Populist Nationalism, France and the Fraying of the Union

Populist nationalism, a creed which has infiltrated political systems across the EU, is here to stay. Recent evidence suggests member states would rather remain in the EU and not comply than take the leap of faith the UK did by initiating Article 50.

This could affect how the EU operates in the future, particularly if entities such as Le Pen’s Rassemblement National and the AfD in Germany, which represent two of the EU’s founding countries, gain influence over issues that define the EU, such as the extent to which borders remain porous, the promotion of EU identity, and the idea that individual states must share power with the EU Commission.

The EU's idea and the political constraints it imposes on nations' sovereignty failed to convince Icelanders that joining the union would serve their national interests. On 29th August 2026, a referendum asked whether to resume talks suspended in 2013 on joining the EU. The result was that 52.8% said no, with 47.2% in favour. This was a legally decisive rejection, with a record turnout of 82.5%. 

Iceland’s rejection is even more significant given recent threats from the Trump administration to annex Greenland, which is why the vote was brought forward from 2027. It was thought that the EU support Iceland could receive for their defence and protection in the backdrop of Trump’s threats would incentivise people to vote to join the bloc. 

We have witnessed Icelandic patriots reassert their resolve to retain sovereignty, particularly over fisheries, which they hold dear. They recognise that joining the EU would mean losing their right of access to their own waters under the EU’s collectivist Common Fisheries Policy. Around 40% of Iceland’s export earnings stem from fishing. Kristrún Frostadóttir, the PM who led the Yes campaign, interestingly claimed the referendum result was a victory for democracy.

The question on many readers' minds is whether nationalist-populist forces across the EU will combine to dismantle an increasingly fragile EU. It is more likely that the bloc's direction will shift rather than fragment. The Rassemblement National (RN) no longer wants to leave the European Union or the Euro after 2017, partly because it is thought that proposing ‘Frexit’ contributed to its historic unpopularity. Instead, RN plans to hold a referendum on the primacy of French law over European law, implement a £2 billion- budget rebate, restrict the Schengen migration zone to EU nationals, and cancel programmes for Franco-German fighter jets and tanks. 

The German populist right-wing AfD on the other hand, has said in 2024 it intends to hold a Dexit referendum. However, the practical likelihood of a Dexit referendum happening is slim, given that every other bloc in the Bundestag has ruled it out of a future coalition. 

The EU’s future is likely to see greater non-compliance as nationalist governments reassert their sovereignty despite legal ramifications. If a supranational bloc that seeks to impose its will on member states is run by member states that want to assert their own national will over the EU, the authority of the EU’s architecture is undermined. 

Many will remember how Hungary and Poland – both states that sought to prioritise their national sovereignty over EU jurisdiction and could therefore have had their voting rights suspended – protected each other through the unanimous vote required by Article 7. If the EU can’t address non-compliance among its smaller member states, it is unlikely to stop France or Germany.

However, despite growing nationalist sentiment across Europe, the current establishment, which continues to push for free movement and funding for Ukraine, is likely to pull out all the stops to prevent populist nationalism, which supports tighter border controls and de-escalation of tensions with Russia, from gaining electoral representation.

This was evident in June 2024, when a Front Républicain sought to curate a Parliament in France that did not reflect the popular vote. On 9 June 2024, the Rassemblement National won the European elections in France with 31.4%, compared with Macron’s 15.2%. Receiving less than half the support, Macron dissolved the National Assembly three years earlier than planned to seek a clearer mandate. 

Le Pen’s party won 33.2% of the vote in the first round and 32.1% in the second, with the Rassemblement National winning more seats than any other party in the first round. The Rassemblement National ended up with 125 seats, or 143 with Éric Ciotti's Republican defectors, while the New Popular Front acquired 180 and Ensemble had 150. 

Given the high turnout, many third-placed candidates cleared the 12.5% threshold, triggering three-way run-offs. Nearly 220 third-placed candidates from the left and centre withdrew between the two rounds. An operation, orchestrated in under 48 hours, saw candidates stand down to allow one anti-Rassemblement National candidate to contest the Rassemblement National in the seat, concentrating the left and centrist vote. Ultimately, mainstream parties will work together to stop nationalist parties from prevailing.

Since then, chaos has descended on the French political system. Barnier, appointed in September 2024, lasted only three months before being brought down by the combined efforts of the left and the Rassemblement National over budget disagreements, becoming the first French PM ousted by a no-confidence vote since 1962. His replacement, Bayrou, lasted only nine months before losing a confidence vote. Lecornu, Bayrou’s replacement, similarly resigned 27 days after his appointment, the morning after announcing the cabinet, but Macron reinstated him four days later. This shows the extent to which the establishment can rearrange the deckchairs on the sinking Titanic to prevent populist forces, such as the Rassemblement National, from coming to power. 

Notably, on 31st March 2025, the Paris Criminal Court convicted Le Pen and two dozen party figures of operating a system that misused European Parliament funds to pay Rassemblement National staff in France between 2004 and 2016, costing nearly €2.9 million. Le Pen described her immediate ban from politics as a denial of democracy and as a political decision by the establishment to quash her efforts to form a government that was becoming increasingly likely.

