The Distance Between Warsaw and Taipei is Shorter Than You Think

As 100 days under Trump 2.0 have passed us by, media outlets from AP to The Guardian have criticised and scrutinised Trump’s decisions — and many more opinion articles could be written criticising or extolling his second term.

What is mostly missing from headlines is the reaction from that half of the world’s population who live in Asia. Beyond the surprising (to put it mildly) meeting between South Korea, Japan and China, Western headlines, and indeed society, have failed to reassure our Eastern allies on their ability to count on the West as a whole - not solely on Trump’s increasingly isolationist America. The last time the US withdrew in such a manner from the global systems it helped create was in the 1920s, a century ago, leaving a toothless League of Nations and the rest of the Western world in disarray, squabbling among themselves. I trust no one needs a reminder of how the 1930s and 1940s unfolded. And while NATO and Europe today are stronger and more unified, history remains a mirror of the present.

The West has tried to prepare itself for the return of Trump long before the 2024 presidential campaign started. Increased defence spending and cooperation within Europe had been at the top of the agenda. In the UK, this left the traditionally pro-welfare Labour to prioritise defence spending over its traditional aims. Due to over a decade of austerity, our armed forces are not something we can expect to bounce back within this Parliament. Yet, that is a story for another time. The (European) West needs to unite and reach out its hand to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, sidestepping the US. Not only are these fellow democracies (Taiwan and Japan are full democracies with Korea not far behind the US in the EIU 2024 Democracy Index), they share similar strategic interests when it comes to China and other geopolitical issues. 

Moreover, they are key allies in the area of defence - South Korea has signed an agreement for its K2 tanks with Poland for the latter to build domestically and export to the rest of Europe. Taiwan’s TSMC is a major stakeholder in the semiconductor industry - reaching 67% in the global wafer market -  a key component in semiconductors that are crucial in everything from your phone to the makeshift military drones used in Ukraine. 

There are encouraging signs that the EU is taking steps in order to build closer relationships with the Asia-Pacific region. For example, just over three weeks ago, the European Parliament passed two resolutions supporting deeper Taiwan ties especially in the realm of “hybrid threats”.

Europe, as a whole, does not face immediate threats. But appearances are deceiving.

Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, now officially recruiting North Korean soldiers and rumours of Chinese “volunteers” have started spreading. The Baltic states, once fearing imminent invasion, can now sleep - with one eye open - as Russia can no longer afford to launch a second front in a war that has, at best,  stalled for it. And statements by Trump, like "If they don't pay, I'm not going to defend them. No, I'm not going to defend them.", can shake us to the core and boost our entire defence industry (a look at the stock market will suffice). These jolts remind us that the security order Europe relies on will not survive on autopilot, but requires our active input.

Imagine being just a strait away from the world’s second (or already largest depending on who you ask) largest economy which has longed to ‘reunite’ with you since 1949 (Taiwan). Having a rogue nuclear state with the largest military (including a 5,000,000 military strong paramilitary) across a heavily armed minefielded border which is as predictable as its elections are free (South Korea). Facing missile “tests” flown over or around your country by the second antagonist as well as the first antagonist in your neighbourhood with a (rightful) grudge about the war crimes you committed 80 years ago (Japan). 

All three depend on the US. Trump’s America is one of self-interest, transactional temporary alliances and not one of multilateralism and ‘special relationships’.  

And yet, unlike Europe, Asia does not enjoy the luxury of distance to the frontlines  or the cushion of collective defence agreements. Japan, confronting a far more assertive China and a belligerent North Korea, is pushing ahead with its most significant rearmament since the Second World War. With a 2025 defence budget over ¥8.7 trillion and a clear target of 2% of GDP by 2027, Tokyo is no longer hiding behind constitutional pacifism (ironically imposed then and criticised now by the US). With statements calling the current security environment “the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II”, it’s clear that the Japanese establishment is aware of the risks facing ahead.  

South Korea is the same. Last year, its now-former President Yoon Suk-Yeol expressed a desire to BICES, NATO’s military intelligence sharing network. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg informed reporters that NATO was seeking to improve the ways and networks its member states use to share with South Korea and vice versa. This step towards a better partnership between South Korea and NATO remained largely overlooked outside of Korean media.  

