Patriotism to Polarisation: Why Gaza Resonates Differently Than Afghanistan or Iraq

A Foreign War That Feels Domestic 

For nearly three years, the conflict in Gaza has dominated American media outlets. Local governments have passed resolutions calling for a ceasefire, while New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani has stated that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should be arrested if he travels to New York to address the United Nations. Divisions have emerged within Congress over funding for Israel, and some political candidates have made a point of refusing to accept donations from AIPAC. Online debates have increasingly extended into workplaces and schools, culminating in high-profile protest encampments at Ohio State University, the University of Texas at Austin, and, most infamously, Columbia University. 

When I was an incoming graduate student at Columbia, I recall repeatedly being asked for my opinion on the encampments. Having finished my first year, Palestine has undoubtedly consolidated as a central focus of discussion among the school’s international affairs students, faculty, and broader community. In fact, while at a bar during the Knicks’ Finals run, someone asked for my take on Palestine after I mentioned I study at the international affairs school. Although I was obviously not interested in discussing the Israel–Palestine conflict while my friends waited with beers and the Knicks were on the verge of their first title in 53 years, the encounter underscored a set of questions that remain worth investigating. Why has Gaza become such a potent domestic political issue? And why does it seem to permeate American political life in a way that Afghanistan and Iraq did not?

The puzzle is not that Americans ignored Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, both wars generated enormous public attention and eventually substantial opposition. Rather, Afghanistan and Iraq were initially filtered through a patriotic consensus and institutional unity of the post-9/11 era, whereas Gaza has unfolded in a fragmented political environment dominated by social media, identity politics, distrust of institutions, and intense partisan polarisation. The result is that Gaza has become a domestic political conflict in ways that earlier Middle East wars largely did not. 

Afghanistan and Iraq: The Age of Patriotic Consensus  

Following the September 11 attacks, the United States experienced a rally round the flag effect. In political science, this refers to the phenomenon of a short-run popular support of a state’s government or leaders during times of crisis. For example, President Bush’s approval rating skyrocketed from 51%, prior to the attacks, to 90%, after the attacks. Americans exhibited extraordinary trust in the government and the national security apparatus, with the War on Terror framework enjoying widespread public acceptance. 

The United States erupted in patriotism with citizens displaying flags on their homes, some even tattooing their bodies with American emblems, and an annual Pentagon survey of young people’s propensity to join the military showed an 8% increase among young men likely to enlist immediately after 9/11, remaining high until 2005. 

In mid-September of 2001, 77% favoured U.S. military action, even if it meant thousands of American casualties. This trend continued as 2003 polling showed 72% of Americans favoured the war in Iraq. Both war efforts saw largely bipartisan consensus in Congress as the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed 98-0 in the Senate and 420-1 in the House. The Iraq Resolution passed 77-23 in the Senate and 296-133 in the House. 

Mainstream media and universities largely fell in line as well. Although dissent existed, it was marginalised, with critics portrayed as naïve, unpatriotic, or insufficiently supportive of U.S.  national security. The key point is that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were understood primarily through a counterterrorism and national security lens.

The Collapse of the Post-9/11 Consensus 

Today, the majority of Americans view the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to be failures with two thirds of veterans saying Iraq was not worth fighting. What could account for this significant decline in popularity among Americans? First, both wars were incredibly costly, in terms of both money and human life. In Afghanistan, 2,350 American servicemembers were killed and an additional 20,146 were wounded. Iraq saw 4,492 servicemembers killed, with an additional 32,292 wounded. A report from Brown University revealed that, over twenty years, the United States spent $2.3 trillion on the Afghanistan/Pakistan warzone and $2.1 trillion on the Iraq/Syria warzone. Longer term and more indirect costs, such as veteran care and interest payments on borrowing for the war, bring the total cost to $8 trillion. 

The wars’ unpopularity was also fuelled by the prolonged American presence in both countries, as well as the infamous claim by the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. This claim proved to be false, as Charles Duelfer, the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, stated in a report that no such weapons were found.

As a result, the American public lost trust in their government, media, and academia. As such, Americans became less willing to defer to elite narratives and foreign-policy consensus became harder to sustain. By the time Gaza erupted, the political infrastructure that had supported the War on Terror no longer existed.

The Social Media Revolution

Afghanistan and Iraq were largely viewed via traditional media such as newspapers, cable news, embedded journalism, and limited direct access to events. Today, there are 310 million social media users in the United States, accounting for approximately 93% of the population. Social media has become a weapon of war, a phenomenon that has intensified dramatically since October 7 and the ensuing war. 

