Secessionism and Regionalism: The Case of South Yemen–and South Arabia?

The prolonged war in Yemen, which has been locked in a stalemate for a decade, has now entered a new stage. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a major player in the war in Yemen, was able to successfully penetrate the regions of Hadhramaut and Al Mahra, effectively controlling the official borders of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) – South Yemen. The STC has been the sole representative of the southern secessionist movement whose purpose is to revive the state of South Yemen, or South Arabia, following what the movement perceive as a failed union with the north of Yemen in 1990. The STC’s control over Hadhramaut and Al Mahra was not only a sociopolitical statement, but also contained a geoeconomic angle, since Hadhramaut possesses most of Yemen’s oil reserves, and Al Mahra borders Oman on the East and the Arabian Sea to the South making it effectively a region of strategic importance. However, the STC was not successful in consolidating their advancements due to Saudi intervention in the Southern regions after the UAE had decided to completely withdraw from the conflict in Yemen. The result: Saudi proxies, the Islah Party, and tribal forces reversed the STC’s military advancements within the regions of Hadhramaut and Al Mahra, as well as secessionist majority regions that the STC has dominated the past decade. 

The most recent Saudi policies had called for the dissolution of the STC following their declaration of the state of South Arabia. It is too early to judge the current status of the STC, though it does seem to be splitting into two sub-factions, a pro-Saudi solution faction aiming to attain secession through a Saudi-sponsored political process, and an anti-Saudi faction led by the STC’s president Aidrous Al Zubaidi who is currently in hiding and is allegedly claimed to have been transported to Somalia. That all being said, the recent events have also brought to light the almost forgotten South Yemeni–South Arabian secessionist movement. The secessionist aspirations of the STC are no longer implicit, and are explicitly expressed in their political symbolism, where the flag of the former PDRY is raised instead of the union flag commonly associated with Yemen today. As these recent developments begin to shed further light on the ongoing conflict in Yemen, the international community should be aware of the clear distinction between the organic South Yemeni secessionist movement and its historical claims, and the non-state actors weaponising secessionism as a geopolitical instrument of expansion for external state actors. 

Additionally, these developments led to severe implications on the Gulf states, primarily, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – the main external state actors in the Yemeni conflict. These events coincided with the secession of Somaliland from Somalia, worsening the tensions between the Saudis and Emiratis. 

This, of course, led to serious discussions concerning the cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as the international political order shifts towards a new multipolar order. Through an adaptation of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis, and Aleksander Dugin’s notion of multipolarity, I have described a multipolar order as one where different civilisations either clash with one another, converge, or build alliances. The Middle East currently stands as one of the most dysfunctional poles, with the GCC being the only confederal framework that previously possessed any form of cohesion. The current Saudi-Emirati rift, as well as the previous tensions between Qatar and the UAE, undermines the cohesion of the GCC as a whole, which is problematic since a weak pole could function as a battlefield for other clashing superpowers in a multipolar world. Perhaps the current volatility the Gulf states, Iran, and the whole Middle East is witnessing is a perfect reflection of these concerns regarding the competence of the Middle East in a multipolar world. 

Secessionism and International Law

Secessionism, in the case of Yemen at least, or perhaps the rest of the world today, has become a term of abuse in an international political order that gives primacy to the territorial integrity of all existent states, over the self-determination of peoples. This does not only reflect the failure of current international law but reveals the clear contradictions and flaws within it. While the UN charter calls for the “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (Article 1(2) – UN Charter), it simultaneously imposes a contradictory objective, namely, to uphold the “territorial integrity of states” (Article 2(4) – UN Charter). These two objectives of international law are clearly mutually exclusive and antithetical to one another especially when taking into consideration the reality of international politics. This comes as no surprise if one were to trace the origins of such idealistic conceptions of international politics expressed by the UN today, which essentially is the practical application of Kant’s utopian liberal international political order that is characterized by “perpetual peace”. 