The appeals court upheld the conviction on 7 July 2026 but reduced the ineligibility to 45 months, with 30 suspended. The case removed the leading candidate from the political arena for fifteen months, only for her to return stronger in time for her election campaign. Le Pen, for instance, scored between 35% and 38% comfortably in a Toluna Harris Interactive Poll for M6 and RTL on 18 and 19 August.

The establishment is unlikely to prevent a Rassemblement National victory in the next election. They were arguably only able to prevent Le Pen from taking office by presenting Macron as an outsider in 2017. However, given that likely successors, such as Philippe and Attal, both served as Macron’s PM, the prospect of repeating this feat is slim. Especially given the current government's unpopularity. Mélenchon took 16% to 17%, while Philippe took 17% and Attal took 8%. Interestingly, 27% of Macron’s voters are tempted to swing to Les Républicains or the Rassemblement National, supporting the broader argument that a government under the Rassemblement National’s name is a conceivable prospect.

On the left, Mélenchon appears to be on the rise, having polled 12% with Harris in April 2026 and over 16% in August. Interestingly, an Ipsos Fractures Françaises survey in 2025 found that French voters considered La France Insoumise more dangerous to democracy than the Rassemblement National. Given the view that Mélenchon faces greater demonisation in the media and by the political class than the Rassemblement National, the persistence of support for Mélenchon, who remains the left’s strongest candidate, gives centrists, who seek a centrist continuity candidate, a headache. A run-off between Le Pen and Mélenchon would mean the Front Républicain would be unable to assemble and concentrate all forces against the Rassemblement National as they did at the last election if half the assembly perceives the opponent as a greater threat.

If Le Pen claims office, the European political class will hope she will follow Meloni's path. While Meloni has masqueraded as a nationalist in rhetoric, her policies have not deviated from the status quo, as she has supported Project Ukraine and worked within the EU structure. However, this may be less likely in practice, given that Le Pen has a strong base of supporters who would soon exert immense pressure on her to stick to her principles. This is because Meloni founded her party, whereas Le Pen inherited it from her father and shares leadership with Jordan Bardella. She has close ties with Orban, having joined Orban’s Patriots for Europe, a Parliamentary group founded on 30th June 2024 by Herbert Kickl and Andrej Babiš, which Bardella chairs. 

This move from the Rassemblement National indicates that it has no intention of moderating its policies, despite being blocked from government after an alleged cross-party, establishment-sponsored operation. It chose not to join Meloni’s ECR group, which supports Ukraine and is considered part of the establishment right. 

Le Pen and Bardella are already amassing support from roughly a third of pensioners, which is significant given the high turnout of those over 65. She is committed to restoring the retirement age to 62 in defiance of Bardella’s wishes. 

Meanwhile, there are lots of similarities between Le Pen and Charles de Gaulle, even if the latter had a stronger personality. Like Charles de Gaulle, who withdrew from NATO's integrated military command in 1966 (though France rejoined in 2009), Le Pen intends to leave again. De Gaulle also removed France’s representatives from the Council of Ministers in 1965, paralysing the EEC for six months. This led to the Luxembourg Compromise, under which a member state could block decisions that affected its national interests. The Rassemblement National will similarly seek to establish the primacy of French law over European law through a referendum, with the result written into the constitution. This would place further strain on the integrity of the EU. 

The irony is that the EU has already circumvented its own rules, making it difficult to object to any attempts at constitutional manoeuvres. For example, the freeze on Russian central bank assets required unanimous renewal every six months. Hungary and Slovakia's vetoes in December 2025 prompted EU ambassadors to invoke Article 122, an emergency economic provision that requires only a qualified majority and bypasses the European Parliament. As explained in my previous article, this rule change allowed the indefinite immobilisation of approximately €210 billion, including €193 billion in Euroclear in Belgium, which would not have happened if the EU had stuck to its unanimous renewal requirement. Orbán said Brussels had crossed the Rubicon and that this would lead to the de facto abolition of the unanimous vote. Ultimately, the Union is willing to circumvent its rules when its interests are at stake. Any argument that Le Pen’s actions would violate EU rules could be countered by the fact that the EU is already doing so.

Lastly, it may be argued that populist nationalism is not necessarily here to stay in light of Orban's defeat in April 2026. Yet despite his removal, four months later no accession chapter has been opened with Ukraine. Andrej Babiš governs Prague in coalition with the right-wing SPD, and Robert Fico remains in Bratislava. Despite Orban’s defeat populism remains alive and kicking.

To conclude, the centrist front kept the Rassemblement National out of office last time. However, France’s unstable and ineffective political situation has seen four prime ministers in fourteen months, three collapsed governments, the abandonment of the pension reform that was set to define the Macron legacy, and borrowing costs higher than Greece's. France will likely elect a President who will assert French primacy over European law, cut its budget contribution, restrict free movement, depart from NATO's integrated command, and end European defence integration efforts. Even during a security crisis in the Arctic, new members are not interested in joining the EU. It was not even able to secure the Western Balkans a future in the EU as it promised at Thessaloniki in 2003, with only Croatia having joined since (in 2013). Expect nationalism to triumph for years to come as the integrity of the EU’s political operations and jurisdiction is put to the test.

Image: Wikimedia Commons/Vox España

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