Media, Trust, and Disinformation: Who Controls the Narrative in Georgia?

Introduction

In a country positioned at the crossroads of East and West, the battle for hearts and minds is increasingly fought not on the battlefield, but in the media. Once the frontrunner of the so-called “Associated Trio,” Georgia now finds itself among the most vulnerable to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and broader information disorders, as media freedom and freedom of speech face growing threats.

Amid ongoing protests, political unrest, and strained relations with foreign partners, Georgian society remains deeply polarised. Russia—Georgia’s northern neighbour—has never turned its gaze away and continues to target the country with relentless disinformation campaigns that erode civic trust and undermine independent thought.

The outbreak of war in Ukraine gave Georgia’s political elite new momentum to push and reinforce their narratives. Themes like "peace policy" and the West’s alleged efforts to drag Georgia into war have become central to the ruling party’s messaging strategy. These talking points dominate state-aligned communications, shaping a media environment where polarising questions increasingly frame public discourse: Does Georgia truly need European integration? Is the West a genuine ally? And what is the real cost of peace?

This data blog explores the current landscape of media, trust, and disinformation in Georgia. It traces the evolution of dominant narratives and assesses the country’s preparedness to counter disinformation in an era of growing geopolitical pressure.

The Rise of Anti-Western Narratives

Although Georgia has long been a target of disinformation—whether political, social, or medical—the challenge intensified significantly after 2022. As geopolitical tensions reshaped both domestic and foreign policy discourse, dominant narratives appeared to shift from pro-Western to increasingly anti-Western, though notably, without becoming explicitly pro-Russian, meaning that they were neither praising nor criticising Russia; it was simply removed from the daily agenda. These narratives promoted pessimism in Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic path and doubted the West's role as a strategic partner of Georgia. One of the most amplified claims, voiced not only by anonymous social media accounts but also by high-ranking government officials, is the idea that the collective West attempted to drag Georgia into war by demanding it open a second front during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine marked the beginning of a sustained wave of anti-Western propaganda in Georgia’s information space. Various political parties and societal groups began promoting the idea that neutrality is the best path for Georgia, an idea that implicitly rules out NATO membership. At the same time, ruling party officials have increasingly spoken about the alleged financing of radical, anti-government groups in Georgia by foreign actors, particularly from the West. These narratives are often accompanied by criticism of Western diplomats, who are accused of supporting revolutionary agendas under the guise of civil society funding.

Against this backdrop, however, a strong counter-narrative persists—one that is pro-European and vocally supported by civil society organisations, which continue to emphasise the risk of losing the democratic progress Georgia has achieved over the past two decades. Support for this narrative has been expressed repeatedly through large-scale public protests.

Disinformation in Numbers

A country’s resilience to disinformation is influenced by various factors, with the level of public education and the degree of media freedom playing especially critical roles. Since 2022, the state agency “Communications Commission” has taken steps to integrate media literacy into the formal education system. However, media literacy is not a skill learned in a single class; it requires long-term critical thinking development. Despite the efforts, Georgia has ranked last (41st) for two consecutive years in the Media Literacy Index developed by the Open Society Institute Sofia. The Index evaluates countries based on four key indicators:

• Media Freedom (40%)

• Education (45%)

• Trust (10%)

• E-Participation (5%)

Georgia received a score of 20 out of 100 in both 2022 and 2023, which led to its ranking in 41st place in Europe. A lack of media literacy among citizens creates a fertile ground for disinformation to spread, leaving Georgia particularly vulnerable to information disorders.

Slowly, it has become very apparent that new narratives have become dominant in Georgia, shaping the social and political agenda to a large extent. As a result, even the priorities of Georgia’s foreign policy have been called into question. Georgia’s vulnerability to disinformation is determined not only by the level of media literacy but also by an aggressive and active online information campaign, which, according to multiple studies, originates from Russia. Parallel to important events (protests, elections, etc), Georgia, among other countries, is heavily targeted by influence operations such as the PRAVDA network, which has a Georgian analogy and amplifies Russian narratives as they mostly translate their articles from agencies connected to the Russian government (TASS, Sputnik, Russia Today). Simply put, against the backdrop of low media literacy and a fast information flow, disinformation campaigns do not allow society to catch its breath and constantly strive to secure dominant positions in the information space.

Following March 2024, a growing wave of protests reemerged in Georgia, which was openly pro-European in character and opposed a transparency-related draft law—widely referred to by many Georgians as the 'Russian law' due to its content. Later, protests occurred again in November 2024 as the ruling party of Georgia decided to stop accession to the EU on their end.  Observing the pro-European protests over the last year offers a good example of clear and telling trends regarding the actors shaping Georgia’s information agenda, especially when it comes to challenging its Western path,  both online and on TV.

Social media consumption is on the rise in Georgia. Approximately 91% of the Georgian population has internet access, and among internet users, 94% cite access to social media as one of the main reasons for being online. In other words, nearly everyone who uses the internet also uses social media. This makes the content that citizens encounter during a typical scroll especially significant.

During the 2024 protests against the "foreign agent" law, Meta—one of the most popular social media platforms—published its quarterly threat assessment report, in which it stated that it had removed 76 Facebook accounts, 30 Pages, and 11 Instagram accounts for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. This network originated in Russia and targeted audiences in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In the case of Georgia, the accounts specifically focused on the recent protests, criticising the demonstrators and expressing support for the ruling party. 

Why It Matters: Public Trust and Democratic Resilience

Although the main source of news has shifted from TV to online platforms, a significant number of people still use TV as their main source of information consumption. The latest survey conducted by CCRC reveals that 44% of people say that television is their main source of news, compared with 51% using social media and messaging apps to share and consume news.