And then there’s Taiwan—forever the awkward plus-one, diplomatically speaking. In March, the European Parliament passed two resolutions supporting deeper ties with Taiwan, particularly in addressing hybrid threats and enhancing strategic resilience. These moves signal a growing recognition of Taiwan’s importance beyond its geopolitical position. President Trump’s remarks likening U.S. defence support for Taiwan to an “insurance policy” and suggesting that Taiwan “doesn’t give us anything” have cast doubt on the reliability of U.S. protection. Such statements underscore the need for Europe to consider a more proactive role in supporting Taiwan—not only as a fellow democracy but also as a critical node in the global semiconductor supply chain. Taiwan’s TSMC produces more than 60% of the world’s most advanced chips, which are integral to everything from smartphones to advanced military equipment.  Ensuring Taiwan’s security is, therefore, not just a matter of democratic solidarity but also of safeguarding global technological infrastructure.

Meanwhile, links between Europe and the Indo-Pacific are strengthening in quieter ways. Japanese forces are participating in NATO exercises. South Korean officers are now stationed in Brussels. Even New Zealand, long fond of moral high ground and nuclear-free declarations, joined a UK–Japan cyber drill. Even the AUKUS framework is broadening, with Korea informally involved in early-stage tech sharing discussions. None of this is dramatic, but collectively it suggests something important: if the US is retreating, others are – and should – begin to fill the gap.

They must. But for Europe to do so credibly, this effort must be more than symbolic diplomacy or rhetorical declarations. Structured defence cooperation should mean joint command exercises with Japanese and Korean forces under the NATO Partnership Interoperability Initiative, and the permanent stationing of EU defence liaison officers in Seoul and Tokyo. It also means initiating an EU–Taiwan cyber dialogue, modelled on the EU–US Trade and Technology Council, to improve joint resilience against hybrid threats. These efforts don’t have to wait on NATO consensus or American blessing—they can begin bilaterally, or under the auspices of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Just as critical is recognising that the Indo-Pacific is not defined solely by its most obvious democracies. The Philippines, which faces daily maritime pressure from China, is rapidly expanding security ties with Japan and Australia. Vietnam maintains wary distance from both Washington and Beijing, yet increasingly leans West on tech and defence. Indonesia, despite its hedging, remains a crucial swing state. These countries will shape the region’s geopolitical architecture, and any meaningful European pivot must include ASEAN-centric diplomacy, development funding, and security partnerships adapted to their non-alignment and internal constraints. Europe has leverage: through trade, investment, and soft power, but it needs the political will to use it smartly.

Still, strategic ambition alone won’t suffice. Europe’s ability to step into even a partial leadership role in the Indo-Pacific is undermined by internal inconsistencies. Germany and France diverge on China policy and remain lukewarm on extending NATO’s remit eastwards. Hungary regularly obstructs EU foreign policy, while others lack the capacity to contribute meaningfully. The continent lacks a unified strategic culture, and its armed forces are often non-interoperable, underfunded, and plagued by procurement delays and recruitment failings. For Europe to be taken seriously, it must reconcile its ambition with its actual readiness and that begins with brutal internal honesty.

Nor should we assume that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan form a neat strategic bloc. South Korea’s economic dependence on China constrains its alignment, and its public remains sceptical of entrapment in US-led escalation. Japan’s constitutional constraints, though weakening, remain a legal reality and a political fault line. Taiwan, for all its resilience, exists in a liminal diplomatic space. Any official interaction with it seems like an outright provocation to China (one must remember Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit),  something not all in Europe have an appetite for. Moreover, all three have complicated relationships - a difficult history that often allows nationalist sentiments to supersede more pragmatic collaboration.  Any Western engagement with these actors must be carefully weighed, but taken urgently.

Because from Tokyo to Seoul to Taipei, the question is no longer whether the US is listening. It’s whether the rest of the West understands what’s at stake—and whether it is prepared, politically and materially, to act.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Groov3

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