Secessionism and the Post-Cold War Order

In reality however, when viewing the current trends, and future projections, in international politics we are instantly confronted with the significant rise of secessionism globally. The post-Cold War order witnessed the rise of 34 new sovereign states which had emerged as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and only two cases of union, namely, Germany and Yemen. In the case of Germany, the split was a direct result of Cold War dynamics following the end of the Second World War, and the union was the logical end of the post-Cold War order. In Yemen, however, the union was a non-organic one, based on a mixture of pan-Arabist fervor following the collapse of the Soviet Union, subsequently leading to the decline of Marxism in the Middle East, and a sense of uncertainty in South Yemen during the early stages of the post-Cold War order. The case of Yemen is perhaps best understood when compared to the case of Catalonia and the Basque regions in Spain, rather than Germany, since the two secessionist regions in Spain, as well as other regions calling for autonomy (Galicia), are based on historically founded claims. The complex case of secessionism in Yemen should not be understated in order to ensure that state, and non-state, actors globally navigate their interaction with a potential future independent South Yemen/Arabia competently. 

The Predominant Arab View

The dominant view towards South Yemeni secessionism in the Arab world is primarily negative, this is perhaps a long-lasting effect of Pan-Arabism, which had shaped the modern Arab collective psyche, despite the existence of dozens of Arab states, and the lack of any prospects of a concrete union between Arab states at the confederal or federal levels. Another reason, which is also a global one, the notion of secession gained a negative connotation due to contradictory international law which ultimately anathematised the concept of secession. In fact, the contradictions in the UN charter were weaponised by Western powers in the Middle East in order to ensure their foreign policy objectives, preserving the territorial integrity of specific states when that ensures their self-interest (Yemen, Turkey, Somalia, and Morocco), and giving autonomy to other regions when it fit their foreign policy goals (Iraqi Kurdistan and Somaliland). Yet, most views towards the secession of South Yemen lack a sound historical understanding of the history of Yemen and South Arabia. Unlike Germany, which had unified during the second half of the 18^th century, South Arabia and Yemen (or North Yemen), had been separate political entities across most of history. The notion of a unified Yemen, that consisted of both the Southern and Northern regions of Yemen today emerged during the Cold War era, being primarily shaped by the Pan-Arabist currents that dominated the political scene. However, the introduction of the word “Yemen”, in South Arabian political discourse, is historically unprecedented. 

Political Etymology and Vocabulary

Focusing on secessionism across my research the past decade made me realise that the key to understanding the nature of secessionist movements lies at the intersection between etymology, culture, history, and vexillology. In the case of South Yemen, etymology is crucial since the introduction of the term “Yemen” in Southern political currents – associating the Southern regions with Yemen as a whole – has precipitated catastrophic political implications. Embedding a false term, such as the notion of a “South Yemen”, into the collective psyche of both the Northern and Southern regions had paved the way towards a union that functioned as a platform for kleptocratic elites to extend their authority over Southern regions of Yemen. Although both Northerners and Southerners in Yemen were profoundly optimistic about the union in 1990, in hindsight it becomes clear that it had only weakened the former by empowering the kleptocracy and subjugated the latter through conquest after the brief secessionist war of 1994. That all being said, the introduction of the term “Yemen” into the political vocabulary of everyday Southerners during the Cold War had drastic consequences on their sociopolitical future. Hence, most secessionists today prefer the term “South Arabia”, which was the official name of the region during the century long British rule over the region, since it makes a clear distinction between the North and South, and reverses any Northern claims over the South.

