The EU vs. Kaja Kallas

It’s funny how history repeats itself. Yet again, we see another defence initiative of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, being nixed by the European Union (EU) member states. This time, on September 1, she sought the creation of an independent expert group that would gather senior political and military officials to directly propose new ideas to boost European defence capabilities and fight against external threats. As one might expect, this proposal went nowhere; several member states (including Italy, France and Germany) scrapped the entire project, forcing the High Representative to cancel the plans at the last minute.

The irony is that such an expert group was not even going to make binding decisions. It was an advisory body intended to produce recommendations. Still, France, Germany and Italy reportedly pushed back, with governments objecting that they had not been properly consulted. Even smaller member states contested this new project, fearing that the European External Action Service (EEAS) would be empowered to act independently, rather than serve their respective interests. 

However, it appears that Europe has enough time to debate who gets to discuss European defence, even when it does not have enough time to strengthen European defence. The institutions kept mentioning the Defence Readiness Roadmap, in which member states want to reach the capability areas by 2030. Yet as time goes on, member states are still adamant about not following any proposals to strengthen defence. In fact, Kallas wasn’t simply proposing another defence programme: she was trying to make the EEAS a more consequential actor in defence policy.

What about the European Commission? Last July, the Commission announced five major cooperative defence projects covering drones, maritime and seabed defence, space, air power and missile defence, involving 18 member states and Ukraine. By this logic, it may appear that the Commission and the EEAS are on the same page when it comes to safeguarding European defence proposals and initiatives.

However, that is not the case. Even Kaja Kallas butted heads with the Commission on her project. EU diplomats felt that it was neither the time nor the place to create such an expert group. Still, when an anonymous EU diplomat told Politico that this project is ‘[Kallas’s] way to remain relevant’, then you know the EU is still divided on foreign policy issues. That’s what happens when you don’t possess a single representative in EU foreign policy. Such a task is divided between the Commission President, the High Representative and even the President of the European Council. Having three voices which formulate the  EU’s foreign policy is dysfunctional, to say the least. Especially during crises (such as conflicts in the Middle East), this three-voice mechanism has led to diluted positions through inconsistent statements and internal rivalry, raising the question of how the EU achieves unity despite inherent structural challenges.

But let’s not kid ourselves. Kaja Kallas is no saint. Let’s not forget March 2025, when the EU High Representative presented a €40 billion Ukraine support package without consulting member states, leading to its rejection on the grounds of a lack of communication and coordination. And in mid-2026, during the Lennart Meri Conference in Estonia, critics misinterpreted her words, claiming that Kaja Kalla labelled China itself as a “cancer”. However, it was later clarified that Kallas’s remarks were misrepresented, and that Kallas used the word ‘cancer' as part of a broader analogy concerning Europe diagnosing a difficult economic problem and choosing between “morphine” (represented by subsidies for European firms) and “chemotherapy” (meaning stricter measures against China). Nonetheless, the EU considers China’s economic competitiveness as coercive towards the European market, and Kallas herself has considered China as one of the ‘systemic rivals’ the EU needs to overcome.

When it comes to defence policy, Europe does not have a shortage of warnings. It has no shortage of strategies, roadmaps, or political speeches. The EU has repeatedly identified the threat of Russia. What Europe still lacks is the ability to translate urgency into collective action without every initiative becoming a contest over national influence, industrial advantage or institutional ownership.

While Kaja Kallas’ project seems appealing in theory, we need to be completely realistic: the group itself was hardly going to save Europe. Military experts sitting around a table in Brussels were never going to solve Europe’s military capability gaps. But the fact that even an advisory group became entangled in institutional and national sensitivities is revealing. We’ve heard countless times that Europe is ‘running out of time’ on several important issues such as defence and migration. Yet it continues to behave as though it has plenty of time to argue about who gets to hold the stopwatch. 

The EU should initiate ambitious projects to enhance Europe’s defence capabilities, such as cross-border contracts for ammunition, drones, and heavy weapons. This approach could address fragmented procurement and insufficient industrial capacity, at the same time enabling manufacturers to invest in production capacity during longstanding conflicts without creating additional bureaucratic bodies.

A second step would be reconsidering the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) limits in foreign and security policy, to potentially enhance EU responsiveness during crises. Expanding QMV would lessen the power of individual governments to obstruct initiatives unrelated to the proposal’s substance, thus enabling quicker collective action against security threats.

Finally, Europe needs to leverage some conflict experience from Ukraine to shape military doctrines, particularly in drone warfare, cyber operations, and battlefield intelligence. Incorporating these lessons into EU defence planning will enhance capabilities according to modern warfare realities, potentially leading to improvements in Europe’s security and even decision-making.

And a word of advice for Kaja Kallas: leave the advisory bodies alone. Trying to make European defence work is one thing; trying to organise people to actually discuss how to make it work is quite another. The first may earn you praise; the second may cost you friends and, if you’re not careful, a career. After all, there is apparently no greater threat to European security than a High Representative who forgets to ask permission before calling a meeting.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/European Union

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