Iran Is Neither Iraq Nor Afghanistan

As this article goes to press, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has reportedly been killed in a joint U.S.–Israeli airstrike. His death marks the most dramatic escalation in U.S.–Iran tensions since the 1979 revolution and introduces a new variable: succession instability at the apex of the Islamic Republic. Yet even this unprecedented development does not make a war with Tehran comparable to Iraq in 2003 or Afghanistan in 2001, both of which share borders with Iran. 

Geography and Scale: A Harder Target Than Either War

2003 Iraq possessed a population of about 25 million people. Iraqi borders encompass approximately 169,000 square miles and its climate is characterised primarily by desert. Water flows in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have decreased by 30 to 40% and now half of Iraqi farmland is at risk of desertification. Nearly 40% of Iraq has been overtaken by blowing desert sands that claim tens of thousands of acres of arable land each year.

Today, 93 million people call Iran home, a country that is nearly four times as large as Iraq. About 55% of Iranian terrain is mountains with the main chain being the Zagros where many peaks exceed 3,000 meters above sea level. 

This mountainous geography, like Afghanistan, favours defence. Unlike Afghanistan, Iran possesses a centralised command, air defences, missile forces, and naval capabilities. Thus, a “shock and awe” collapse scenario is highly improbable.  

Iranian Military Doctrine

According to the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Iran has enhanced the lethality and precision of its domestically produced missile and UAV systems, creating one of the largest such stockpiles in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Iranians have demonstrated both growing expertise and an increasing willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations against the United States and its allies.

Iran’s military doctrine does not necessarily descend from Islamic teachings or Iranian revolutionary ideology. Much of Tehran’s strategy is instead focused on past lessons learned and finding effective and pragmatic solutions to Iranian security issues. 

After the 2025 war with Israel, numerous political, intelligence, and military weaknesses were exposed, to which Tehran had to respond:

1. The structure of the Supreme National Security Council was reformed, with the addition of a defence council and the appointment of Ali Larijani as Secretary-General of the SNSC.

2. The most significant vulnerability was the extensive network of Israeli agents who, under Tel Aviv’s direction, conducted military operations. Before the war’s end, Iran arrested more than 700 alleged spies across five provinces. State television broadcast images of some of the accused individuals, many of whom were Afghan nationals. Iran has since revised its policies toward Afghan migrants, initiating the deportation of those who had entered the country illegally.

3. Two new laws were passed to prevent disclosure of the extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear program and to hinder sabotage activities allegedly orchestrated by Israeli spies. One strictly regulates the production, importation, and operation of civilian drones. The other mandates that the government suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

4. Air-raid warning devices have been installed in Tehran’s public squares, apparently in preparation for future attacks. There are also plans to use underground subway stations as civilian shelters in the event of air raids.

Interestingly, the Iranian military does also incorporate foreign thinking although it requires ideological and moral justification from the Supreme Leader. 

Leadership Decapitation is Not Regime Collapse 

The reported death of Ali Khamenei marks a profound shock to Tehran, but simply assassinating a leader does not necessarily equate to regime collapse. Unlike Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which was highly personalised and disintegrated once central authority was removed, the Iranian political system is institutionalised. Authority flows through clerical bodies, the Supreme National Security Council, and, arguably most importantly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These structures are designed to ensure continuity beyond any one individual.

Nor is Iran comparable to Afghanistan in 2001, where a weak central state and decentralised insurgent networks allowed the Taliban to retreat, regroup, and wage a prolonged war. As aforementioned, Iran is a consolidated state with centralised command, missile forces, intelligence services, and a layered security apparatus.

Regionalisation: The War Would Not Stay in Iran

Conflict with Iran is almost certain to spill over into the rest of the region. Rather than end the conflict, the removal of the Supreme Leader may incentivise competing power centres within Iran to demonstrate resolve through external escalation. 

As part of their “Axis of Resistance”, Iran funds and supports Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and other Palestinian groups, the Houthis in Yemen, pro-Assad Alawite insurgents in Syria, and various Iraqi Shi’ite militias. In fact, Houthi leaders have already threatened to renew attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea in efforts to show support for the Islamic Republic. 

Economic Considerations

Everyday, about 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products pass through the Strait of Hormuz from the Persian Gulf. This represents nearly 20% of global consumption and a war in the region would undoubtedly disrupt the global economy.

Asia would be impacted the most since most oil traffic from the Gulf is destined for Asian markets. For example, nearly 90% of Iran’s oil exports go to China. China has relatively diversified oil import sources and large reserves but markets such as India and Indonesia, who rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil, will become more vulnerable. European demand for liquefied natural gas has increased since Russia’s war in Ukraine, although reliance on the Middle East has fallen as Europe has begun to import more from the United States. Moreover, they too remain highly sensitive to energy prices.

On the other hand, the United States could be less impacted compared to previous oil crises when it relied more on oil imports. However, the U.S. is entering this period from a vulnerable state of increasing risks of inflation and an economic slowdown. It is estimated that a ten dollar increase in oil prices could add 0.3-0.4% to inflation. Thus, stagflationary risks could be exacerbated given the surge in tariffs. 

The Global Context: No Longer a Unipolar Moment

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began at the height of American unipolar dominance. Today, by contrast, Russia has grown increasingly assertive, and Chinese foreign policy now competes for influence across virtually every region of the world. 

Additionally, the United States would have to manage not only escalation in the Middle East, but also the war in Ukraine, commitments in the Indo-Pacific, and a renewed emphasis on spheres of influence regarding policy toward Latin America. Therefore, the risk of American overextension is far greater today than it was in 2001 or 2003. 

President Trump’s Ambiguous and Flawed Rationale

Operation Epic Fury appears to lack a coherent strategic rationale. If the objective concerns Iran’s nuclear program, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action proved effective in constraining Tehran’s activities before Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018. President Trump has also claimed that Iran will soon possess missiles capable of striking the United States; however, U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that there are no indications of dramatic new progress in the Iranian ICBM program. Increasingly, it appears that the Trump administration is pursuing regime change, an objective that should proceed, if at all, with extreme caution and with due regard for the historical failures of prior American regime-change efforts.

Although President Trump has at times been ambiguous in his public messaging, he has consistently aligned with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has espoused alarmist rhetoric on Iran for thirty years.

Whatever the reason for war with Iran, I am of utmost confidence that President Trump and his family will find a way to profit financially from it.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/khameini.ir (http://farsi.khamenei.ir/photo-album?id=33268)

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