"New World, Old Games" - Rethinking Latin America's Dilemma Amid U.S.–China Rivalry

CELAC–China summit revealed both the potential and limitations of regional diplomacy in this new era. China is defending the order that America has created. It is a reminder that multipolarity does not guarantee autonomy—and that the region must avoid falling into old traps wearing new faces.

The very architecture of the post-war international order—the Bretton Woods system—was designed to insulate trade and economic cooperation from “high politics.” It allowed countries, particularly those in the Global South, to participate in global commerce without being forced into ideological camps. Yet that order is eroding. Ironically, it is the United States—its main architect—that is dismantling these principles through a foreign policy increasingly shaped by coercion, decertification, sanctions, and unilateralism. It is Washington—not Beijing—that is today exporting pressure and cohesion.

Historically, the U.S. has pursued a grand strategy of tactical denial—a logic rooted in preventing rival powers from gaining influence in Latin America, a region it has long sought to keep within its strategic orbit. But power vacuums don’t remain empty for long. Over the past two decades, China has stepped into that space—as a creditor, investor, and trading partner, significantly expanding its footprint across the region. 

But make no mistake—this is not a moment of liberation. It is a moment of reckoning. As China’s influence grows, Latin America risks falling into two seductive but dangerous traps:

Trap 1: False Binary Alignments

Latin America must resist the illusion that its only choice is between Washington and Beijing. Swapping one dependency for another—whether wrapped in stars and stripes or bearing a red flag—does not amount to sovereignty. The real question is not who to align with, but how to strategically leverage relationships to build structural autonomy.

Moving beyond dependency means more than balancing ties—it requires negotiating from a position of strength. Engaging pragmatically with both powers—say, commerce with the U.S., infrastructure with China—can only work if the region builds real collective bargaining power. Otherwise, it simply fragments itself along new lines of extractivism and competition.

Yes, the U.S. remains a key partner in terms of trade, migration ties, and cultural flows. Yes, China offers attractive loans and massive infrastructure investments. But without a shared agenda and coordinated regional strategy, these opportunities risk reinforcing the same asymmetries that have historically kept Latin America on the margins of global decision-making.

Trap 2: Putting the Cart Before the Horse

The fundamental question is not what Latin America can negotiate with the U.S. or China—but why. What is the region’s development model? What kind of societies do we want to build? That conversation must come first.  

Without that strategic vision, diplomacy becomes reactive—driven by short-term gains rather than long-term transformation. It’s not enough to celebrate lithium exports to China or expanded trade with the U.S. The real issue is whether those flows support innovation, industrial upgrading, and social justice at home.

Do we want to remain the world’s mine for lithium, copper, and soy? Or do we want to build technology, regional value chains, and green industries with local ownership, democratic accountability, and a low-carbon future at their core?

Latin America can only engage China or the U.S. strategically if it first answers a more fundamental question: what kind of development do we want? The model must come before the partnerships. Once that vision is clear, then we decide how to engage, with whom, and for what purpose—not the other way around. The agenda should not be shaped in Washington or Beijing, but from within the region itself.

CELAC’s Test: From Forum to Force

These are the questions CELAC—still more a forum than a force—must confront. What is our shared development model? How can we, together, negotiate better terms with China, the U.S., and Europe?

If CELAC continues to operate without coherence or strategy, Latin America will remain a passive stage for great-power competition. But if it finds common purpose and institutional strength, it has a real chance to shape the rules of a new international order.

This moment—defined by the energy transition, the reordering of global supply chains, and the rise of China—is not just a geopolitical shift. It’s a structural opportunity.

Yet even opportunities can entrench old patterns. The demand for critical minerals like lithium—concentrated in Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia—has soared. These are key inputs for solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. But while prices have increased, national strategies differ widely. Some countries seek public ownership, others welcome private investment, and many still lack a clear long-term plan.

The risk is clear: a new extractivism dressed in green. The challenge is to turn these resources into leverage—not just revenue.

Image: Flickr/Gobierno de Guatemala

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