Hamas and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) use social media for psychological warfare, intelligence gathering, and global public relations. Both actors use X, TikTok, and other social media platforms to shape the international narrative and influence domestic opinion.

For civilians, in theory, anyone can become a journalist as long as they have a phone and access to social media. Those on the ground in Gaza can instantly relay videos and photographs to users living halfway around the world. Moreover, emotionally charged content is often rewarded with virality and, in some cases, financial compensation. 

The contrast is clear. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were largely mediated by the established media, whereas the war in Gaza is experienced in real time.

The Rise of Identity Politics and Diaspora Politics

First, we must make a distinction: Arab Americans are not necessarily the same as Muslim Americans. Identifying as Arab does not mean that one is Muslim. Many Arab Americans are Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Druze, or simply nonreligious.

As such, the Arab-American Institute estimates that there are 3.7 million Arab-Americans with the majority being native-born and 86% possessing U.S. citizenship. From 2010 to 2024, the Arab-American population has increased 43%. Furthermore, the United States is home to the largest Jewish population outside of Israel. Islam is the third-largest religion in the U.S., behind Christianity and Judaism, with 3.5 million followers. By 2050, it is estimated that 8 million Americans will be Muslim. More than 40% of Muslim-Americans were born and raised in the United States. The remaining 58% are immigrants. 

These demographic realities can shape how Americans engage with conflicts in the Middle East. For many Arab-, Muslim-, and Jewish-Americans, family and community ties can create direct personal connections to events overseas, making these seemingly distant conflicts feel immediate and personal. At the same time, political engagement is increasingly shaped by religious identity and lived experience. This helps explain why developments in the Middle East can generate significant political engagement within the United States, even among Americans who have no direct personal connection to the region. This means that Gaza is not just a foreign policy issue. There exists a connection that many Americans experience through questions of belonging, discrimination, and representation.

The New Age of American Activism 

Since 2010, the United States has seen a plethora of new protest movements. These include Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, indigenous rights activism, and climate movements. These movements, particularly since 2020, have brought terms such as structural power, oppression, colonialism, and human rights into greater prominence in public discourse. These concepts can be applied to many aspects of the Israel-Palestine conflict. For example, Jewish migration to Palestine, the Israeli occupation, Palestinian displacement, Israeli settlements, restrictions on movement, and the competing national claims of Israelis and Palestinians. As such, the conflict has become symbolic of broader questions surrounding justice and inequality.

In contrast with Iraq, where antiwar activism largely focused on policy failure of the White House and the Defense and State Departments, Gaza activism often centres on moral and identity claims.

The Democratic Party’s Internal Transformation

For years there was a strong consensus and limited ideological diversity on Israel policy. However, as Generation Z has approached voting age, there emerged a significant difference in attitude regarding support for Israel. Less than half of Gen Z Harris voters would favor the use of troops in the case of Iran attacking Israel. Overall, 44% of Gen Zers were against any U.S. military support to Israel, and 24% favoured only defensive weapons for Israel. 

There exists a large gap in public opinion on Israel between Americans and their elected officials. Polling from Pew Research Center states that, in 2026, 60% of Americans have a negative view of Israel and 59% maintain no confidence in Prime Minister Netanyahu. Both figures are nearly twenty point jumps from four years earlier in 2022. This shift in opinion can most aptly be viewed in Democratic members of Congress. In a July 15 vote, nearly half of House Democrats voted to eliminate aid to Israel. Once a largely unified ally, Israel has now become a deeply polarising issue, not only among the American public but also among U.S. lawmakers. 

Progressive Democrats have become more willing to challenge longstanding party positions, as well as contest for leadership. Primaries in New York City, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, and countless others illustrate these intra-party tensions.  

Why Israel-Palestine Is Different and What Gaza Reveals About America

Israel-Palestine possesses unique symbolic power that Afghanistan and Iraq lacked. The conflict maintains a large religious significance amongst Jewish, Muslim, and Christian communities, complex historical narratives, strong advocacy networks, and decades of sustained media visibility. 

Iraq did generate massive opposition but comparing it to Gaza opposition has its own set of limits as it consists of different actors and historical contexts. So, why has Gaza become a domestic political flashpoint? 

Simply, the United States that experienced Afghanistan and Iraq no longer exists politically. The patriotic consensus has been replaced by fragmentation, distrust, identity-based politics, and more sophisticated activism. Gaza may ultimately be remembered not only as a Middle Eastern conflict but as a moment that exposed how profoundly American political culture has changed since September 11. This story is less about one war than about the transformation of the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/4kbw9Df3Tw

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