Keir Starmer Couldn't Control His Backbenchers – Burnham Must Do Better

The event that best captures the folly of Keir Starmer was the sacking of three trade envoys and the suspension of “four persistent rebels” in July 2025, after he faced the most serious rebellion to his government yet. He and his Chancellor, Rachel Reeves, were attempting to push through a welfare reform bill which, according to its detractors, would have cut vulnerable people off of PIP. They failed, with backbench Labour MPs forcing them to reverse the welfare cuts. Instead of trying to build bridges with backbenchers, Starmer had punished his MPs for being right. He didn’t fall because his MPs were disloyal, he fell because he mistook a large majority for an obsequent one and answered dissent with an authoritarian discipline instead of open dialogue and compromise. Burnham must not fall for the same mistake, lest he inherit the same problem that felled Starmer.

Throughout the whole of the New Labour government, in which the party enjoyed the biggest majority in its history, Jeremy Corbyn was a constant thorn in the side of Blair and Brown; he rebelled 428 times across the 13 years. If someone had suggested he be suspended, it would have been thought to be preposterous. Instead, both Blair and Brown projected strength through managing dissent within a broad church, not removing MPs vindictively. The price of a big majority is that there will always be dissenting voices. Managing that is the job. The early suspension of the 7 MPs over the two-child benefit cap poisoned relations between the leadership and MPs before Starmer had even been tested, and backbenchers, who have learnt ever since Brexit that assertiveness works, were never going to be cowed by the threat of suspension. Starmer had the parliamentary arithmetic to survive and deliver, he simply lacked the temperament to use it. He was a politician fundamentally disinterested in politics. Instead of engaging with ideological debates which would offer a “big picture” vision, he dismisses it all as pointless, opting instead for technocratic processes and quiet governance. This meant he appeared detached from the day to day experiences of his MPs, expecting them to merely turn up and vote for whatever his government proposed, with all criticism dismissed as frivolous or navel-gazing instead of a core part of the job.

In marching his MPs up and down the hill when it came to winter fuel payments, the damage was not simply confined to Westminster gossip, but it told centre-left voters that Starmer simply was not serious about being the anti-Farage option, further compounded by the “island of strangers” speech where by his own admission he had not read it prior. It told everyone that he was simply more interested in masquerading as “Reform-lite” than shoring up an electoral base which stood a chance at beating Farage. Whilst it is true that Starmer did effectively everything wrong when it came to building up a relationship between Downing St and backbenchers, it is true to state that Labour MPs were never especially loyal to begin with. It was not a betrayal of trust so much as a trust that was never built.

As demonstrated, control of MPs is necessary, but Burnham would be remiss to think that it is sufficient for a successful premiership. He will inherit a coalition already split by Starmer’s rightward lurch, with Labour’s left flank ceded to Polanski and the Greens, as harbingered by the internecine debate and speculation over Burnham’s potential chancellor. He will need to govern in a way which clamps down on Labour’s tendency to resort to factionalism as soon as difficulties arise. Better whipping and a more cooperative approach from Burnham will fix a symptom, more work will need to be done to win back voters who have already left.

To do this, he needs to have the political courage to actually tell the truth as to the damage that Brexit has caused, call out both the Tories and Reform for espousing far-right immigration policies, reminding voters that Labour is and always will be an anti-racist party, whilst maintaining a strict but fair approach to immigration, which has been falling. Labour under Burnham should not try to, as Ben Ansell put it, “target all its strategic energy on socially conservative voters who are not interested in voting for the party”.

Starmer’s fall was not about disloyal MPs, it was about mistaking a big majority for an obedient one, and opting for punishment rather than persuasion is the opposite of what such a big majority requires. Early, vindictive discipline poisoned relations between himself and the rest of his MPs before any major difficulties had arisen, against backbenchers who knew that assertiveness won results. Fixing this should be Burnham’s immediate priority, however, alone it will not save him. He inherits a coalition Starmer’s rightward lurch has fractured. To win the next election, he needs to address this and build a coalition which can beat Reform. This will require political courage, such as by telling the truth about the damage of Brexit and in calling out the far-right policies of its opponents. Burnham can easily out-charm Starmer. Whether he can out-listen him and rebuild an electoral coalition, not just a whips office, is the only question which will decide his premiership.

Image: Flickr/UK Parliament

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