Transcaucasia At A Crossroads - Armenia, Russia, Azerbaijan And America Grapple For Power, Again

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan remain in a process of rapprochement, at the expense of Russia’s traditional dominance in the region. At the same time, Russia plans to bolster its military presence in Armenia. Under President Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia is also pursuing extraordinary rapprochement with former adversary Turkey. As Russian influence in the South Caucasus republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan noticeably declines, other actors—particularly Turkey, the U.S., NATO, and the EU—are attempting to fill the emerging power vacuum. At the centre of these geopolitical debates is the Syunik—or Nakhichevan—Corridor, a strategically vital strip of land in Armenia’s Syunik province.

This corridor connects the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, an exclave of Azerbaijan, with the rest of the country. Currently, Armenia monitors and secures it with assistance from the Russian border service. Azerbaijan and Turkey have long sought control of this transport route to enable uninterrupted movement of goods and raw materials from China and Central Asia to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, positioning themselves as key players in global trade. The United States has proposed handing over control of the disputed Syunik Corridor to a private American operator under a 100-year lease agreement to ensure fair and neutral usage by all parties. This would signal Washington's willingness to assume security responsibilities in the region and represent an active step in reshaping the South Caucasus's geopolitical landscape. Unsurprisingly, this plan undermines the strategic ambitions of Russia and Iran, who seek to preserve their alternative corridor stretching from India through Iran and Azerbaijan to Russia. Although Russia has lost some influence in Armenia, it remains in a position to exert influence in military, political, and religious spheres. The head of the Armenian Apostolic Church (Catholicos Karekin II), reportedly close to Moscow, has publicly called for the resignation of the Armenian prime minister.

On June 10, 2025, Prime Minister Pashinyan called for the removal of the Catholicos in a leaked Telegram message. In recent months, several high-ranking religious figures have been arrested in Yerevan on suspicion of plotting a coup. Tensions between Armenia and Russia have been further strained by the arrest of Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian oligarch and businessman who has openly expressed his intention to run in next year’s parliamentary elections. Much of the Armenian population is dissatisfied with the prime minister's cautious and diplomatically restrained approach to managing border disputes with Azerbaijan, as well as his planned handover of the internationally recognised Armenian Syunik Corridor to the U.S.-Turkish-Azerbaijani trilateral alliance. However, this unrest and the risk of escalating domestic instability cannot be attributed solely to Russian interference.

As if that were not enough, the Ukrainian intelligence service recently published an alleged order to reinforce the Russian military base in Gyumri, located in northwestern Armenia. Moscow has not yet officially commented on the matter, and no formal confirmation has been issued.

Geostrategic Interconnections in the South Caucasus

• Armenia-Azerbaijan: The two have been working for several months on a peace treaty primarily supported by NATO members the United States and Turkey. Despite intermittent border disputes, both countries have continued to work on a peace agreement since Azerbaijan took almost full control over Nagorno-Karabakh—and thus the majority-Armenian, internationally unrecognised Republic of Artsakh—between September and December 2023. Key issues in these talks include border demarcation and the Syunik Corridor. However, the talks held in Abu Dhabi on Thursday, July 10, 2025, produced no new results beyond a joint statement committing to continued confidence-building measures.

• Russia-Azerbaijan: Bilateral relations between Baku and Moscow have deteriorated since Russian forces shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane near the Chechen capital of Grozny in December 2024, killing 38 people. Moscow attributed this tragedy to increased defensive measures against Ukrainian drones in the region near Azerbaijan. Tensions escalated further after Russian police in Yekaterinburg arrested dozens of ethnic Azerbaijanis on June 27, 2025, who were allegedly linked to a notorious criminal group led by the Saratov brothers. Two people died during the incident. Moscow stated that the raids were part of a crackdown on organised crime. However, Baku condemned the police action as racist and suspended diplomatic exchanges. They also cancelled a planned visit by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk. A few days later, Azerbaijani authorities raided the local Sputnik News office in Baku and detained senior staff on suspicion of espionage. Additionally, relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have been strained by Azerbaijan’s delivery of mine-clearing equipment to Ukraine. While Kyiv and Baku classify this assistance as humanitarian aid, the Kremlin views it as military support for a rival.

• Russia-Armenia: Relations between the two countries have deteriorated mainly due to the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) failure to provide aid. Yerevan expected decisive intervention from the Russia-led alliance during the 2022 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh wars. However, the Kremlin stated that the mutual defense clause in Article 4 of the CSTO charter did not apply because Armenia and Azerbaijan were engaged in conflict on Azerbaijani territory, and Armenia had not been attacked within its internationally recognised borders. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s role in the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia, plays a significant part in Russia’s crisis management. These tensions have directly impacted bilateral relations, especially security policy. Armenia has scaled back its participation in and cooperation with the CSTO while intensifying its dialogue with the United States, Turkey, NATO, and the EU.

Assessment and Outlook

The domestic political situation in Armenia remains tense due to dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Pashinyan and the ongoing delicate situation with the Azerbaijani border. Russian support of political unrest could represent a subtle threat. If suspicions about the reinforcement of Russian troops in Armenia are confirmed, there is a risk of direct Russian intervention linked to protests and a potential coup attempt.

Although the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan has temporarily eased, the issue is far from settled. Armenia is in a weak position and could make concessions that would anger its own population, as well as Iran and Russia. Against this backdrop, it is unlikely that the Moscow-Tehran axis will stand aside. Rather, Russia may allow the prime minister to act for now while waiting for the right moment to intervene. 

There is a realistic probability (40-50%) that domestic resistance will peak during Armenia's Independence Day on September 21, 2025. Against the backdrop of a supposed reinforcement of the troop contingent in Gyumri, Russian influence under the guise of securing peace and stability or open support for the opposition is also a realistic scenario. I will be following developments closely and reporting live from Yerevan for Europinion on 21.09.2025.

Patrick René Haasler 

Chisinau July 21th 2025

Illustration by Will Allen/Europinion