The EU’s Fatal Inertia: How Delay Turns A Regional War Global

A peaceful sky is worth fighting for, and while Ukrainian air defence has been duelling Russian and Iranian drones since the beginning of the invasion, Poland has come under fire from Moscow for the first time since 1939. Being a part of the strongest military alliance in the world, shooting down a relatively small number of UAVs, in comparison to what Ukrainians experience every night, could have been done over Ukraine, followed by a stronger reaction than just a few posts on social media from the de facto leader of the alliance – the US. While it is evident that the collective strength of the West surpasses the already weakened Russia, unless Europe shakes off its weak resolve and slow decision-making, accepts responsibility and the disengagement of the US, the war in Ukraine risks spiralling into a wider threat to the European continent, perhaps even to World War III.

Europe’s most significant weakness in this war is not a lack of resources, but a lack of urgency. Time and again, promises from Brussels are made in lofty tones only to be stranded in the swamp of procedure. As a Ukrainian MP recently warned at a London conference, “speed of decisions is decisive.” Yet the European Union has repeatedly taken six to twelve months to move from pledges to deliveries, blunting the battlefield effect of its own promises. The EU’s much-trumpeted commitment to supply Ukraine with one million artillery shells is a case in point: production constraints and coordination challenges saw the pledge fulfilled eight months late. For Ukraine, fighting a war of attrition against a fully mobilised Russia with millions of potential conscripts enticed by financial gain, such delays are not minor technicalities but rather existential dangers. Even grand announcements, like the €800 billion rearmament package or the much-heralded “Sky Shield”, collapse under scrutiny. Most of the funds are reallocated from existing budgets, while the shield remains closer to a PowerPoint slide than a functioning defence system. The problem lies not in Europe’s capacity but in its design, as the system built to protect compromise and consensus in peacetime cannot cope with the demands of war. Outlined in the Ukrainian government’s requests since the early days of the invasion and voiced again in the recent Policy Paper titled “Winning the Future: Strategies for a Resilient Europe and a Secure Ukraine” by the Cambridge Ukrainian Studies and then echoed at the high-profile private roundtable held in Cambridge last week actively requesting more AA systems for policing Ukrainian airspace, particularly over its western and central regions, would have prevented the attack on Poland all together. Wars are decided by tempo as much as by firepower and Russia has mastered escalation on its own terms. Europe, by contrast, is trapped in endless consultation, giving Moscow the one resource it values most: time. Similarly, deliberations and reluctance to use the full economic power of the union to implement more decisive sanctions against Russia, which could include going after the shadow fleet, preventing 3^rd country exports to the aggressor and moving away from the Russian oil would put a dent in the Russian war chest and hence save European lives. This results in a strategy that looks strong on paper or potent on social media and yet falters where it matters most – on the battlefield.

As the EU’s machinery grinds slowly forward, others in Europe have begun to move faster. New coalitions are forming outside Brussels, built not on unanimity but on urgency. The most prominent example is the emerging UK-Poland-Ukraine triangle. Born in 2022 as a framework for cyber and energy security, it has since grown to cover logistics, joint defence production, and interoperability. When I asked President Zelenskyy at the time about its prospects, he was hopeful: “Our army trusts them [the Allies], and communications are held between the experts daily.” That optimism endures, but the alliance remains incomplete. Experts point out that any troop deployments or reassurance forces are still officially limited to the post-war stage. The danger, of course, is that waiting until after a ceasefire may prove too late. Poland, meanwhile, is pressing harder. Already the logistical hub of the war effort, it is now openly urging allies to consider a no-fly zone and push for the aforementioned “Sky Shield”. Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski recently argued that both NATO and the EU have the capacity to enforce such a measure but that no single country can act alone. His call underlines Warsaw’s growing role as the risk-taker in Europe’s security debate but also out of the growing threat from Russia in light of its joint training with Belarus, the point of which is to probe the European resolve and air defence.

Building on the argument for the European but not EU-mandated alliances, in Paris last week, twenty-six countries signed onto a framework for a post-war “reassurance force” in Ukraine. The United Kingdom and France are steering the effort, with planning teams already drafting concepts for maritime security, training, and troop presence. France has promised further air-defence supplies, while Germany is reinforcing Ukraine’s shield with Patriot and IRIS-T systems. Yet both capitals insist that any deployment of forces on Ukrainian soil will come only after a ceasefire. The plans are real, but for Kyiv, the dilemma is immediate: help delayed is help denied. Additionally, the Scandinavian states have shown a different model. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden pooled almost half a billion dollars this summer to procure weapons through NATO, complementing earlier aid on F-16 training and air defence. Their approach is more pragmatic as it prioritises collective funding, fewer obstacles, and faster delivery. Similar innovations are emerging elsewhere: the Danish model of financing weapons production directly in Ukraine, the Dutch focus on joint procurement, and the German push for cross-border defence industrial projects all point to alternative and flexible ways of sustaining Ukraine without EU unanimity or NATO’s article 5. Coalitions like these are still messy, ad hoc, imperfect but unlike Brussels, they are moving, and movement is what matters most. Crucially, such models of support carry practical benefits for the allies themselves. Ukraine has not only become a proving ground for high-tech weaponry, but also a laboratory where tactics and training are battle-tested against the very adversary Europe is most likely to face in the future. Even without a formal alliance, Ukraine has effectively become part of Europe’s security architecture, a fact underscored by the recent “voyages” of Russian drones across Polish, Latvian, Romanian, and Moldovan airspace.

Europe is not powerless. It has the industry, finance, and military strength to secure Ukraine’s victory, however, what it lacks is the courage to act at the speed of events. Every delay in shells, air defence, or guarantees gives Moscow the one resource it values most: time. The coalitions of the willing show another path. Britain, Poland, the Nordics and others are proving that ad hoc alliances can deliver where Brussels falters but they must move from frameworks on paper to actions in the field. Ukraine, for its part, has accumulated valuable battlefield experience, from countering drones to integrating new technologies, which it is ready to share with NATO partners, including training specialists and strengthening collective resilience. Waiting until a ceasefire, as Paris and Berlin suggest, is to gamble on a future Russia will do everything to prevent. Therefore, Europe faces a choice: it can continue to treat this war as a distant problem managed through communiqués and committees, or it can recognise it for what it is – a battle for the security of the continent itself. Ukraine is not an abstract transatlantic concern but rather a European one, and its fate cannot remain hostage to the shifting priorities of Washington. The responsibility to act lies first and foremost with Europe, without waiting for an American green light. Hence the lesson is as old as Rome and as relevant as ever: si vis pacem, para bellum.

In preparing this piece, I drew on the insights of Dr. Victoria Vdovychenko, Joint Programme Leader of the Future of Ukraine Programme at Cambridge’s Centre for Geopolitics, as well as the policy paper “Winning the Future: Strategies for a Resilient Europe and a Secure Ukraine” (Cambridge Centre for Geopolitics, 2025).

I’m also grateful to Lukas Schmelter, Visiting Scholar at the Cambridge Centre for Geopolitics, and to the many contributors at the Cambridge Roundtable on European Order and the “11 Years of Resistance: Advancing the UK–Ukraine Strategic Partnership” conference, whose discussions helped shape the arguments above.

Finally, a personal thanks to Ivan Taran and Diana Shypovych for their help in research and preparation.

Illustrations: Will Allen/Europinion