A Federal Turn in Northern Cyprus? The Implications of Tufan Erhurman’s Election

The presidential election in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on October 19th, 2025, has introduced a potentially transformative figure into the island’s long-stalled peace process. Tufan Erhurman, the centre-left lawyer and leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), defeated incumbent president Ersin Tatar with 62.76% of the vote, signalling a decisive shift in the Turkish Cypriot political landscape. For the first time in five years, the Turkish Cypriot electorate has endorsed a candidate explicitly committed to the UN-endorsed model of a bizonal, bicommunal federation (BBF) with the Republic of Cyprus.

A BBF envisions a single sovereign Cypriot State composed of two politically equal constituent communities — a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot — each with a high degree of self-government. Yet, each community would be united under a federal structure retaining key competencies in foreign policy, defence, and macroeconomic regulation. By contrast, the two-state model advocated by Tatar seeks international recognition of the TRNC. Hence, Erhurman’s election is not merely electoral but deeply symbolic for the future of the Cyprus Question. This is the case as Erhurman’s conception of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem starkly contrasts with that of Tatar. Erhurman favours the establishment of a BBF, whereas Tatar advocated for a two-state solution without stepping back from the concept of two separate states (a Turkish Cypriot one in the north and a Greek Cypriot one in the south) , which is fully supported by Turkey.

Erhurman’s campaign stressed pragmatism. It promised economic renewal and re-engagement with the EU. Political isolation, he argued, has left Turkish Cypriots increasingly dependent on the Republic of Turkey and, by extension, President Erdoğan. Erhürman’s conciliatory tone starkly contrasts with Tatar’s Denktaş-influenced nationalism: Turkish Cypriots as an extension of the Turkish nation; the Turkish military. “There are no losers in this election […] we, the Turkish Cypriot people, have won together,” Erhürman proclaimed after his victory, signalling a deliberate effort to transcend factional divides and project a moderate, bridge-building image to Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, and the wider international community.

Appealing to the international community is therefore essential since the settlement framework remains anchored in international law. Since 1974, successive UN Security Council resolutions — most notably in UNSC Resolutions 649 (1990) and 1251 (1999) — have reaffirmed that a comprehensive settlement must be based on a BBF that guarantees political equality between the two communities. This is not merely an abstract principle: it preserves the island’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, recognising its demographic and political realities. Erhürman’s commitment to this formula therefore repositions the TRNC within the legal consensus upheld by supranational bodies.

Equally important for any practical settlement is the human rights aspect. Significant jurisprudence has developed on the Cyprus Problem, with the European Court of Human Rights (ECt.HR) playing a pivotal role at the junction between law and politics. In Loizidou v Türkiye, the ECt.HR held that Türkiye bore responsibility under the Convention ECHR for the continuing deprivations of property and related rights. Crucially, the Court characterised denial of access to property as a continuing violation rather than a one-off historical act; that framing makes restitution, compensation, and effective domestic remedies central to any credible settlement.

In summary, the logic from Loizidou establishes that property and human rights are central to settlement negotiations. Legal responsibility and political negotiation must run in parallel for any viable settlement. This is the core relevance of the case and key to the central question of this article. 

Another important pillar in determining whether Erhurman’s election will give a federal steer to the settlement talks is the concept of reconciliation. Cyprus’s frozen conflict has long reflected wider regional tensions. Turkey maintains more than 35,000 troops in the north and exerts substantial financial influence over the TRNC’s budget. Any renewed push toward federation will depend on Ankara’s willingness to tolerate a softer diplomatic stance from its Cypriot allies.

President Erdoğan congratulated Erhürman, whilst urging the continued defence of Turkish Cypriot rights and interests. This signals cautious pragmatism from Ankara hindering Erhurman’s reconciliatory tone. A more conciliatory TRNC leader could help Türkiye reduce frictions with the EU and Greece—especially as current Eastern Mediterranean diplomacy requires cooperation, not confrontation.

The EU, for its part, has welcomed the election as an opportunity to reassert its relevance in Cypriot policy and peace-making after years of drift. The island’s EU accession in 2004 — with membership benefits suspended in the north — remains an anomaly that undermines the bloc’s credibility as peace guarantor. A renewed negotiation process could perhaps allow Brussels to demonstrate that European integration can still reconcile divided societies.

The United Kingdom also retains a role. As a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and home to two sovereign base areas on the island, London has maintained quiet diplomatic channels with both communities. Post-Brexit, the UK has an incentive to demonstrate its continued influence in the eastern Mediterranean through conflict resolution and trade facilitation. 

As far as the Greek Cypriot front is concerned, the question of reconciliation is inseparable from justice. The 1974 intervention displaced around 165,000 people from their homes in the north, many of whom still hold title deeds recognized under the Republic of Cyprus’s land registry. Thousands of families remain divided, and many cases of missing persons remain unresolved. A political solution that fails to acknowledge these realities would not therefore be sustainable.

The ECtHR jurisprudence reinforces this moral imperative. By treating property denial and other deprivations as legally continuing wrongs, the Court has made clear that remedies are not merely symbolic: they are legal obligations that must be woven into any settlement. At the same time, many Turkish Cypriots have endured decades of isolation, economic hardship, and restricted recognition. A federal solution that guarantees political equality, economic integration, and the lifting of embargoes would represent tangible benefits to both sides. Erhürman’s language of partnership — avoiding triumphalism while acknowledging pain — offers a rare chance to rebuild empathy, restoring the performance of these legal obligations across the island. In this, his approach recalls earlier, more hopeful moments in Cypriot diplomacy, when mutual recognition seemed within reach.

One may therefore assert that the road ahead remains fraught. Turkey’s leverage over the TRNC, entrenched mistrust between the communities, and scepticism among international actors all threaten to erode momentum. The UN process itself is fatigued, with successive special envoys cycling through the same formulas. Yet history suggests that progress in Cyprus often emerges at moments of exhaustion — when both sides quietly recognize that stalemate serves no one’s long-term interests. Erhürman’s early gestures — reopening channels of dialogue, proposing bi-communal working groups on property and climate, and reasserting support for the UN framework — may seem incremental.

Nevertheless, incrementalism has always been the engine of Cypriot diplomacy. Where legal duties are established, domestic institutions have begun to operate, and diplomatic patience can be married to judicial remedies and may produce durable outcomes. Pragmatically, the election of Tufan Erhürman does not resolve the Cyprus problem. Yet it represents a rare convergence between legality, legitimacy, and leadership. For the first time in years, a Turkish Cypriot administration appears willing to align itself with the internationally accepted parameters of a settlement — and to speak the language of federation rather than division.

For those who grew up in the shadow of barbed wire and UN watchtowers, this matters a great deal. It reaffirms that a just, federal Cyprus — one that honours the rights, security, and dignity of both its peoples — remains conceivable. Whether this moment becomes a turning point or another lost opportunity will depend on the courage of leaders in both communities, and the willingness of the international community to match rhetoric with sustained engagement that combines diplomacy with enforceable legal remedies.

Image: Flickr/Jon Culver

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