Resistance: Myanmar’s Rebels Gain Ground Against the Junta

Inside Myanmar, the pro-democracy resistance has gathered remarkable momentum against the military junta, even as international support fluctuates. After four years of nationwide conflict, Myanmar’s anti-junta fighters, from newly formed People’s Defence Forces (PDF) to long-established ethnic armies, have achieved battlefield successes that were once unthinkable. They have shattered the Tatmadaw’s aura of invincibility and built an unprecedented unity around a vision of a federal, democratic Myanmar. This second part examines the domestic front of Myanmar’s civil war: the military, political, and social advances of the Burmese resistance, and why 2025 is being hailed by its leaders as the potential year of victory.

Battlefield Victories Turn the Tide

Against all expectations, Myanmar’s motley resistance forces have put the junta on the defensive on multiple fronts. The loosely coordinated coalition of PDFs (civilian guerrillas formed after the coup) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) has liberated large swathes of territory from regime control. In fact, recent estimates suggest the junta now fully controls only about one-fifth of the country, a stunning collapse from holding the entire state just a few years ago. What began in 2021 as scattered self-defence uprisings has evolved into a broad offensive pushing the army out of key strongholds. A dramatic example came in late 2023, when a coalition of ethnic insurgents known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched “Operation 1027.” Within weeks, they seized a string of towns in northern Shan State, including the strategic city of Lashio (population 130,000) and multiple townships. Lashio’s fall, the first loss of a regional military command centre, was a humiliating defeat for the junta, even sparking rare dissent in pro-military circles and calls for coup-leader Min Aung Hlaing’s resignation. By the end of 2024, the military had lost major footholds in Shan State, a crucial region for Sino-Burmese trade. Although the city of Lashio was handed back to the junta in April 2025 by the EAO that had seized it, this reversal owes more to Chinese pressure than to any significant military gains by the junta.

In western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, a similar story unfolded. The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic force that struck an understanding with the NUG, now controls nearly the entire state. It has captured 14 of Rakhine’s 17 townships from the junta’s grip, including major bases and the junta’s Western Regional Command. The fall of Rakhine, rich in resources and home to critical Chinese investments like the Kyaukphyu port, not only tightens the noose on the junta but also illustrates the trust being built between the Bamar-majority resistance and ethnic minorities long at odds with the central government.

Meanwhile, in the central heartlands of Burma (Myanmar), the resistance has made surprising inroads into areas once considered regime strongholds. Local PDF units, often comprised of young urban dissidents and villagers, have waged a guerrilla campaign across the central Dry Zone and Sagaing Region that has worn down the Tatmadaw. They have overrun dozens of rural townships and even established nascent parallel administrations in some liberated districts. Sagaing has been a particular hotbed of insurgency, with junta columns ambushed repeatedly. By late 2024, resistance fighters were pressing toward the outskirts of Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city and a symbolic bastion of the military establishment. For the first time in 70 years of conflict, disparate anti-regime forces are coordinating nationwide, stretching the military across simultaneous fronts and eroding its capacity to reassert control.

Forging an Unprecedented Unity

Equally significant to the battlefield gains is the political unity coalescing among Myanmar’s opposition. The National Unity Government, formed by ousted lawmakers, activists, and ethnic representatives after the coup, has successfully rallied groups that were erstwhile enemies into a common front. For the first time, the ethnic Bamar majority (represented by leaders from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy) is fighting side by side with a multitude of ethnic minority armies in pursuit of a shared goal: the end of military rule and the birth of a federal democracy. This marks a decisive break with the past. 

Mistakes of earlier eras, when victorious pro-democracy forces in Myanmar sidelined minority grievances, are being openly acknowledged by NUG leaders. In exile and in the jungles, NUG officials have negotiated new charters promising state autonomy, equality for minority languages and cultures, and a federal power-sharing system if the junta falls. By addressing decades-old ethnic minority demands and apologising for the Bamar-centric policies of prior civilian governments, the NUG has fostered an unprecedented sense of common purpose among groups that once mistrusted each other. “2025 will be the year of our victory,” declared Zaw Wai Soe, the NUG’s Minister of Health and Education, reflecting rising confidence that the regime’s days are numbered. While that timeline may prove optimistic, his bold prediction captures the buoyant mood permeating the resistance as it senses the junta reeling.

Gaining Legitimacy 

On the international stage, the NUG has scored symbolic wins. Despite the junta’s formal state power, its representatives have been shunned in many fora. At the United Nations, for example, the military regime’s envoys have not been accredited; instead, the U.N. still recognises Kyaw Moe Tun, the ambassador appointed by the ousted NLD government, as Myanmar’s legitimate representative. Several Western parliaments have formally acknowledged the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar. The NUG has even opened a liaison office in Washington, D.C., underscoring the previous U.S. administration’s support (though the current Trump-led government is far cooler toward them). In a landmark step toward justice, the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor in late 2024 sought an arrest warrant for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on charges of crimes against humanity for the regime’s brutal crackdowns. While Myanmar is not a party to the ICC and the junta chief remains at large, the move sent a clear signal: the world is starting to hold the junta accountable for its atrocities.

Even within Southeast Asia, long bound by a norm of non-interference, patience with Myanmar’s generals is wearing thin. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) barred Min Aung Hlaing from its summits after his regime reneged on a peace plan, and some member states are adopting a tougher line. Notably, Malaysia, which holds ASEAN’s chairmanship in 2025, has pushed for more engagement with Myanmar’s opposition and for ASEAN to rethink its failed approach of “constructive engagement” with the junta. Such shifts are incremental, but they chip away at the junta’s facade of legitimacy. The NUG’s ability to speak with one voice for Myanmar’s diverse opposition has been key in this diplomatic struggle. By unifying the resistance politically and preparing for an eventual transition, the NUG is proving that a democratic alternative exists, one that is ready to step in and rebuild the nation.

However, the question remains: will the outside world seize this opportunity to help tip the balance? With the U.S. largely absent, many are looking to other players – especially Europe – to step up. In the final part, we examine Europe’s stake in Myanmar’s future and the moral and strategic imperatives driving it to act.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/mil.ru (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation)

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