The Arctic as a Theatre of Polarisation

President Donald Trump’s ambition to acquire Greenland is indicative of a historic shift not only in American foreign policy, but in global perceptions of the High North: the Arctic is no longer an innocuous area of scientific exploration, but a political-military nexus of global power competition. This article problematises three loci of NATO, Russian and Chinese power projection in the Arctic.

With the onset of climate change, temperatures in the Arctic are rising rapidly by as much as four times compared to other global regions. The first ice-free day is predicted to occur before 2030. 

With the Arctic, which makes up 4% of the globe, diminishing, new opportunities have materialised for trade routes and mining natural resources, such as rare earth minerals, oil and gas. However, this also raises new security dilemmas, by removing a once largely impenetrable natural barrier between the Euro-Atlantic and the Pacific. 

Whilst underlying tensions have been festering in the polar region for some time – towns like Kirkenes in Norway, situated at the border between the Soviet Union and the West, were recognised as a “nest of spies” during the Cold War – the Arctic has been hailed as an example of peaceful international cooperation for decades. In 1996, Arctic powers – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States – formed the Arctic Council with the intention of encouraging collaboration over the protection of biodiversity and indigenous peoples’ rights. 

Yet, such ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ is fast melting away. The planting of a Russian flag at the base of the North Pole in 2007 was a turning point in genteel relations. Following this, the drastic suspension of the Arctic Council by the Arctic 7 at the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO – leaving Russia as the only Arctic power without a NATO membership – have turned the region into a geopolitical chessboard. 

The rise of China as a self-proclaimed ‘near-Arctic’ power only broadens the sphere of influence in the East, and the Arctic serves as a key point of mutual strategic cooperation in the Sino-Russian partnership: China seeks access to the Arctic for minerals and sea routes, whilst Russia needs allies to rival NATO. 

Power Projection 1: Military

In July 2024, China and Russia engaged in a joint military exercise, using H-6K bombers and Tu-95MS Bear bombers, in the Arctic Ocean close to Alaska. Moreover, Chinese and Russian coastguards collaborated in a joint patrol in the Arctic in October 2024. 

This takes place within a wider context of increased Russian hostility, such as GPS jamming and cases of espionage in the polar region. It has also been recognised that Russia is undergoing a major military build-up in the Arctic - British Defence Secretary John Healey noted that Russia has been “reopening old Cold War bases.” Indeed, Russia owns 30 of the 66 operational military bases in the Arctic. 

However, Russia’s militarisation stems in part from a sense of vulnerability. It is no coincidence that the Kola peninsula has been the location for Russia’s strategic weapons: the sea ice serves as a natural defence barrier. Thus, the melting of sea ice jeopardises the barrier’s continued effectiveness by leaving Russia’s nuclear submarines more vulnerable to detection.

On the other side of the chessboard, the other 36 military bases in the Arctic belong to NATO members, who are also engaging in regional military activity. Indeed, NATO’s Cold Response exercise took place this March, and involved 25,000 troops – of which 1,500 were Royal Marine Commandos – deployed across Norway, Finland and Sweden. NATO also launched Arctic Sentry this February, contributing to a plethora of other military activities like Joint Force Command Norfolk, led by the US, a Combined Air Operations Centre in Norway and other multi-domain capabilities. 

In addition, Lion Protector, a Joint Expeditionary Force exercise concerning British and Norwegian troops deployed in Iceland, the Danish Straits and Norway, will take place this September. 

Power Projection 2: Science 

The Arctic is a well-established locus of scientific research and exploration. In 2018, the leading producers of Arctic Research included the United States, Canada, Russia and the United Kingdom. Yet, in recent years, China has increased its engagement with the scientific community. In 2018, China established a China-Iceland Observatory in Karholl. China has also invested in Arctic research stations and space infrastructure. All this helps to bolster China’s claim to the title of a ‘near-Arctic’ power whilst also facilitating the expansion of the country’s influence on NATO member territory. Beijing’s scientific investment underpins China’s strategic economic interest in the Arctic, notably in new shipping lanes which can contribute to an “Ice Silk Road.”

Power Projection 3: Territory 

A physical, dominating presence in the Arctic is another dimension through which power is projected. A substantial quarter of Russian territory is in the polar region; in other words, two-thirds of the Arctic’s population lives in Russia. In comparison, the extent of the United States’ Arctic territory is just 15%. 

Moreover, Russia has engaged in military exercises beyond its territory, encroaching on Norway’s exclusive economic zone through intrusions into the Barents Sea. In addition to this, as not all maritime boundaries are settled in the Arctic, Russia is currently tracking the Lomonosov underwater shelf in order to prove its connection to Russia’s continental border; under the International Seabed Authority, this could enable Russia to further expand its exclusive economic zone. 

Meanwhile, Canada is trying to claim sovereignty over the waters between its northernmost islands, such as Somerset Island and Devon Island. This is a contentious issue as this expanse of water, which constitutes the famous Northwest Passage, is recognised as an international strait by Russia and the United States.

Spheres of influence?

Yet, the dichotomous model of two opposing camps – East and West – is oversimplified. 

President Donald Trump’s recent threats to withdraw the United States from NATO on the grounds of NATO members’ reluctance to back the US in its war against Iran, alongside the United States’ disregard for international law, with the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, signal rising complications in the Euro-Atlantic relationship. 

Moreover, whilst cooperation over the Arctic is of mutual benefit to the Sino-Russian partnership, suspicions between the two countries remain. Indeed, it is in China’s economic interests to avoid Western sanctions for collaborating with Russia, whilst Russia seeks to limit the extent of China’s influence in its Arctic territory. 

And so, as temperatures rise, so do tensions in the Arctic, making the area yet another theatre of action on the global stage, not with direct physical conflict, but with multifaceted projections of regional power.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/US Air Force – North American Aerospace Defense Command (Airman 1st Class Aaron Guerrisky)

Licence: public domain.

No image changes made.