The Malleability of Culture

In Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen (2012), Stephen Day explores the diverse cultural fabric of Yemen as a product of the different terrains and ecological zones existent in the country. Day argued that regionalism in Yemen is a perennial constant that is essentially embedded into the cultural fabric, and a lack of understanding of such deep-seated regionalism when dealing with Yemen could have catastrophic implications. Day’s work is crucial here since he claimed that regionalism is an intrinsic cultural trait, meaning that the Cold War dynamic alone does not explain the union, hence the rise of the claims for secession in the South. The diverse geographic terrain in Yemen as a whole means that regionalism is also a characteristic of the Southern areas, the cultural and regional complexities means that a formation of a separate Southern state would require a federal arrangement that accommodates such complexities well. This also reveals the highland-coast distinction that shaped the North Yemeni political realities. Thus, whether a South Yemeni state secedes in our lifetime, or not, Yemen as a whole requires a federal model that does not oversimplify its diverse cultural and regional realities. Moreover, cultural boundaries transcend political borders, the negligence of this statement by modern state-actors has suppressed the self-determination of countless minorities, and worse, has split specific groups ultimately severing their historic connection – the case of the Kurds, who have been split between four different states, is one tragic example. In the case of Yemen, however, this reveals the historic and cultural ties at the border regions, whether between the North and South, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. 

The Suppression of Historical Narratives

Most secessionist movements justify their claims through a historicist argument that traces their origins within a historical period where their sovereignty, or autonomy, was guaranteed. South Arabia has a distinct history stretching back to antiquity, the era of Islamic caliphates, and the Western imperialist era. Of course, this distinct experience overlaps with other neighboring regions, such as Dhofar in Oman, and Northern Yemen as well. That being said, a nation's distinct historical experience should not be suppressed or rejected, for history shows us that suppressed narratives return in a more violent manner. This, I fear, is already apparent in elements of the STC, who have weaponised their historical narratives to justify their oppression of Northerners, as well as Southerners, who do not necessarily reject secessionism, but rather, object to the means adopted by the STC in order to achieve secession. Apart from the clear violation of human rights, cases of corruption, and oppression of specific minorities, the STC has paved the way for foreign interventionism that has led to what can be called an unprecedented political dilemma in the Southern regions.

Vexillology and Secessionism

In Worth Dying For: The Power and Politics of Flags (2016), Tim Marshall reminds us of the power symbols play in our political, social, and economic realities. Marshall argued that flags can represent a people’s yearning for freedom but can also be simultaneously weaponised to implement insidious agendas. The vexillological realities of Yemeni politics should not be ignored, the significance of symbolism, history, and usage of flags in politics reflect the organic forces at play in contemporary and historical cases. While some feudalist factions utilise the Southern flag to pave the way for foreign adventurism, a significant portion of the Southern masses rally around the same flag as an expression of resistance against the suppression they had faced for three decades since the formation of the union. 

The re-escalation of the civil war within Yemen could also have severe repercussions on neighbouring states, the rift between Saudi and the UAE is growing as a result of their scramble over Hadhramaut. The Saudis have openly supported the government and tribal forces in Hadhramaut, while the Emiratis continue to fund and arm secessionist troops through the STC. Additionally, the STC has been recently flirting with the idea of joining the Abraham Accords and establishing formal relations with Israel. With the Houthis still in power in the Northern regions, an Israeli-STC alliance could possibly reignite the war in Yemen with the Southern regions effectively functioning as a launchpad for Western adventurism in the region. With that all being said, it is worth noting that the interventionist forces are prioritizing their agendas in the Southern regions over the grassroot secessionist claims of the South Yemeni people, this is also the case with most of the armed factions that claim to be fighting for secession but have in reality morphed into feudalistic warbands. The same could be said about pro-Saudi proxies who are now weaponized to preserve the unionist factions in Yemen. Foreign adventurism in all of its forms, be it pro-union, or pro-secession, will ultimately lead to a state of confusion in Yemen and across the international community when dealing with the complexities of the Yemeni conflict. 

The secessionist movement might have been hijacked by internal and external forces that are leading the Southern regions of Yemen into feudalism, be that as it may, this should not lead to the rejection of the rights of the masses who have been fighting for their self-determination. Thus, the primary task today by both state and non-state actors when considering secessionist movements, is not how to subsume such movements under outdated and contradictory models, but rather, how to transform our understanding of history, culture and politics in order to accommodate the reality of secessionism in Yemen, and elsewhere.

Image: Flickr/NASA Hubble Space Telescope

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