Tarique Rahman's India Standoff: Why Bangladesh's New PM Won't Visit Delhi

When Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman visited Malaysia and China in June, more than 100 days after being sworn in, watchers of South Asian diplomacy saw what was emerging; Dhaka was clearly looking to break the shackles imposed by India’s regional hegemony. This turn of events was not incongruous with how ties between the two neighbouring countries have shifted in recent years, particularly after August 5, 2024, when New Delhi’s longtime ally Sheikh Hasina was ousted as Bangladesh's prime minister amid a student-led upheaval. But the uncertainty over Rahman’s visit to India in August, despite Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s repeated invitations, has laid bare the deeper evils that have troubled relations between two of South Asia’s most consistent allies. 

Dramatic situations have prevailed in both countries over Rahman’s stalled visit, as Dhaka seeks a ‘propitious environment’ for its PM to set foot in India, linking such considerations with its demand for Hasina’s extradition. Such chaos and confusion over a Bangladeshi head of government's visit to India is unprecedented. Historically, leaders of Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) visited India multiple times, despite the presence of both political tensions with New Delhi and various domestic challenges. Those visits went ahead, and leaders such as Ziaur Rahman, the former Bangladesh president and founder of the BNP, and Khaleda Zia, former Bangladesh prime minister and his wife, prioritised Dhaka’s national interests more than anti-Indianism. The current prime minister, Tarique Rahman, the former’s child, has not been able to do the same so far.

Bangladesh’s Changing Realities

The reason lies in Bangladesh’s fast-changing realities. After Hasina fell and took shelter in India, Dhaka’s policy orientation adopted a radical opposition to New Delhi. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus fuelled resentment against India between August 2024 and February 2026, when Bangladesh held fresh elections. Although the country’s radical forces could not grab power, they formed a strong opposition alliance even as the BNP swept the polls. The 11-party bloc is led by a resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s biggest Islamist party, known for its anti-Indian stance.

Bangladesh's conservative opposition has piled pressure on the BNP, which had tried to fill the space left by Hasina's sidelined Awami League while projecting a liberal face. Rahman, unlike his late parents, is struggling to overcome the radicals’ resistance, and his ‘Bangladesh First’ foreign policy risks being derailed by a myopic anti-India stance. At 55, it is not unusual for a country to become ambitious; of course, India and Pakistan both went nuclear at 51 to assert themselves globally. Dhaka has reasons to feel upset with New Delhi, its longtime friend, for sheltering Hasina, who a Bangladeshi tribunal sentenced to death for crimes against humanity. Her remarks on August 5, 2026, only deepened tensions. Still, by tying the Bangladeshi PM's potential India visit to Hasina's extradition, Dhaka may be undermining its own interests.

Hasina’s Importance For India

For New Delhi, backing Hasina is about strategy and credibility. Besides her family’s old ties with India, Hasina has, over the years, safeguarded the bigger neighbour’s interests in the South Asian neighbourhood against threats such as counter-insurgency, alongside Pakistani and Chinese designs. It cannot meet Dhaka’s demand to return Hasina and expose her to risks, for that would lead to a loss of face for India, while further emboldening anti-India radicals in Bangladesh. Sending her to a third country could signal a loss of India’s regional influence and give opportunity to elements to target New Delhi’s security interests, thereby complicating the matter further.

India backs Hasina, still a symbol of secularism despite claims she let fundamentalism grow in Bangladesh, hoping to safeguard its strategic security in a sensitive region. Her US-based businessman/politician son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, lacks grassroots influence in Bangladesh, leaving the Awami League's future tied to 78-year-old Hasina herself. While India treats this as a strategic calculation, Bangladesh has mixed things up.

One might recall the issue with the Dalai Lama. Despite India hosting him over several decades and drawing China’s ire, New Delhi-Beijing ties have not been derailed, as both nations maturely compartmentalise different dimensions of their bilateral relationship.

Bangladesh must understand that, irrespective of sentiment, it remains dependent on India. Dhaka’s reliance on New Delhi for all sorts of assistance cannot be wished away overnight. No matter how much Dhaka tries to diversify its foreign policy by inching closer to Pakistan, China and other countries, its geographic and economic compulsions demand a steady relationship with India, much akin to Nepal and Bhutan. The Islamist opposition is putting pressure on Prime Minister Rahman, whose government is facing myriad challenges in running the country, be it because of power and electricity shortages or internal political tensions, to oppose India.

This is not a pragmatic choice for the country. Bangladesh depends on India for essentials, including food, locomotives, energy, textiles, and raw materials. The more urgent matters demand joint attention, particularly river water-sharing. Renewing the Ganga Water Treaty, which is set to expire in December 2026, represents a major bilateral task that the two countries must accomplish soon, while the similarly important Teesta treaty also remains stalled.

People-to-people ties, meanwhile, run deep. Tourists cross both ways, reflecting a shared history. Many Indians visit Bangladesh to trace ancestral roots lost during 1947's Partition, while Bangladeshis frequently travel to India for medical treatment. Cultural exchange with India’s West Bengal state remains vibrant, with artists from both countries regularly performing across the border. Even in cricket, India-Bangladesh relations were once warm—until politics eroded such affability.

Dhaka is perhaps pursuing a foreign policy in haste. Its expression of openness to joining the Mecca defence pact, which includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, will not take it anywhere. It doesn’t have the political, economic or military clout to join such platforms, even if it tries to please the domestic anti-India sentiments.

At the end of the day, neither Bangladesh nor India can ignore each other. While some voices in Bangladesh continue to back favourable ties with India, the 57-year-old PM Rahman’s lack of experience in governance has perhaps undermined him. The election of Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, a BNP stalwart who has steered the party in challenging times, as the president of Bangladesh, might provide Rahman with a guidebook on pragmatism.

Dhaka Needs to Diversify its India Policy

Diversifying foreign policy is welcome, but Bangladesh must diversify its India policy for its own sake. While pursuing the Hasina case on suitable political and legal platforms, Dhaka must ensure that it does not lose sight of its diplomatic interests vis-à-vis New Delhi. Despite Hasina, India has reached out to the Rahman government in different ways. It is up to Dhaka to capitalise on that for its own benefit. If it allows its soil to become a shadow war between India and Pakistan, or a geostrategic tussle between India and China, Bangladesh could end up losing all that it has achieved since its independence by becoming unstable. The ongoing energy and gas crises are already hinting at serious internal consequences for the developing nation. For example, Bangladesh would lose a major opportunity to engage with the international and regional communities if Rahman doesn’t respond to India’s invitation to attend September’s BRICS summit in New Delhi, as the current chair of the BIMSTEC bloc. 

For India, too, prioritising pragmatism is key. New Delhi must accept Bangladesh’s changed realities. The Hasina era is over. As it made adjustments to its Afghanistan policy after the Taliban’s return, New Delhi has to cautiously address the anti-Indian sentiments prevalent in Bangladesh at the moment. Backing Rahman is one option, but as the situation now stands, it might not be sufficient. The media on both sides of the border need to play a constructive role. Vocabulary such as ‘India surrounds Bangladesh on three sides’ can be replaced by ‘India embraces Bangladesh on three sides’ to facilitate confidence-building measures. New Delhi's 'Act East Policy' can place a special focus on Bangladesh to bracket its growth with that of the northeast.

India-Bangladesh ties are too robust to collapse in a day. But the two countries must ensure that the panacea for the evils is found quickly.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Mark Jones

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