Media channels in Georgia often present conflicting perspectives on political issues, leading to their classification as either pro-government or critical (opposition) media. Among them, TV Imedi remains the most-watched and most-trusted television station in Georgia. It is also widely perceived as a pro-government outlet and played an active role in shaping the narrative around the 2024 protests. For the past couple of years, Georgia has struggled to maintain its decade-long progress in media freedom and the safety of journalists, especially after the mass protests started. It has become extremely difficult to cover and broadcast events for media outlets that tend to be critical towards the ruling party, enabling certain anti-Western narratives to be left undebunked. As a result, Georgia now sets the anti-record since Georgian Dream assumed office in the World Press Freedom Index.  

The narratives promoted by different media channels during the protests diverged significantly. Pro-government channels—which enjoy the highest viewership and public trust—portrayed the draft law as a major step toward transparency in foreign funding and a move that would strengthen democracy in Georgia. Accordingly, the law was often referred to as the Transparency Law in short. In contrast, other leading television channels such as Mtavari, Formula, and others highlighted the law’s similarities to the Russian “foreign agent” legislation, which has been used in Russia to suppress a vibrant and critical civil society and entrench authoritarianism. These media outlets frequently referred to the law as the “Russian law,” echoing the terminology used by protesters and emphasising the law’s repressive nature during their broadcasts.

As mentioned above, in November 2024, following the disputed parliamentary elections and Georgian Dream’s controversial decision to postpone EU accession until 2028, another wave of protests broke out. The information landscape during this period followed similar patterns seen earlier in the year. Data from Google Trends reveals which media outlets were most frequently searched during the onset of the November (and still ongoing) protests in relation to other channels. 

Among Georgia’s five major television channels, TV Imedi once again emerged as the most searched outlet, followed by Formula. The data includes interest of these search queries in both Georgian and Latin scripts and covers the period from November 23, 2024, to February 23, 2025. The protests began on November 28, 2024.

To delve deeper into narrative analysis, both domestic and foreign media monitoring reports highlight the pluralism, though polarised and biased tendency in the editorial choices of major TV channels. For example, a pre-election news monitoring report by the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics underlines the preferences of each channel. Naturally, during the research period (the pre-election period), all channels devoted the largest share—about a quarter of their news coverage—to Georgian Dream. However, the way this coverage was presented is a separate matter. Channels such as TV Pirveli, Mtavari, and Formula covered Georgian Dream mainly in a negative context, while 1TV (the Public Broadcaster) and TV Imedi portrayed Georgian Dream in a positive context. This trend was also noticeable after the elections, during the coverage of the pro-European rallies. Therefore, when we talk about who controls the narrative, we have to zoom in on the most watched and searched media outlets, in this case, TV Imedi. It is evident that TV Imedi frequently amplifies and mirrors the voices of Georgian Dream officials, highlights violent incidents during protests, and frames these events as orchestrated by the opposition rather than as expressions of genuine public discontent. In contrast, channels like Mtavari, Formula, and TV Pirveli tend to question the government’s legitimacy and focus on instances of violence against protesters and journalists, often attributing responsibility to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It can be said that TV Imedi also mirrored the GD-approved results of 2024 Elections in their exit polls, showing a little to no difference with the official statement of Central Election Commission of Georgia. 

When in contrast, a different narrative was presented to the viewers by pro-opposition channels, as shown in the For example, TV Formula relied on Edison Research, while TV Imedi based its exit poll on a survey by GORBI, a different research company. Although the difference might not seem significant, the results shown by the two channels are substantially different. Both TV Imedi and CEC indicated that Georgian Dream won the majority of parliamentary seats. However, TV Formula showed that no single party was a clear winner, necessitating a coalition government. Broadcasting different exit polls became a heavily discussed topic during this election. Setting aside the media policy of each Georgian TV channel, one aspect of exit polls is measurable: since 2012, Edison Research results have shown very small differences compared to official results. Therefore, it came as a surprise to many, including the research agencies themselves, that official results by CEC significantly differed from what they calculated, thus calling it “statistically impossible”. 

The popularity of different media outlets thus reflects which narratives dominate public consumption - and, consequently, how public opinion is shaped. A survey conducted in February 2025 underscores this dynamic: while a large majority of Georgians express support for EU (86.3%) and NATO (74.2%) membership, a seemingly contradictory 53% say they are against joining any political or military international organisation. This inconsistency points to the growing influence of anti-Western narratives in the media, which appear to be leaving a tangible mark on public attitudes.

Conclusion

What we’re observing in the Georgian information landscape is a deepening polarisation, where competing narratives—both domestic and foreign—are battling for influence, shaping public opinion, and redefining Georgia’s geopolitical identity. While public support for Euro-Atlantic integration remains high on paper, anti-Western messaging has gained traction, reflected in the contradiction between aspirations and political scepticism.

The stakes go beyond media control. Georgia’s information disorder now directly impacts democratic resilience, foreign policy direction, and civic trust. The dominance of emotionally charged, politically aligned narratives—whether on TV or TikTok—erodes space for critical thinking and pluralism. Until media literacy becomes embedded in education and institutional responses become stronger, the country will remain vulnerable to manipulation, both from within and beyond its borders.

In the end, who controls the narrative in Georgia may not be one actor, but rather, whoever can most effectively exploit division, uncertainty, and distrust. And in an environment lacking transparency, that’s a dangerous advantage.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Vyacheslav Argenberg

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